Why Is NATO Expanding Its Nuclear Force?

There has long been suspicion in Europe that the US would not launch nuclear weapons to defend European territory because of the risk of a nuclear exchange between Russia and the United States. To an unknown extent, the presence of tactical nuclear weapons (under US control) is intended to enable the US to use the tactical part of its nuclear arsenal – reducing the risk of a strategic nuclear exchange with Russia.

Yet it is certainly the case that Stoltenberg's emphasis on NATO as a nuclear alliance was primarily intended to offset fears that Russia could turn to nuclear weapons to settle the Ukraine conflict. Compared with the US, Russia has a vast arsenal of tactical nuclear weapons. And many of its tactical missiles can be equipped with nuclear warheads. In fact, the Ukrainians have been warning Europe that this is exactly what Russia could do.

The Russians have been conducting nuclear exercises and claim to have put nuclear weapons in Belarus, although none have been spotted there as of now. Likewise the US has been flying its strategic bombers close to Russia's borders, as a US warning.

Ukraine has also attacked two sensitive radar sites that are important parts of Russia's early warning system. It is not clear why these targets were selected whether by Ukraine or by NATO, which supplies the weapons and intelligence for these attacks.

NATO relies on nuclear gravity bombs for deterrence.
These weapons would be delivered against Russian targets by NATO aircraft.
About 150 bombs are stored at six bases:
Kleine Brogel
in Belgium,
Büchel Air Base
in Germany,
Aviano
and
Ghedi Air Base
in Italy,
Volkel Air Base
in the Netherlands and
Incirlik
in Turkey.
These are part of NATO's nuclear sharing agreement.

In addition, the US announced in January that it was upgrading parts of the RAF Airbase at Lakenheat , Surrey, in the UK. There a special squadron, the 48th Security Force, of F-35s will be capable of carrying B-61 gravity bombs. The US is building special hydraulic loading ramps, upgrading storage facilities and installing a nuclear“shield” to protect personnel at the base.

These F-35s will be operated solely by US pilots and are outside of NATO's nuclear sharing arrangement – meaning that their mission could be linked to NATO's security and deterrence but could be used outside of any general NATO agreement.

US B-61 gravity bombs are close to completing a modernization program (Mod 12). The B-61 is a“dial-a-yield” weapon, meaning that the bomb yield can be adjusted to fit specific targets. The US also will retain some Mod 11 B-61 bombs.

The Mod 11 B-61 is regarded as a bunker buster bomb and is not“dial a yield.” It has a special 400 kiloton warhead. About 30 of these bombs were manufactured. It is not clear if they are deployed in Europe.

The Mod 12 B-61 can select yields (in kilotons) from .3, 1.5, 10 or 50 kt. For comparison purposes, the Hiroshima bomb was between 11 and 16 kt.

The modernization of the B-61 requires the modernization of the delivery systems, including changes in the aircraft's electronics. There is very little information on how quickly the upgrades and changes can be made. New F-35s can carry B-61 bombs if they are equipped to do so. It isn't known how many of the F-35's delivered to Europe are nuclear capable.

It is important to point out that neither the US nor NATO has any treaty obligation, or any other responsibility, to protect Ukraine from a nuclear attack. Thus NATO deterrence, at least insofar as it is understood, does not apply to Ukraine in any formal manner. But that does not mean that Stoltenberg, and by proxy the United States, is not shifting the alliance to extending a nuclear umbrella over Ukraine.

One reason to assess there may be a change in strategy underway is the NATO-US decision to unleash long-range weapons in Ukraine on Russian territory.

In the proxy wars prior to Ukraine, the US and Russia have been careful to avoid directly attacking each other. That is why Truman was against US forces crossing the Yalu River in Korea; why neither China nor Russia was attacked in the Vietnam war; why in the Cuban missile crisis President John F. Kennedy refused any nuclear attack on Cuba and the Soviet Union.

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But there were moments when tensions grew to approach the nuclear threshold. That was especially the case in 1973 when Russia began threatening intervention with nuclear weapons in the Yom Kippur war, and when the US declared a DEFCON-3 alert.

In the context of superpower rivalries, and proxy and other conflicts (the Cuban Missile Crisis was not a proxy conflict but a direct confrontation between the US and USSR), NATO-approved attacks on Russian territory appear to cross a dangerous red line.

When combined with the no-negotiations, no-talks, no-peace posture of the US and most of Europe regarding Ukraine, the danger of an expanding conflict – even one involving nuclear weapons – is increasing. Upgrading nuclear arsenals in that context adds fuel to the fire.

Stephen Bryen served as staff director of the Near East Subcommittee of the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee
and as a deputy undersecretary of defense for policy.

This
article was first published on his
Weapons and Strategy
Substack and is republished with permission.

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