Japan's New Island-Defense Missile Pointed Sharply At China

The islands are pivotal for China to break through the First Island Chain, which is essential for its naval operations and a potential Taiwan blockade. Conversely, Japan views these islands as a defensive barrier against Chinese expansion as it seeks to establish an“island wall” of advanced missile systems.

China has conducted periodic naval and air drills around these islands, with its carrier battlegroups conducting exercises simulating attacks. In response, Japan's 2022 National Security Strategy includes deploying long-range missiles and enhancing counterstrike capabilities against China and North Korea.

However, Japan's pursuit of long-range counterstrike capabilities faces significant tactical, operational and strategic-level challenges.

At the tactical level, Zuzanna Gwadera mentions in a July 2023 International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) article that Japan's ambitious missile development program requires significant investments in intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities and missile penetration countermeasures.

Similarly, Masashi Murano mentions in a March 2024 Hudson Institute article that Japan's pursuit of long-range strike capabilities faces significant technical challenges, noting that extending its missiles' range necessitates a data link for real-time target updates, which is crucial for engaging moving targets.

Murano says current warheads are inadequate for damaging hardened targets, requiring the development of new ordnance types. He states that targeting dynamic threats like mobile missile launchers demands advanced targeting systems and two-way data links.

He adds that developing electronic warfare capabilities, such as stand-in jammers, is also essential but will take considerable time.

At the operational level, Will Kielm mentions in an article for the Center for Maritime Strategy this month that Japan's recent shift in military strategy, as outlined in its 2022 National Security Strategy, highlights the challenge of distinguishing between offensive and defensive capabilities.

Kielm points out that Japan's acquisition of long-range counterstrike capabilities raises fundamental questions in international relations about whether a state can enhance its military capabilities for defensive purposes without being perceived as aggressive. He says the“security dilemma” concept suggests that even defensive military buildups can trigger insecurity in other states, leading to an arms race.

He asks whether defensive and offensive capabilities can be reliably distinguished. He says focusing on defensive technologies can signal non-aggressive intentions, adding that the indistinguishability of these capabilities nullifies the security dilemma, necessitating a focus on deterrence and escalation dominance.

In addition, Yohsuke Aoki mentions in a July 2023 Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) article that a large-scale system covering everything from target identification to post-attack evaluation is necessary when attacking a target from a distance. He added that Japan would seek US assistance in building this essential infrastructure.

However, Christopher Johnstone and Jim Schoff point out in a February 2024 CSIS article that the existing US Forces Japan (USFJ) structure, essentially unchanged since the 1960s, is insufficient for Japan's rapidly evolving counterstrike and response capabilities, with limited joint operational authorities and a fragmented command system.

To address those shortcomings, the US Department of Defense (DOD) announced in July 2024 plans to transform US Forces Japan (USFJ) into a joint force headquarters, reporting to America's Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM).

This historic shift aims to modernize command and control structures to address contemporary challenges. The new joint force headquarters, led by a three-star officer, will align with Japan's Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) Joint Operations Command, enhancing bilateral military cooperation.

Sign up for one of our free newsletters

• The Daily Report Start your day right with Asia Times' top stories
• AT Weekly Report A weekly roundup of Asia Times' most-read stories

At the strategic level, Japan faces significant challenges in maintaining deterrence with conventional forces, as it is up against nuclear-armed China and North Korea.

Japan's renunciation of nuclear weapons and offensive military capabilities makes it challenging for it to implement deterrence by punishment, necessitating a deterrence-by-denial approach.

Ken Jimbo notes in a February 2023 Stimson think tank articl that Japan's deterrence by denial strategy would focus on making an adversary realize that an invasion of Japan is not possible and that the damage an adversary would incur would make it not worth the cost.

Jimbo notes that Japan's deterrence by denial rests on three pillars: modernizing military equipment, strengthening the US-Japan alliance and strengthening partnerships with partner countries in the Indo-Pacific and Europe – a concept known as“integrated deterrence.”

The US 2022 National Defense Strategy mentions that integrated deterrence is enabled by US and allied combat-ready forces, backstopped by a nuclear deterrent.

US policy shifts may also be problematic for Japan's defense posture. In an August 2024 War on the Rocks article , Jeffrey Hornung and Zack Cooper mention that the most profound challenge in the US-Japan alliance is synchronizing long-term strategies, as US strategic documents change with each administration, causing potential misalignment.

Hornung and Cooper note that the situation requires the US to involve Japan early in strategy development, a fundamental shift from current practices.

Already have an account? Sign i Sign up here to comment on Asia Times stories OR

Thank you for registering!

An account was already registered with this email. Please check your inbox for an authentication link.