Fiji A Case Study Of How 'Not To Choose' US Or China

Attempts at senior-level meetings between Rabuka and Chinese officials haven't gone well. In April, Rabuka
skipped
a meeting with visiting Chinese Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Ma Zhaoxu. Further, the prime minister
called off
a trip to China when he sustained an injury after stumbling on some steps while looking at his mobile phone.

Perhaps picking up on the seesawing calibrations in Fjii's relations with China, the new Chinese ambassador, Zhou Jian,
commented
that his country would still be open to a security agreement with Fiji.

That didn't seem to do the trick as three months later Fiji
signed
a defense agreement to strengthen military training and maritime security with Aotearoa New Zealand.

Nevertheless, Rabuka's new course in foreign relations deserves more context. Commentaries that
assert
zero-sum outcomes in the geostrategic contest between China and the United States and allies overlook how the new prime minister has also used his platform to criticize so-called traditional partners.

Within a week of assuming office, Rabuka
told
the Australian Broadcasting Corporation that“Australia and New Zealand and the United Kingdom and America ... have not reorientated their thinking to the international landscape where we are all equal.”

In an echo of his predecessor's comments, Rabuka added,“China has come in with a blank sheet of paper. They have seen us as just development partners.”

What's apparent is, in Suva, China is seen more as a trade and investment partner, and to a lesser extent an aid partner, rather than as a security partner. Consistent with the emphasis on commercial relations, media in both
China
and
Fiji
have reported on the importance of trade to bilateral ties with
tourism
stressed as a critical industry in Fiji's post-Covid-19 economic recovery.

Rabuka has continued a pattern, established by his predecessor, of prime minister attendance at the annual Chinese New Year celebrations organized by the Fiji Chinese community.

At this year's festivities, he
acknowledged
the contributions of Fiji Chinese, stating,“The Chinese diaspora in Fiji may be small but they are influential and play an integral part of Fiji's development.”

In an interview with Voice of South Pacific, a Chinese language news app, Rabuka
discussed
his long association with Fiji Chinese when he was growing up in rural Fiji. The messaging was one of familiarity with Chinese communities rather than populist exclusion.

In conversations, my Fiji Chinese friends have expressed relief at the change of government. While many Fiji Chinese supported Bainimarama's call for inclusivity on who gets to identify as“Fijian” and/or were cautious about Rabuka's past of ethnonationalism, they felt fatigue with the former prime minister stemming from post-Covid economic stagnation and the widespread corruption that impacted private enterprise.

The stakes are becoming higher in Oceania. Regional leaders'
appeal
to keep power politics and militarization out of the region appear to have fallen on half deaf ears. Signs of a militarizing space include the security pact between Solomon Islands and China, the development of AUKUS and the
opening
of a new US base in Guam, the first in 70 years.

The United States has
set out
a vision for Pacific-led engagement through its September 2022 Pacific Partnership Strategy that follows closely the
2050 Strategy for the Blue Pacific Continent
agreed upon by Pacific Islands Forum members in 2021.

In
contrast , the Biden administration's February 2022 Indo-Pacific Strategy outlines a much clearer rationale for presence in the Pacific: the threat of China. In March 2023, China
announced
a 7% increase in military spending citing escalating threats as the explanation.

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The high stakes of external political, economic and social influence in Oceania are a reality. Since the middle of the last decade the momentum has only intensified toward greater economic and military competition that is very much intertwined.

Prime Minister Rabuka's comments and his government's policies towards external powers, in my opinion, do not signal a turn from China to the United States and allies. What they do signal is the difficult middle path through these competing interests.

Prime Minister Rabuka is calibrating his great power ties. Image: Twitter

Officials from the United States and China may indicate that the interests of Pacific Islanders are at the core of their interventions. However, the intensified political, diplomatic, and economic presence from Washington and Beijing alone means these statements should be treated with skepticism.

The pressure of choice is a reality and a preferred outcome for forces beyond the region. The United States and China need to back up not only their economic promises but also their pledge to leave choice of political and development partners to the people of Oceania.

But the policymaker's task of converting“not choosing” into tangible benefits for the people of Fiji and more broadly the people of the Pacific Islands in an atmosphere of tacit conditions on friendships is onerous.

Thus it is no surprise that regional political leaders feel pulled and pressed in multiple directions as they consider all the costs and benefits of this renewed interest in their blue continent.

Henryk Szadziewski
PhD ( ) is an affiliate of the Center for Pacific Islands Studies at the University of Hawaiʻi at Mānoa.

His work on Oceania and China has been published in Political Geography, Geographical Research, and Asia Policy. He is currently working on a book to be titled Mapping Chinese Fiji.

Republished with the kind permission of Pacific Forum.

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