US 'Pragmatic Engagement' Legitimatizes Taliban Rule

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In July 2023, President Biden implied that working with the Taliban in counterterrorism efforts had borne fruit :“I said al-Qaida would not be there. I said it wouldn't be there. I said we'd get help from the Taliban.”

Yet, after vowing in the Doha agreement to send a“clear message” to groups such as al-Qaida that“threaten the security of the United States and its allies,” the Taliban has yet to publicly sever ties with the group or banish militants from Afghanistan.

The Taliban has killed a few individuals identified as being threats to the US, notably by targeting the terrorist group ISIS-K . But it has been less helpful in cracking down on al-Qaida members. Indeed, al-Qaida leader Ayman Al-Zawahiri was hiding out in Kabul – something that couldn't have happened without the involvement of high-ranking Taliban officials – until a US operation in July 2022 killed him.

In maintaining contacts with the Taliban for counterterrorism goals without pressuring the group on human rights issues, the US might serve to legitimize the Taliban's leadership of the country at times when the group still lacks an internal mandate .

Despite these concerns, the US is seemingly pushing ahead with the policy of“pragmatic engagement.”

In July 2023, A US delegation led by Special Representative for Afghanistan Thomas West and Rina Amir, the special envoy for Afghan women, girls and human rights, met with the Taliban foreign minister in Doha. A State Department press release framed the meeting as a confidence-building exercise, noting positive developments such as growth in trade, a“decrease in large-scale terrorist attacks” and a“reduction in opium cultivation.”

Mention was made of the US urging the Taliban to“reverse policies responsible for deteriorating human rights.” But as one critic noted , such language falls“atrociously short of describing the Taliban's vast inhumanity toward Afghans.”

The void left by the US is being filled by regional powers and countries that share borders with Afghanistan: China, India, Russia, Pakistan and Iran.

But every one of these countries has its own interests in Afghanistan. Sometimes these are directly conflicting, such as with Pakistan and India, each of which has long been suspicious of the other's influence in Afghanistan. Historically, all border countries have looked upon warring Afghan factions as proxies to further their own aims – a tactic that has only added to the instability of the country.

The result is a lack of coordination among regional players on Afghanistan's path forward and little pressure on the Taliban to continue down the political road map as set out by the Doha agreement.

This failure to hold the Taliban accountable risks repeating past mistakes in Afghanistan.

In the 50 years since the last Afghan monarch was dethroned in 1973 , the country has been ruled by a succession of single-party governments that have excluded other political groups.

In 2001, the international community excluded the Taliban from the Bonn Conference , which set the pathway to governance for the country after the US invasion. Masoom Stanekzai, a former chief peace negotiator for the Afghan government, called the exclusion of the Taliban“a strategic mistake” – and for good reason, I believe: History has shown that excluding factions in Afghanistan has led only to civil strife.

Since 2021, the Taliban has been allowed to continue Afghanistan down this path of single-party governance. As Andrew Watkins, senior expert on Afghanistan for the US Institute of Peace, noted, the Taliban has shown in its governance one intent :“To establish uncontested and unquestioned authority over Afghanistan's state and society.”

With such ambitions, the Taliban leaves little room for the intra-Afghan dialogue needed for Afghanistan to move forward.

By signing the 2020 deal with the Taliban, the US took on joint responsibility for the delivery of promises made in the agreement. The pledge by Washington to withdraw forces has been fulfilled. But two years on from that, the Taliban has yet to deliver on its commitments.

This leaves the Biden administration with a choice: Try to keep the Doha agreement alive by pressuring the Taliban into intra-Afghan talks, or accept that the deal is now dead. Either way,“pragmatic engagement” with the Taliban has shown itself to be wanting.

Sher Jan Ahmadzai , is the director of the Center for Afghanistan Studies at the University of Nebraska Omaha .

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article .