China's New Island-Building Tech Sure To Churn South China Sea

In a January 2018 article for the Chicago Council on Global Affairs , Weston Konishi notes that the primary US strategy for China's land reclamation activities in the South China Sea is to conduct Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPS). Still, Konishi says it is unclear if this strategy will practically impact China's land reclamation activities.

Further, in a March 2023 Associated Press (AP) article , Jim Gomez mentions that the Philippines has launched a strategy of publicizing China's aggressive actions in the South China Sea. In the latest round of accusations this month, the Philippines has accused China of destroying coral reefs in the disputed Scarborough Shoal, ruining the livelihood of the former's fisherfolk.

Gomez says that the Philippines' publicizing China's aggressive actions in the South China Sea aims to expose the latter's“grey zone” activities and inflict reputational costs by forcing China to admit or lie about its actions.

But, as with US FONOPS, the Philippines' publicity strategy against China may have little practical impact on China's land reclamation efforts.

David Hutt, in an April 2024 Deutsche Welle article , says that an increasing number of European US allies, such as the UK, France, Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands, have deployed warships to the South China Sea in recent years.

However, Hutt says these countries have an opaque position regarding the Philippines' territorial claims in the South China Sea. He adds that it is doubtful they have the military capabilities to assist the Philippines or shape the course of events should a conflict erupt in that strategic body of water.

While the Philippines has been hurriedly modernizing its military on a limited budget and is diversifying its defense partnerships to include Japan and Australia, US resolve is still the decisive factor in the Philippines' defense posture in the South China Sea.

Despite statements from US officials assuring the Philippines of an“ironclad commitment” and upscaled naval exercises and shows of force in the latter's exclusive economic zone (EEZ), US calculus for the Philippines may not be that favorable for the latter.

One indicator is the disparity of US military assistance to key allies and partners. In April 2024, former Philippine senator Panfilo Lacson pointed out the vast difference between US aid to the Philippines and Taiwan.

Lacson says that US$500 million is just“alms” to console the Philippines for potentially being a collateral target should the US use the country as a staging area in case of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan. He points out that Taiwan has received US$8 billion in US military aid , which makes the sum allocated to the Philippines relatively paltry.

From an operational perspective, Quinn Marschik, in an article this month for The National Interest (TNI) , says that disputed features in the South China Sea have little strategic value for the US, are militarily indefensible and that China is unlikely to halt freedom of navigation in the area as it is the prime beneficiary.

He says that instead of cooling tensions between China and the Philippines, the US has leveraged the Philippines' willingness to be used as a staging area in case of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan, raising risks of escalation.

Marschik adds that it is doubtful that the US will risk a nuclear war with China over South China Sea islands and features. He adds that implausible reassurances to the Philippines be replaced with a firm commitment to defend its main islands if attacked.

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Much to the US's advantage and perhaps the chagrin of Philippine pundits, the US has remained ambiguous about its commitment to defend the Philippines in the South China Sea.

In a two-part Cambridge Core article this month , Melissa Loja and Romel Bagares point out that the US 1975 and 1979 interpretations of its 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT) with the Philippines deny any legal obligation to defend the latter in an armed conflict over the Spratly Islands. They mention that those legal interpretations were not revised in US government statements in 2024.

Loja and Bagares say the US is careful to limit its obligations to an“armed attack” against Philippine armed forces, public vessels and aircraft, including the Coast Guard, while in the Philippines' EEZ, but not when they are on the disputed Spratly Islands or their respective territorial seas.

They point out that while the Philippines' decrepit warship BRP Sierra Madre grounded at Second Thomas Shoal is covered by the 1951 MDT, the US has condemned China but not used military force in response to harassment and attacks on Philippine resupply missions to the beleaguered outpost.

While they say the 1951 MDT covers Philippine installations, forces and vessels on Reed Bank, the 1975 US interpretation excludes the disputed Scarborough Shoal from treaty obligations.

For Loja and Bagares, the question is whether the US is willing to uphold its treaty obligations with the Philippines with American soldier lives fighting over tiny features scattered over the South China Sea.