US Bases Woefully Exposed To Chinese Missile Attacks

This strategic shift aims to distribute US forces in smaller, more mobile units across the region rather than concentrating them at large bases, thereby making them less vulnerable to Chinese missile strikes.

However, a June 2023 report by the US Congressional Research Service (CRS) highlights significant concerns regarding the survivability of US defense infrastructure in the Indo-Pacific against a Chinese attack.

The report underscores that the US maintains at least 66 significant regional defense sites, which are crucial for basing military personnel, conducting maintenance and supporting operations. It notes the current basing posture, largely reflective of Cold War-era decisions, is increasingly vulnerable to China's increasingly advanced missile capabilities.

Key installations, especially those west of the International Date Line including in Japan, South Korea and Guam, are well within striking range of Chinese missiles.

The CRS report calls for Congress to adequately address whether the DOD's infrastructure supports strategic goals and operational requirements. It also questions whether investments through initiatives like the Pacific Deterrence Initiative are sufficient and appropriately managed.

Recent war game simulations indicate substantial US aircraft losses on the ground due to inadequate infrastructure defenses, underscoring the urgency of these considerations.

Using Guam as a case study, Asia Times noted in April 2024 that the strategic island's disjointed air and missile defense mechanisms may prove inadequate in safeguarding against sophisticated weapons like drones, cruise missiles, ballistic missiles and hypersonic weapons.

Kill chains supporting Guam's new Integrated Battle Command System (IBCS) may also be vulnerable to kinetic or non-kinetic attacks. Kill chains are the processes and assets involved in detecting, locating, tracking, targeting, attacking and assessing battle damage.

US kill chains reportedly have limited flexibility and information sharing. Their centralized decision-making approach and fixed connections are ill-equipped to adapt to disruptions likely to occur in an Indo-Pacific region conflict.

Carl Rehberg and Herbert underscored the need for layered, comprehensive and distributed US base defenses in a January 2024 Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA) report , which addressed the need to counter the growing threat of massed precision-guided air and missile attacks in the Indo-Pacific.

Rehberg and Kemp recommend continued support for the Guam Defense System, emphasizing the urgency for a timely, cost-effective implementation plan with minimal personnel and infrastructure.

They also call for fielding Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) equipped with advanced sensors for persistent detection and early warning of missile salvos.

Furthermore, they call for acquiring multiple types of High-Power Microwave (HPM) and Electronic Warfare (EW) defenses, leveraging emerging technologies demonstrated by directed-energy weapons programs like THOR and Mjolnir to counter drone swarms and cruise missiles.

Rehberg and Kemp also recommend alternatives to the delayed Integrated Fire Protection Capability Increment 2-Intercept (IFPC 2-I) for cost-effective and timely cruise missile defense, including the US Marine Corps (USMC) Ground-Based Air Defense Medium Range Interceptor Capability (GBAD MRIC) and gun systems.

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They highlight the importance of improving responsibilities for Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD) within and outside the DOD for greater effectiveness. In particular, they suggest creating an enhanced IAMD Test Bed for the US Indo-Pacific Command (USINDOPACOM) to support realistic training and development.

US aircraft carriers share the same, if not greater, vulnerabilities as US Indo-Pacific bases. In an article for The National Interest (TNI) this month , Brandon Weichert argues that the staggering costs-upwards of US$13.3 billion for a single Gerald R Ford-class supercarrier-and their increasing vulnerability render them ineffective in contemporary warfare.

A USS Ford-class carrier. Photo: Petty Officer 3rd Class Riley Mc / Public Domain

Weichert argues that even non-state actors like the Houthis, backed by Iran, have demonstrated the ability to challenge US naval might with low-grade anti-ship missiles. These missiles, he notes, have the potential to overwhelm carriers' shipborne defenses, including in strategic regions like the Indo-Pacific and Red Sea.

However, in an April 2024 TNI article , Harrison Kass says that aircraft carriers will remain strategically relevant, pointing out their still unmatched mobile airpower and elusive nature in vast oceans.

While Kass says that modern defensive technologies pose risks to aircraft carriers, their ability to operate without harassment in the open sea remains a significant advantage. He argues that carriers' effectiveness outweighs the risks, facilitating US grand strategy and offering a mobile alternative to fixed airbases on foreign soil.