Still Too Early To Write Off Myanmar's Junta

Looking further ahead, a few observers suggested that it was“Time to start planning the post-war future of Myanmar's military.” One academic even floated the idea of UN intervention, along the lines of the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) in 1992–93.

Opposition supporters following events in Myanmar can be forgiven for feeling buoyed by the junta's recent string of defeats. Some of their responses betray an element of triumphalism, but their optimistic prognostications are based on firmer ground than similar claims made in the past.

The EAOs, assisted by PDFs and other militias, have enjoyed a remarkable degree of success. There are still political differences between them, but they seem to have achieved an unprecedented measure of cooperation at the military level. This has permitted them to conduct joint and coordinated operations over two-thirds of Myanmar,
with dramatic results .

This level of cooperation between Myanmar's insurgent forces is one of the junta's worst nightmares. The Tatmadaw simply does not have the manpower to maintain a strong presence everywhere, or to
conduct major operations
in several places at once. Moving its mobile strike forces to key trouble spots leaves other vulnerable areas exposed.

All that said, predictions of the junta's imminent demise are premature. Many are based on limited and often unverified sources, a fair degree of speculation and not a little wishful thinking. The junta has undoubtedly been gravely weakened, but it is too early to write it off. The recent operational losses, while significant, do not pose an existential threat.

As
Anthony Davis has written
for Asia Times, there are no good options for the junta. However, this does not mean that it is powerless to regroup and respond to recent developments. In the past, Myanmar's generals have shown surprising pragmatism and an ability to survive even the most difficult circumstances. Their resilience should not be underestimated.

For all its problems, the Tatmadaw is a strong, well-armed and well-trained force that still poses a major obstacle to the opposition movement's stated goal of a federal union. Many of the so-called“bases” that were recently overrun, for example, were small, under-manned and outgunned by the insurgents. Not all Tatmadaw units would be defeated as easily.

The armed forces still seem to be reasonably loyal and cohesive. There are internal tensions and other issues but, as
Bertil Lintner has written , there has been no sign of a serious breakdown in discipline, a mutiny in a major combat unit or irreconcilable differences between elements of the state's coercive apparatus, of a kind that would spell the junta's downfall.

Also, there is a possibility that the insurgents will over-reach themselves , or once again fall prey to discord. As The Economist magazine wrote last year, there is a danger too that the resistance movement will start to believe its own propaganda. The recent rather exaggerated claims by its supporters and sundry commentators can only add to this problem

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The Tatmadaw has struggled to fight a multitude of guerrilla forces scattered around the country and in the cities. Should the EAOs and PDFs start conducting more conventional operations, however, employing larger formations and trying to capture, hold and administer territory, then they
become more vulnerable . The junta's air power, artillery and armor are most effective against such targets.

The momentum is currently with the opposition forces. However, time
may be on the side
of the junta. It has access to economic resources that the EAOs and PDFs do not. Also, it has external allies to protect it, and to replenish its stocks of arms and ammunition. The EAOs and the shadow National Unity Government are more isolated, poorly resourced and divided over many issues.

As the US
intelligence community has observed , for the junta this is an existential struggle. The generals have nowhere else to go. If they are determined and ruthless enough, they could last a long time, albeit at great cost to the country.

The opposition movement too is looking for a total military victory. Neither side is contemplating a negotiated outcome. All this argues for greater caution in evaluating the impact of recent insurgent victories.

Andrew Selth is an adjunct professor at the Griffith Asia Institute. His most recent book is A Myanmar Miscellany (Singapore: ISEAS Publishing, in press).

This article was originally published by East Asia Forum and is republished under a Creative Commons license.

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