Great Power Politics Pulling At Pacific Unity

China has stayed close on the heels of such developments. Beijing has not only replaced Taiwan as a major investor and aid provider in the region, texpanding acceptance of its One China Principle, but it has also criticized the“Band-Aid diplomacy” of the West, describing it as a mere temporary fix to the problems faced by the Pacific Islands that fails to bring any real socioeconomic progress.

China has temphasized the
formation
of the“China-Pacific Islands Community with a Shared Future” rooted in South-South Cooperation. Beijing has further enhanced its regional role from that of a predominantly commercial actor through the Belt and Road Initiative to a
security provider
under the Global Security Initiative. Qian Bo, China's special envoy to the Pacific Islands, recently
met
Cook Islands Prime Minister Mark Brown, who chairs the Pacific Islands Forum.

Such developments have drawn other powers to the region. In May 2023, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi unveiled a 12-point plan for the Pacific Islands focused on health care and community development at the Forum for India-Pacific Islands Cooperation summit in Port Moresby, highlighting the significance of the region for New Delhi's Act East Policy.

The occasion also marked the first official visit by an Indian prime minister to Papua New Guinea (PNG). India might also
expand
its solar infrastructure STAR-C initiative under the International Solar Alliance to several nations in the region.

France
also has huge stakes in the region – with 1.6 million citizens across seven overseas territories, the largest exclusive economic zone, and two sovereign forces with 2,700 military personnel – although its diplomatic influence remains modest.

While pushing for a“French alternative” to the unfolding Sinocompetition in the region, Emmanuel Macron has promised Vanuatu
financial assistance
for security, combating climate change, and education on an unprecedented presidential visit to
the independent Pacific Island nations.

He has, further, promised to look into the dispute between Vanuatu and the French territory of New Caledonia and has also
announced
a new statute for New Caledonia, which will replace the 1998 Noumea Accord, while
confirming
the transfer of 200 more soldiers and 18 billion CFP francs (approximately $165 million) to the armed forces of New Caledonia.

Such developments are bound to impact the region enormously and the Pacific Islands are highly cautiabout the loss of regionalism to great power competition.

The 2019 State of Regionalism Report published by the Pacific Islands Forum noted that the best way of preventing the region from getting embroiled in great power competition is for the Pacific Islands to act collectively as a“Blue Pacific Continent” prioritizing sovereignty and leveraging benefits from all actors involved.

ASEAN can serve as a lesson: While a strongly professed regional identity once helped it in safeguarding mutually held concerns and aspirations, growing external influence has fissured unity and weakened the region. It would seem that strengthening regionalism would allow the Pacific Islands to become friends with all and enemies to none.

The reality is more complex, however. In July 2023, the Solomon Islands and China agreed to enhance police cooperation as part of their
security deal
struck in 2022, elevating diplomatic ties to a“comprehensive strategic partnership .”

The 2022 agreement had heightened anxieties in the region. In March 2023, the United States, Australia and the UK
unveiled
details of the AUplan as a response to China's growing footprint in the Pacific, 18 months after the partnership was formally announced.

Not only did Solomons Prime Minister Manasseh Sogavare
criticize
Australia and New Zealand for“suddenly withdrawing financial support worth millions of dollars” (a claim both countries deny), but he also stated that“nothing” could stop him from seeking China's help in policing if disorder broke out in the Solomon Islands.

Sogavara is set to review a 2017 security treaty with Australia that provided police support to Honiara. Canberra
views
this as an opportunity to“revitalize the security relationship.”

The
no-confidence motion
recently raised against Vanuatu's Prime Minister Ishmael Kalsakau over a bilateral security deal with Australia further reflects this trend as lawmakers worry about upsetting Beijing, Vanuatu's major development partner.

Others have stepped closer to the United States. Fijian President Ratu Wiliame Katonivere seeks to balance Chinese influence by strengthening relations with Western democracies, a major policy departure from former prime minister and interim president Frank Bainimarama.

Fiji not only joined the Washington-led Indo-Pacific Economic Framework, which seeks to lessen economic dependency on China, but also scrapped the memorandum of understanding on police training and exchange signed with China in 2011. Furthermore, Prime Minister Rabuka ended the Chinese police presence in Fiji, citing differences in political and judicial systems. Officers from Australia and New Zealand will remain.

PNG presents a similar case. While Prime Minister Peter O'Neill shared close ties with Beijing, his successor, James Marape, has moved closer to the United States.

In May 2023, the two nations inked a deal on defense and maritime cooperation reportedly allowing American aircrafts and vessels to access PNG's territory more extensively.

Note, however, that Beijing remains not only the
top lender
to Fiji, but also a
major export partner
of PNG. As geopolitical tensions simmer, leaders of Vanuatu, Fiji, New Caledonia's ruling FLNKS party, the Melanesian Spearhead Group (MSG), PNG and Solomon Islands are deliberating on
declaring
a“neutral” position.

Such dependence casts a dense shadow of doubt on the ability of island nations to balance great power influence. Heavy economic reliance on any one external actor is also detrimental to fragile island economies that have been hit hard by Covid.

While Pacific Island states have denied taking sides, growing“Pacific militarization” not only threatens to fragment regionalism and hamper strategic neutrality, but might also overwhelm regional priorities such as climate change.

For instance, the International Atomic Energy Agency's endorsement of Japan's discharge of treated nuclear wastewater from the Fukushima nuclear plant is“deeply concerning” for the Pacific Islands. To China, it is a win as it has tarnished Japan's image as a credible ally.

Furthermore, leaning towards either China or the United States (such as in the case of the Solomon Islands, PNG, and Fiji) can create a wedge between Pacific Island nations and hamper bilateral cooperation, timpacting regionalism.

Despite this strategic tightrope, growing geopolitical interest in the region brings a myriad of opportunities to attain socioeconomic development and address environmental concerns.

Yet to translate such developments into developmental opportunities without compromising sovereignty and autonomy, the Pacific Islands should foon collective capacity building, including greater regional cooperation at official forums, integrated efforts at civil society building, empowering youth and women and promoting stronger media literacy and independent media that strengthens their capacity to act in the regional interest.

Cherry Hitkari
( ) is a non-resident Vasey fellow and young leader at Pacific Forum.

This article was originally published by Pacific Forum . Asia Times is republishing it with permission.