Cambodia Isn't Actually Pro-China At All

While Cambodia's deepening ties with China are undeniable, they should be understood within a broader strategy aimed at preserving national autonomy. Cambodian elites have consistently viewed their larger, more powerful neighbors-Thailand and Vietnam-as significant threats to the country's survival, particularly in terms of territorial integrity.

Ongoing border conflicts and overlapping maritime claims with Thailand and deep-rooted historical antagonism with Vietnam have kept these concerns at the forefront of Cambodia's strategic calculations.

The ruling party's domestic legitimacy hinges not only on sustaining the country's economic performance, peace and stability but also on maintaining national sovereignty and safeguarding Cambodia's borders. These regional tensions, if left unmanaged, could be detrimental not only to Cambodia's national security but also to the legitimacy of Hun Sen's regime and, more recently, that of his dynastic successor, Hun Manet.

By strengthening ties with China, Cambodia has sought a counterbalance to these perceived threats. China's economic and military support provides a vital buffer against the pressures exerted by Thailand and Vietnam, enabling Cambodia to assert its sovereignty more confidently in the face of potential encroachments.

Recent instances reveal Cambodia's dire need for interdependence in defending what it perceives as a sovereign right to defend territorial integrity and national development. From the“Preah Vihea r” temple complex conflict with Thailand, to the recent Funan-Techo Canal debate with Vietnam, Cambodia is consistently reminded of the pressures from powerful neighbors.

The Preah Vihear conflict was once a nationalist campaign exploited by Thai politicians as a political weapon for election and other ends. Regarding the Funan Techo Canal, environmental concerns are less significant than the geopolitical anxiety, with Vietnam consistently using think tanks and mainstream media to resist the canal's construction, alongside indirect American support , as they share common concerns about China.

In both cases, China appears to be the most suitable major power to offer Cambodia necessary support.

However, this does not mean Cambodia's cooperation with China aims primarily at targeting a third party. In line with the country's core foreign policy principle of pursuing peaceful coexistence, Cambodia's primary focus is on strengthening its own defense capacity-an essential step to ensure it can protect its national independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity.

The criticism that Cambodia's defense upgrades cause anxiety among its neighbors, particularly Vietnam and Thailand , and that it is gradually becoming a Chinese client appears somewhat hypocritical when viewed in the broader regional context.

Cambodia's approach is not unique; it mirrors strategies seen globally. For instance, it is widely accepted as normal that Japan has upgraded its defense capabilities and strengthened its security partnership with the United States in response to increasing perceived threats from Russia, North Korea and China.

Similarly, it is normal that Vietnam has recently bolstered its security partnerships with the US and the Philippines to counter Chinese assertiveness in its proclaimed Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) in the South China Sea.

The Philippines, too, has sought more proactive security protection from the US and Japan amid its ongoing tensions with China in the South China Sea. By the same logic, Japan, Vietnam and the Philippines should all now become American clients that may present a geopolitical threat to their neighbors.

Cambodia's strategy, therefore, aligns with a broader pattern of small and medium-sized states enhancing their defense capabilities and international partnerships to safeguard their sovereignty in a challenging geopolitical environment.

Private conversations with Cambodian policy elites reveal a deep awareness of the risks associated with being ensnared in the“great powers' trap.” Aligning too closely with one major power-whether it is Beijing, Washington or another-could jeopardize Cambodia's national interests and strategic autonomy.

For Cambodia, the intense geopolitical landscape often resembles a zero-sum game, where the great powers relentlessly compete for their own interests, potentially undermining the sovereignty of smaller states.

Hun Sen told US Pentagon chief Lloyd Austin during his visit to Cambodia“The US should not place Cambodia in its strategic rivalry and should not use Cambodia as a place to compete geopolitically with other superpowers.”

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Cambodia's foreign policy is thus designed to avoid such entanglement by carefully balancing relationships and maximizing benefits from all sides while minimizing risks. In this context, Cambodia has since gradually been“pro-itself” more than“pro-China.”

The rationale behind its strong embrace of China is rooted in the strategic interests derived from this alignment, which aim to upgrade its socio-economic development and strengthen its defense capability to safeguard national sovereignty and territorial integrity.

In other words, the proudly proclaimed“Cambodia-China ironclad friendship” reflects Cambodia's hope for Chinese support, where other options remain limited, to build a future Cambodia that is capable of standing on its own without heavily depending on external resources or compromising its sovereignty in exchange for survival.

For this very reason, Cambodia is not a“yes man” to China but is willing to be a subordinate friend to great powers at an acceptable cost, akin to the concept of“asymmetrical interdependence” where weaker states aim to secure maximum support by making selective concessions while still maintaining significant freedom of action.

In pragmatic terms, this partnership is about securing both the Cambodian ruling party's legitimacy and the country's development goals. However, Cambodia remains highly cautious about becoming too dependent on any larger state with uncertain future intentions.

This caution underscores that Cambodia's foreign policy is fundamentally about being“pro-itself”-a strategy that prioritizes national interests above all else. Cambodia's alignment with China, therefore, should be seen not as a simplistic allegiance but as a strategic move-at times driven by necessity-to ensure its survival and prosperity in an increasingly complex geopolitical environment.

Chhay Lim is a Monbukagakusho-MEXT scholar at Ritsumeikan University in Japan. He is concurrently serving as a visiting fellow at the Center for Southeast Asian Studies of the Royal University of Phnom Penh in Cambodia and as a young leader at Pacific Forum, a think tank based in Hawaii, United States.

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