Why Do Indian Ocean Architectures For Maritime Security Fail?

(MENAFN- NewsIn) By Admiral Prof. Jayanath Colombage

Colombo, August 11: Reproduced below is the speech of Adm. Prof. Jayanath Colombage, Sri Lanka's Ambassador to Indonesia, former Navy Chief and Foreign Secretary at the round table on Indian Ocean Security organized by the Pathfinder Foundation at Colombo on July 31, 2024:

The topic given to me was 'Regional Architecture with Maritime Security Remit'. In preparation for this talk I checked through some of the presentations that I have done on a similar topic over the years: I found that I have to repeat most of the areas that I have spoken earlier. Then the question came to my mind as to why so and what does it mean? To me it means despite many discussions we have not achieved expected results.

The Indian Ocean is not rich only in shipping and marine resources as a warm water, somewhat closed ocean. It is very rich in maritime strategies with practically every major maritime user having a strategy for this region. These strategies show how important this ocean region not only for Indian Ocean littorals but for the global maritime commerce is.

However, it is necessary to examine what these maritime strategies have done to the Indian Ocean. The question is: As having these strategies really improved
maritime security in the Indian Ocean?

Usually, when we discuss this topic, we start with the maritime security threats and come up with suggestions. We have many regional security organizations. We conduct many summits, forums, seminars, conferences and discussions. It is necessary to study what has happened to the outcome documents and policy recommendations of a number of initiatives such as IORA, Colombo Security Conclave, Galle Dialogue, Indian Ocean Conference, Indo Pacific Regional Dialogue, and Goa Maritime Conclave, to name a few and a plethora of think tank and research centre work.

Has these really contributed to enhancing maritime security in the IOR? Without answering these questions, I feel this conference will also be just another discussion forum.

The major immediate threat is the unpredictability of mainly the response of non-state actors. Then there are unintended consequences. Of course, major and emerging power competition is a grave concern to ocean governance and the freedom of global maritime commerce.

A few years ago, I used to describe the emerging situation in the IOR in six words: Strategic Competition, Strategic Convergence, and Strategic Dilemma. But now I need six more words to describe and those six are: Strategic Ambiguity, Strategic Chaos and Strategic confusion.

Securitization and militarization of every issue is another problem for the IOR. We also have witnessed that insecurity of one country gives rise to insecurity of other countries and results in an arms race, and this goes to prove that 'Indivisible security' -security of any state is inseparable from others in the region

How can we measure the increase in militarization in the IOR? We can find out the increased defence expenditure of the Indian Ocean littorals and other major maritime users. Definitely we can see a substantial increase in this area.

I have one set of figures: visits by warships and research vessels to Sri Lankan ports from 2008 to date: 662 from 29 different navies. Some years more than one ship per week had visited ports in Sri Lanka. We do not know how many submarines carrying nuclear weapons are in this region. I only hope, wish and pray that no country will initiate a war in this ocean. Smaller economies and developing countries cannot withstand another conflict in the IO

We are all aware of the threat posed by the Houthi rebels in the Horn of Africa, Gulf of Eden and Red Sea. In 2009 and following years, Somali pirates took the world merchant shipping for ransom. But this time it is much grave. These events have resulted in destruction of ships, loss of lives, increased shipping cost and congestion in many major ports. Have we been able to counter this threat?

The answer is no, we have not. The Houthis have used suicide boats which is a human guided, sea skimming, low silhouette, anti-ship missile, which is very difficult to detect.
Preventing their launching is the best response. The Sri Lanka Navy and shipping around the country suffered many attacks by suicide boats, unmanned suicide boats and underwater saboteurs and submersibles during the conflict.

Did the world lean anything from these asymmetric tactics by a non-state actor used in the conflict in Sri Lanka? Not much, I guess, because it happened in Sri Lanka. But now that the entire world shipping is threatened and we are trying to respond.

Some analysts call this the 5th Generation warfare. This can contribute to the strategic competition-influencing the thinking of states. Some of the threats in the IO are perception or interpolated threats and not necessarily real threats.

If the opponents' intentions are read incorrectly military actions taken can take a wrong turn. AI generated deep fakes could be a real threat to safety on maritime navigation, and can create havoc

In 2004, the IMO came up with ISPS Code to enhance maritime security. Security in the ports have improved drastically but not in territorial waters. Unstable or failed states provide a breeding ground for violent non-state actors

We need to look at reasons why we are not succeeding in our efforts. The threat is common and the best way is to act collaboratively. But our hidden agendas are preventing us from working together.

International or even regional mechanisms have not worked so well in the IOR. Bi-laterals or mini-laterals are working better. The best example is the Joint Working Group between Australia and Sri Lanka on countering irregular migration by sea. Working together with a joint spirit and collaboration we brought the number of boats leaving Sri Lanka to Australia to a near zero. The Colombo Security Conclave is working well sharing information on white shipping through MDA and focusing on regional security.

We have a fragile freedom of ocean trade across the IOR. Some security event can trigger a collapse very easily. We should not always look at the issues through the political and military lens. We need to look at economic, development needs and impact of marine environment very seriously. We need to evaluate the progress made by each regional architecture.

The IORA is now 27 years old and has 23 members and number of dialogue partners. However, one major flaw is that Pakistan is not a member and Pakistan occupies a major strategic location in the Arabian Sea. So is Myanmar not included.

We need to evaluate the implementation of recommendations of policies and projects made by the working groups, forums of officials, businesses and academics. We should not only focus on holding summits every year and meetings. We need to act and act fact together.

The IO is the third largest Ocean in the world. But I feel it is still too big to handle as one entity. The Western Indian Ocean is having many“flash points”. The Bay of Bengal is relatively peaceful. Only Myanmar is the flash point.

BIMSTEC is of late focusing on maritime security. We need to develop consensus, we need collaboration, we need to act fast

I recall that the Centre for the Law of the Sea at the Pathfinder Foundation put forward a Code of Conduct for enhancing maritime security in the Indian Ocean on 2nd January 2018. However, this was not taken seriously. There were arguments against the COC and it was shot down.

Conclusion

The world is facing a new era of crisis,
the greatest since the end of World War II. We need peace, stability and international rules based maritime order. We don't need a single hegemonic power. In any case we have heard that no single country can be a net-security provider in the IO.

The need of the hour is a strong political leadership which can look beyond its own territory. Unfortunately, most of our leaders are compelled to focus their energy on domestic situations. We need balanced neutral foreign policies- balanced engagement with all major powers even as the pressure to choose continues to mount.

We need leaders to have a long-term vision and work together for common maritime security and prosperity for the region. We need results oriented focused leadership and not mere ceremonials. We need to take ownership and responsibility for our region. We need collaborative efforts to maintain the sanctity of the Indian Ocean and to keep it free for maritime commerce and other maritime use.

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