(MENAFN- Asia Times)
Washington says Russia has taken delivery of the first shipment of drones from Iran and that the Russians plan to purchase hundreds of them. Russia replies that it is not buying Iran's drones while the Iranians insist they are neutral regarding the war in Ukraine.
The view in Washington is that the Russians are running out of domestically manufactured drones because of manufacturing and supply chain problems and the mixed performance of its own drones on the battlefield.
In fact, though, the drones being sought by the Russians have little to do with Moscow's supply chain problems or with the operational situation in Ukraine – and it is unlikely Iran's drones can make any difference in the Ukraine war, at least in the near future.
It's the longer-term possibilities that are more intriguing.
Russia operates a number of different types of drones that have been deployed in the Ukraine war. But the most important of the lot is the Orlan (Eagle) series known as the Orlan-10 (in 11 different variations including the Orlan 20K) and the Orlan-30. By 2018, Russia had manufactured at least 1,000 Orlan-10 drones.
The Ukrainians claim to have shot down, one way or another, as many as 300 Orlans, which is probably a significant overestimate.
In mid-August, the Russian Defense Ministry signed a contract with the LLC Special Technological Center for Orlan 10 and Orlan 30 drones but supplied no information on the quantity of the order. It is known that the latest drones produced are fitted with a laser designator to pinpoint targets for ground-based Russian rockets and artillery.
Anecdotal evidence suggests that most of the Orlans lost by Russia failed because of technical faults or were taken out by electronic warfare. Far fewer were hit by Ukrainian ground fire.
The US and other countries (including Australia) have provided hand-held jamming equipment to Ukraine and the Ukrainian company Kvertus is selling a home-built jammer called the KVSG-6 Antidron , which claims a range of 3.2 kilometers. These tools have been effective at close range where the overhead drone can be seen and heard by operators.
The Orlan, like most other Russian drones, is made out of a composite-like plastic, making them almost impossible to pick up on radar. Furthermore, the Orlans with thermal imagers can operate at night, making tracking them a serious challenge.
The Orlan is made from a variable collection of Western and Chinese parts , with little or no indigenous Russian technology inside the drone other than the red airbag and parachute used to cushion landings.
The weapons-analysis organization Global Security says,“It is rather difficult to find [in the Orlan drone] either inventions or anything Russian. Since the electronics are Western or Chinese, the engine is Japanese, the communications are German, the GPS navigation module is Swiss, the flight control sensors are American.”
Russia's Orlan-10 drones, comprised of parts made in America and its European allies as well as in China, are key to its artillery strike capacity. Photo: Twitter
Early versions of the Orlan used a Canon SLR Model 800D camera with an 85mm lens secured with Velcro tape. More recent versions are using the French Lyred Pico640-046 thermal imager and modular cameras. Both the Canon camera and the Lyred draw power from the drone's power supply.
The drone engine for the Orlan-10 is a Saito model FG-40 , a single-cylinder very small four-stroke gasoline engine (Al-95 unleaded fuel grade) equipped with digital controls. The Orlan-30 used a Saito two-cylinder engine.
The latest Orlan drones operate as a system of three drones. The Orlan has evolved as a system and is primarily used to help Russian artillery achieve accurate targeting, suppress enemy counter-battery radars and jam cell towers and other communications.
Orlan groups are integrated with the Russian Msta-SM self-propelled howitzer and are part of what the Russians call the BKAR unmanned aerial reconnaissance complex. In addition, the Orlan is connected to the Leer-3 electronic warfare complex .
By using three drones, with one hovering over the target, the accuracy of Russian artillery can be improved and firing adjusted based on observed results.
If Russia is acquiring drones from Iran, none of them can be used in an integrated fashion so far as is known, meaning that they cannot replace the Orlans at least until their communications and management are adjusted to complement Russia's artillery.
The two Iranian drones that allegedly were delivered to Russia are the Shahed 129 and the Shahed 191 , the top two models in Iran's arsenal. The Shahed 129 is roughly equivalent to the US Predator MQ-1B drone and China's Chengdu Wing Loong .
It is a combat drone that carries missiles such as the Sadid-1 anti-tank guided missiles that are said to be copies of Israel's Spike anti-tank missile. The drone can stay airborne for as long as 24 hours (like the Predator) and can be used for high-precision strikes.
The Shahed 191 Saegheh (Thunderbolt) is a stealth drone that is an Iranian copy of the US RQ-170 . The Shahed 191 is primarily an ISR (intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance) platform and not a combat drone but later models appear to be able to carry weapons internally and externally.
Russia may be mainly interested in the Shahed 191 because of its stealth characteristics, although like the Orlan as it approaches its target it can be acquired visually and may be vulnerable to Ukrainian jamming. It could potentially be a good tool to knock out the radars of Ukrainian air defense systems, especially if the US delivers new air defense systems to Ukraine.
There is no information on how vulnerable Iranian drones are to electronic jammers. However, they operate at a higher altitude than the Orlans, making it more difficult to jam them with battery-powered handheld devices.
An Iranian Shahed 129 drone was shown in 2015 after it had crashed in Pakistan's Baluchistan province. Photo: Defence Blog
There are reports in the US press , almost certainly based on US intelligence, that the Russians have started training in Iran on these drones. There also are suggestions that, given the complexity of the drones and the need to support them in the field, Iranian operators would be needed and would thus have to be deployed to Ukraine.
To keep their own drone fleet in the air, Russia will need supplies from abroad, putting even greater pressure on China to supply replacement hardware for Western-origin gear. There is, however, no reason to think that China will not make needed supplies available to Russia. China should have no problem substituting for Japan's engines, GPS and radios, cameras and imagers.
Once the Russian army, starting in late June, decided to use traditional tactics in Ukraine featuring heavy artillery barrages and a step-by-step advance against Ukrainian forces in the Donbas region, the importance of the Orlan system grew commensurately.
This helps to explain Russia's need to manufacture more of them, as the new purchase contract was only made in mid-August. But the Iranian drones are not a substitute for the Orlan complex.
Even so, Russia would stand to gain from procuring Iran's drones assuming it can figure out a way to support them in the field and integrate them in some manner with Russian land, sea and air operations, which will be a more daunting challenge.
Russia's turn to Iran, therefore, is not an immediate or even short-term difference-maker in the Ukraine conflict, but over time it could become important if the Iranian drones perform as advertised.
Reportedly the Russians are having trouble with the Iranian drones and their complaints are reaching the West . It will thus be interesting to see if the Russians ultimately actually buy the 200 to 300 drones allegedly contracted.
Follow Stephen Bryen on Twitter at @stevebryen
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