The other side of US strategy in Afghanistan


(MENAFN- Daily Outlook Afghanistan) By 1989, it becamevery clear that Soviet forces residing in Afghanistan would leave the countrydue to reasons more than one. The new situation created power vacuum in CentralAsia prevailed with the disintegration of Soviet Union and feuding among the rulingMujahideen in Afghanistan. At the juncture, the United States of America waslured by the prospects of controlling the oil and natural gas resources ofCentral Asia as well as being right next to the underbelly of Russia and China.Now the US oil giants were pushed by the US government for humouring theTaliban to access the Central Asian oil and gas through pipelines that wouldtouch the Indian Ocean through Afghanistan and Pakistan. Lures of financialgains and strategic needs combined to make the whole region very important foroutside powers. Central Asian leaders became obsessed with projected pipelines,potential routes and the geopolitics that surrounded them, which led some ofthem like Turkmenistan to deal even with the Taliban regime. The new US gamestarted in the early 1990s especially after the collapse of the Soviet Union.
US economic interestsin the region
The energy and other resources of CentralAsia attracted major regional and international powers. During the cold wardays the US had been romancing religious Jihadi groups in Pakistan andAfghanistan. These were important to position US multinationals favourably, tocontrol the considerable resources of the region and to complete theencirclement of the world's major energy resources in the area. After theSoviet collapse, the United States sought to harness these groups to serve USgeopolitical interests in energy–rich Central Asia. In between 1994-96, theCIA–ISI nexus and its arms pipeline marginalised more traditional tribal–based partiesand moderated leadership in Afghanistan and catapulted the radical Islamistsinto the forefront of Afghan civil war.The US was not reluctant to forcefulintervention, if deemed appropriate to achieve its interests. The region,although could not compare with West Asia in terms of reserves, it wasattractive to exploration and production (E & P). For instance, Turkmenistan,which borders the northwest of Afghanistan, holds the world's third largest gasreserves and have an estimated six billion barrels of oil reserves. Enough,experts say, to meet American energy needs for the next thirty years.
In mid-1990s, in particular, Americashowed keen interest in the Caspian Sea region of Central Asia, which wasestimated to have 200 billion barrels of untapped oil. The American oilgiants–Enron and Unocal had been known for their interest in Caspian Sea regionprojects and were negotiating with the Taliban for permission to construct anoil pipeline through Afghanistan to Pakistan and out to the Arabian Sea. Enronhad carried out a feasibility study for pipeline from Kazakhstan, throughAfghanistan and Pakistan to the border of Malta for bringing this oil to themarket. In December 1997, a delegation of Taliban mullahs travelled to Americaand even met US State Department officials. George William Bush and Dick Cheneyhave both worked with oil business and have close ties with major corporationsin the oil sector. Consumer countries in Europe, the US and Japan are alreadydependent on the Saudi-dominated Middle East Oil Producing European Countries(OPEC) suppliers for 40 per cent of the world demand for crude oil. Thedependence on a single region will be dangerous for the US and her allies inthe years to come. Thus, tapping in to the reserves in the Caspian Sea regionwas viewed as a strategic goal to meet the growing energy demand and to reducethe US dependence on oil from the Middle East. Then it is natural for the US toturn her attention to the only alternative major source of ‘boundless' supplyin Central Asia.
Taliban regime andits aftereffects
In between chaos anduncertainty, the Taliban regime commenced in 1996 and at the time the USgovernment did not criticise it, rather a State Department spokesperson toldreporters that there was 'nothing objectionable about the Taliban's coming topower. In fact the US hoped that theTaliban would provide stability. They were expected to provide security forroads and, potentially oil and gas pipelines that would link the states ofCentral Asia to the international market through Pakistan rather than throughIran. Between 1994 and 1997, the US was supporting the Taliban in the sensethat it was allowing Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, its two allies in the region,to back the Taliban. This was because the US and US oil companies wereinterested in building oil and gas pipelines from Central Asia acrossAfghanistan, through Pakistan to the Gulf. In January 1998, the Taliban signedan agreement that would allow a proposed natural gas pineline project led byUnocal oil company of the US. For the realisation of other projects the USfinanced and encouraged the Taliban through its surrogates in Saudi Arabia andPakistan. At that time the US was least bothered about the human rights recordof the Taliban.
The victory ofTaliban in Afghanistan opened a new chapter in its history. During Taliban'sdays in power another version of the great game was being played–there wereefforts to create a world of fundamentalist Islam. Both state and non-stateactors for mutual advantage used religion. The interests of Pakistan and thefundamentalist groups converged. The world that was to be created in thisregion would provide mutual depth to both fundamentalist Islam and Pakistan andother states that were willing to be integrated to this project. The key tothis project however lay in converting Central Asia into a zone of instabilityand religious fundamentalism. In the calculation of religious radicals andtheir backers, Central Asia with vast resources like oil and natural gas,uranium and other rare metals was critical to their global plan. This apart,the nexus between drug trafficking and terrorism in the golden crescent becamea major reason for political and social instability in the region. Afghanistanduring the last decade emerged as the second largest producer of drugs in theworld. From a relatively modest level of around 200-300 tons in 1979, opiumproduction in that country went up to 4,500 tons by 1999. This gave the Talibangovernment enormous financial benefits that went to training, arming andcampaign of the militant groups. The attempt of religious forces has been toidentify nation with religion.
US hopes belied andterror attacks intensified
However, the USdislikes towards the Taliban began only when they realised that Taliban couldnot be a dependable instrument for the realisation of their interests inCentral Asia. As early as 1997 Madeleine Albright was already publiclyexpressing her distaste for the Taliban. It indicated that an influential sectionin and out of the US government were becoming convinced that the Taliban werenot going to deliver what was required of them. Further the US-Talibanrelationship went into some rough waters after the bombing of US embassies inAfrica in August 1998. In retaliation the US attacked on Sudan and Afghanistan.The attacks on US embassies were allegedly organised by Osama bin Laden.
After the event of9/11 the US attitude towards international terrorism emanating from Afghanistanchanged dramatically and it successfully led the campaign to oust Taliban frompower and destroy terrorist training centres. The fate of Taliban was finallysealed the day terrorists bombed the World Trade Centre building and thePentagon on 11 September 2001. In response to the attack the war in Afghanistanbegan on 7 October 2001 and this marked the beginning of US's campaign known asthe 'War on Terrorism.


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