Why The US New Military Operation Against Latin American Drug Cartels Stokes Regional Tensions

(MENAFN- The Conversation) The US president, Donald Trump, has signalled a new approach to tackling the“narco-terrorists” in Latin America, and particularly Venezuela, making it clear he is willing to use military force against them. A report in the New York Times that Trump had issued a“secret directive” to the Pentagon to employ force against certain drug cartels appeared to be borne out by a US strike, on September 2, on a Venezuelan speed boat in the southern Caribbean that killed 11 people .

The president said the strike was against members of Tren de Aragua (TdA), a Venezuelan gang he has branded“narco-terrorists”.

The situation escalated when two Venezuelan fighter jets flew over US Navy ships in the Caribbean Sea two days later in a move that the Pentagon condemned as“highly provocative”.

The US secretary of state, Marco Rubio , has warned that operations against drug cartels“will happen again”. He added that previous US drug policies had not worked and“what will stop them is when you blow them up”.

Trump released a grainy video on social media of a speeding boat after the September 2 incident. US officials said the boat was carrying drugs, but attempts at verification were inconclusive . A Venezuelan government official had questioned whether the video depicted what Washington claimed.

The operation raises legal questions over proportionality and use of force. If this was an intentional strike against a non-state armed group, it signals a significant shift in US policy. The deployment of counterterrorism methods – once directed at al-Qaida or the Islamic State – against a Latin American criminal cartel represents a dramatic escalation with serious implications.

This also fits within a wider Trump initiative to take on drugs cartels including issuing a US$50 million (£37 million) reward for information leading to the arrest of Venezuela's president, Nicolás Maduro, who the Trump administration links with drug smuggling. In early 2025, the US designated the TdA as a foreign terrorist organisation (FTO), along with several other Latin American cartels .

PBS reports on the attack showing the video of a speeding boat.

The decision was unusual. FTO status has historically been applied to ideologically driven groups, not profit-orientated criminal organisations. Yet the designation unlocked the ability of the US to use counterterrorism measures and a political commentary that frames gangs as wartime adversaries rather than criminals.

The US has not ratified the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea , which governs maritime enforcement, but it generally treats many of its provisions as international law. Domestically, only Congress can declare war under the constitution, while the president acts as commander-in-chief . Previous administrations have relied on the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force as the legal basis for counterterrorism operations abroad, but this has never been applied to drug cartels. This creates a grey zone: Washington claims authority to act, but both the international and domestic legal foundations remain contested.

Read more: Guyana's president wins another term in election watched keenly by Venezuela and US

Expanding the fight

FTO designation expands what can be done under domestic law. However, it does not create a right to kill suspects in international waters. Such a shift is important, as it changes what would usually fall within the remit of policing, reframing it as armed conflict . This militarisation introduces the apparatus of warfare: missiles, warships, and rules of engagement that lower thresholds for the use of lethal force.

By conflating organised crime with terrorism, responses risk becoming militarised in ways that lack accountability. A warning from the US defense secretary, Pete Hegseth that“it won't stop with just this strike” is another suggestion that this is a campaign rather than a one-off action. Militarised counter-narcotics operations are not new, but framing them through the lens of counter-terrorism is, and suggests a wider use of military force.

Proponents of a hardline approach contend that cartels such as TdA resemble insurgent organisations. Working across borders, they adapt quickly and use violence, they diversify into trafficking , extortion and protection rackets, while exploiting migration flows and infiltrating law enforcement .

Marco Rubio, the US secretary of state, confirms reports that the Trump administration is going to use 'full powers' to take on drug cartels.

From this perspective, conventional criminal justice tools are ineffective. Extraditions are often delayed and prosecutions unreliable because cartels frequently operate across borders, benefit from corrupt protection networks and are difficult to apprehend .

Yet conflating organised crime with terrorism carries serious risks . Unlike al-Qaida or the Islamic State, TdA seeks profit and control, not radical political change. Labelling it a terrorist organisation risks blurring legal boundaries . The designation of an act as terrorism often shift rules of engagement from due process to battlefield logic, lowering the threshold for lethal force.

The legal basis is also tenuous. FTO status broadens domestic authorities but does not itself provide a licence to use force under international law. Any claim of self-defence would require also imminent danger, this has not been shown.

Risks in the region

This strike delivers Maduro a propaganda gift. For years, Venezuela has portrayed US pressure as imperial aggression designed to undermine its sovereignty. The destruction of a Venezuelan vessel by a US missile, even in international waters, appears to validate that claim. It is likely to give Maduro an opportunity to rally domestic supporters, consolidate control over security institutions and court sympathetic foreign allies who share his anti-US position .

Neighbouring governments face a dilemma. Many are weary of cartel violence , human trafficking , and the effects of criminal infiltration . Some may even welcome Washington's tougher approach. Yet few leaders wish to legitimise unilateral US military action. Even if there is some support for tougher action against cartels, regional political leaders are likely to divide over whether the potential benefits outweigh the risks of being drawn into conflicts they did not sanction.

Finally, there is a deterrence paradox. High-profile strikes may remove leaders, but they rarely dismantle networks. Instead, groups splinter, adapt and sometimes embed further into civilian life. The “balloon effect” – squeezing crime in one place only to displace it elsewhere – remains a constant. In short, military action does not usually eliminate criminal economies, it often changes or moves them. Militarisation risks fuelling escalation.

The US strike against the TdA blurs the line between law enforcement and war. It sets a precedent where states can justify cross-border assassinations under the guise of“counter-terrorism” against criminal suspects. The question is not whether TdA is violent – it is. The real issue is whether labelling it as“terrorism” legitimises a military approach that could be counterproductive, unlawful and dangerous. Washington's new“narco-terrorism” doctrine risks fuelling the very instability it claims to fight.

MENAFN05092025000199003603ID1110023657