Europe Must Flex Muscle In A Trump-Led Ukraine Peace Deal

Even then, meaningful implementation on the ground is hardly a given, and re-escalation is likely – as the Minsk Accords on Ukraine of September 2014 and February 2015 illustrate only too vividly.

A rarely considered third caveat is that, while Trump will probably be fully committed to making a deal initially, he could simply abandon it if his and Putin's timelines do not align. This is what happened when Trump's short-lived enthusiasm for an agreement with North Korea's Kim Yong Un during his first term evaporated, and he simply walked away empty-handed.

But, even in this case, some negotiations took place, crucially without much concern for US allies like South Korea and Japan. Ultimately, the non-deal between Trump and Kim became one of the factors that enabled further advances in North Korea's nuclear program and a closer relationship between Pyongyang and Moscow.

Regardless of whether Trump pressures Ukraine into a bad deal, Russia defects from a Trump-brokered settlement at a later point, or Trump abandons his efforts to end the war, European allies of both Ukraine and the US must plan for the day after Trump's inauguration.

This means, above all, taking more responsibility for their own security, as the Polish prime minister, Donald Tusk, put it succinctly before the US elections. This is easier said than done because it is not clear what the trajectory of relations between the key players will be. But several things are clear, and they can provide parameters for European planning now.

First, the bulk of military support for Ukraine will no longer come from the US. Kyiv's European allies will have to do most of the heavy lifting in this regard in the future. This will mean providing financing for the purchase of arms and ammunition and investing long-term in Europe and Ukraine's defense industrial base.

Second, it means supplying Ukraine in a timely fashion with what it needs. However, Ukrainian requirements will need to be aligned with a credible military strategy – not a dreamy victory plan aimed at restoring control over all Russian-occupied territories. This became wishful thinking at the moment Ukraine's 2023 counteroffensive failed .

What is needed is a viable plan to protect the areas Ukraine will control at the time of a ceasefire, along the front lines and Ukrainian airspace. This will ensure some security against future Russian defection from an agreement, as well as making it more likely that Kyiv-controlled areas can gradually and sustainably be rebuilt.

Third, any military strategy to protect Ukraine will also need to serve as a pillar of a future European security order that reigns in and credibly deters future Russian adventurism. That is why Kyiv must not be left to its own devices in future negotiations. In negotiations involving Trump, Putin and Zelensky alone, Ukraine would be the weakest link and European interests would probably be completely ignored.

This is not to argue for a return to the format of Russia, Ukraine, France and Germany that oversaw the failed Minsk Accords . Rather, if the assumption is that Europe will have to step up and be the main guarantor of Ukrainian sovereignty, Kyiv's EU and NATO partners need to have some input in negotiations.

The surprise phone call Germany's chancellor, Olaf Scholz, shared with Putin on November 14 is an indication that this has been recognized.

Sign up for one of our free newsletters

• The Daily Report Start your day right with Asia Times' top stories
• AT Weekly Report A weekly roundup of Asia Times' most-read stories

A European channel of communication will be important to make clear that there is a common understanding of red lines among European partners and of the consequences if the Kremlin were to cross them – as well as the benefits if it were to respect them.

Both consequences and benefits are linked to the western sanctions regime, a point that was driven home by a G7 leaders' statement in support of Ukraine on November 16, which reaffirmed the“commitment to imposing severe costs on Russia through sanctions.”

Europe will, therefore, also need to work with Trump and have communication channels with his administration. Scholz's phone call with Trump on November 10 was reported as a“very detailed and good conversation”, including on Ukraine.

European skepticism of Putin as a reliable partner is at odds with Trump's vision of cutting a deal with Putin to “un-unite” Russia and China. A common approach to this conundrum across the Atlantic is possible, but it hinges on a feasible and durable settlement concerning Ukraine.

After 1,000 days of the most devastating military confrontation on European soil since the Second World War, it is time to accept that nothing about Europe should be without Europe.

If Trump and Putin respect strength and disdain weakness, then the only pathway to getting this point across in Washington, Moscow and Kyiv is through muscular pursuit of European self-interest and self-assertion.

Stefan Wolff is professor of international security, University of Birmingham

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article .

Already have an account? Sign i Sign up here to comment on Asia Times stories OR

Thank you for registering!

An account was already registered with this email. Please check your inbox for an authentication link.

Share this:

• Click to share on X (Opens in new window)
• Click to share on LinkedIn (Opens in new window)
• Click to share on Facebook (Opens in new window)
• Click to share on WhatsApp (Opens in new window)
• Click to share on Reddit (Opens in new window)
• Click to email a link to a friend (Opens in new window)
• Click to print (Opens in new window)