Feigned Reluctance: New Zealand Mulled Joining AUKUS From The Start

They also raise significant questions about whether associate members might be subordinated within the pact, and whether accommodating associates is intended to add a multilateral legitimacy that enhances both the pact's authority and credibility.

The notion of a“tiered” system runs counter to recent rhetoric around AUKUS.“Pillar two” has been presented as a standalone technology-sharing arrangement, carefully delineated from pillar one's nuclear-powered submarine deal.

This also highlights the lack of specific detail around the proposed benefits of pillar two involvement. As it stands, we know remarkably little about the“advanced capabilities” being developed through AUKUS, due to the secrecy surrounding the pact from the beginning.

Initially conceived as enhancing“joint capabilities and interoperability” between the three AUKUS members, what became pillar two has since been presented as an industrial program focused on emerging technologies and job creation .

Now, it appears the technology is being used to draw in prospective members with promises of opportunities for their aerospace and research sectors .

Australian critics have argued that AUKUS is not a jobs program but a strategic initiative that could lock members into exclusive US trade controls, jeopardize research independence and prevent international research and development collaboration.

These concerns recently led former Australian foreign minister Bob Carr to describe pillar two as“cobbled together” and no more than“fragrant, methane-wrapped bullshit.”

Pillar two technologies are also designed to be interoperable with US forces. So far, there are no assurances that intelligence or data from AUKUS partners would not be used by autonomous weapons systems or nuclear command, control and communications infrastructure.

Indeed, the US has made“integrated deterrence” a core objective of its defense policy, including how it works with“allies and partners.”

Pillar one of AUKUS sets a precedent whereby Australia will be the first non-nuclear weapons state to receive highly enriched, weapons-grade fissile material and nuclear-powered submarines.

Pillar two technologies, including AI, are already contributing to the modernization of US and UK nuclear weapons command and delivery systems.

Broader AUKUS interoperability will see foreign nuclear-capable bombers and submarines“rotated” indefinitely through Australia.

Opponents of AUKUS argue this violates the spirit and the letter of the Treaty of Rarotonga, which establishes a nuclear-free zone in the South Pacific and bans the use, possession, storage and – crucially – stationing of nuclear weapons.

AUKUS has clear implications for New Zealand's non-nuclear security and close defense relationship with Australia. But to date, New Zealand has not sought to challenge Australian assurances around non-proliferation and compliance with the Treaty of Rarotonga .

Strikingly, it appears that New Zealand officials – not AUKUS members – designated pillar two as“non-nuclear,” while they were formulating public messaging about potential involvement in March 2023.

Sign up for one of our free newsletters

• The Daily ReportStart your day right with Asia Times' top stories
• AT Weekly ReportA weekly roundup of Asia Times' most-read stories

New Zealand has taken a leading role in nuclear disarmament, through domestic nuclear-free legislation and support for international treaties. Framing pillar two as technically“non-nuclear” could compromise such advocacy in future.

Prospective partners under pillar two must recognize there can be no genuinely limited involvement in AUKUS. Participation tacitly supports Australian acquisition of nuclear-powered submarines, the maintenance of US primacy in the Pacific region and, potentially, dangerous confrontation with China.

It also puts New Zealand offside with other key partners.

Few Pacific nations see AUKUS as addressing the principal security threat of climate change or accept it as having a“non-nuclear” component. ASEAN states view it as establishing an unhelpfully adversarial relationship with China.

AUKUS aims to expand a tiered, de facto alliance through integrated, nuclear-enabling technologies. For New Zealand, this raises serious questions about whether there is any meaningful distinction between pillar one and pillar two.

Marco de Jong is a lecturer in the Law School of Auckland University of Technology and Emma Shortis is an adjunct senior fellow of the School of Global, Urban and Social Studies at RMIT University .

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article .