High Time For Real US-Japan Defense Cooperation

First, assigning a four-star general to USFJ isn't exactly salvation on the wings. Four-star generals ran the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan for over 20 years. How did they do? Winning wars does not appear to be a requirement for generals who get promoted to the top rank.

There are exceptions to everything, of course. If they were to recall retired Admiral Robert Willard and his team which from 2009 to 2012 ran the US Pacific Command (as it was called before the 2018 name change) and send them to Japan with proper marching orders and authority, I'd change my mind.

Second, without any operational control over anything, USFJ looks likely to continue its principal role as the“designated apologists” (said only half tongue-in-cheek) when Japan complains about something the American military has done.

A four-star commander's apologies might have more clout but USFJ will still seem irrelevant when it comes to Japanese and US forces doing actual operations and fighting.

Japanese forces now coordinate with USINDOPACOM in Hawaii, an arrangement that is inefficient to say the least. It would be better to set up a headquarters (or something serving that function) in Japan to handle the bilateral relationship and emplace a commander with real operational authority, as in able to conduct a war.

This requires a mindset and a structure entirely different from what currently exists. And, of course, the Japanese would also have to be fully invested, devoting the necessary attention and resources.

It is not apparent this is in the works on either side. Several have pointed out these shortcomings over the years, and there have been some good ideas. But there has never been interest at levels – either civilian or military – where it matters.

Indeed, US alliance managers told us for decades:
“The relationship has never been stronger,” adding that every exercise held with the Japanese was a“great success”
that“strengthened interoperability.”

And the commanders in Hawaii since, say, early 2012 onwards could not be bothered to push for bringing Japan and the US closer together in a meaningful, spelled operational, way. Not that the Japanese ever really pushed for it either.

The Financial Times article quotes now-retired Admiral Philip Davidson, who was USINDOPACOM commander from 2018-2021, as saying:

One might fairly say it was a logical next step years ago – and for the entire period of the Davidson tenure.
Every top leader of that command at least since Admiral Samuel Locklear (who arrived in 2012) should have had this as priority number one – and ought to have been judged accordingly.

Without a capable JSDF that's solidly linked to US forces and able to operate together, the US will be hard-pressed to maintain its position in the Indo-Pacific or to prevail in a potential conflict. And it was obvious back then.

Too much time was wasted – by people in Washington and Hawaii who had position and title (and presumably responsibility) – while China built into a powerful military and a serious threat.

Even now, it's not clear that there is a sense of urgency to improve the US-Japan military relationship so that it can fight a war properly. Making superficial modifications and installing a four-star at USFJ with a slightly expanded role – to“send a message” to China – does not indicate urgency.

As if the Chinese weren't smart enough to understand US-Japan actual operational capabilities. But let's see what is announced at the Biden-Kishida meeting. Maybe we'll be surprised and maybe we won't.

It is nonetheless astonishing that after 60-plus years the Americans and Japanese are such strangers and the military-to-military relationship is so superficial – if not downright Potemkin – in too many respects. Again, the exceptions of the two navies and missile defense show that it can be done if tried

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But there is some good news: much good work is being done at lower levels between Japanese and American forces. If Biden and Kishida issued the order to“do the necessary so we can fight together (and go down to Yokosuka Naval Base if you need some ideas)” they would be surprised how quickly things could come together.

But, Newsham, enough with the complaining. What's your advice for getting a joint/combined US-Japan headquarters in Japan? Here's one idea: Establish a“Joint Task Force Nansei Shoto.”

This would have an immediate real-world mission: defending Japan's southern islands (also known as the Ryukyu Islands) and nearby areas. That requires real day-to-day coordination, specifically assigned forces and command and control to carry out the joint patrols, exercises and planning needed to defend an area that's already under Chinese pressure.

Put the actual headquarters on Okinawa. But, if necessary, you could run it out of Kyushu. This approach would also have considerable political and psychological effects – on Japan, on the US and on partners such as South Korea and Taiwan. But even more on the PRC.

Get this right and later expand to the entire US-Japan military relationship. How hard is it? As hard as you want to make it.

Grant Newsham
is a retired US Marine officer and former US diplomat. He is the author of the book
When China Attacks: A Warning To America .