How Us-Japan-S Korea Can Deter China On Taiwan

In such discussions, it is critical for Washington to reassure Seoul of the USFK's ability to deter the DPRK from engaging in any military adventurism during a Taiwan Strait conflict. Washington, for example, could enter into a NATO-style nuclear sharing agreement with Seoul.

Additionally, Seoul must be prepared for a distracted Washington in the event of a Taiwan conflict and be prepared to engage in more burden-sharing regarding deterrence efforts vis-a-vis Pyongyang. With the ROK's already sizable military advantages over the DPRK, this should not be a significant challenge.

Second, the three countries should seek to bolster cooperation with Taiwan via joint coast guard operations.

Japan has proven proactive in this regard. In 2017, for example, Taiwan and Japanese officials
signed
a memorandum of understanding enabling the conduct of joint search and rescue operations.

Likewise, thehas sought to bolster coast guard ties with Taiwan and the two nations
established
a Coast Guard Working Group in 2021. The 2022National Defense Authorization Act also mandates a report on national guard cooperation with Taiwan, which should be expanded to include coast guard training as well.

Given such precedent, Seoul should follow suit and initiate joint coast guard training exercises with Taiwan. All four nations should conduct training exercises together, particularly in the
waters
off Pacific Island countries with which Taiwan has diplomatic relations.

Given Seoul's potential concerns regarding provoking Beijing, cooperation can foon issues such as drug trafficking,
marine debris and illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing.

Third, the three countries should continue efforts to bring the Chip4 Alliance to fruition. The proposed alliance will enable the three countries to build, together with Taiwan, a more robust and comprehensive semiconductor supply chain that reduces Beijing's leverage on the international stage.

Each of the four nations possesses a unique comparative advantage when it comes to semiconductors. As ROK Minister of Trade, Industry, and Energy Lee Chang-yang
stated :
“South Korea holds its strengths in memory chip [production], Taiwan is strong in the foundry business. Thehas the equipment and technology and Japan is strong in minerals and components.”

Chip4 has shown promise despite initial doubts regarding the initiative. In February 2023, for example, Chip4
held
its inaugural video meeting featuring senior officials from all four nations, tassuaging concerns about preliminary
delays .

In March 2023, Japan
lifted
export controls previously imposed on the ROK's semiconductor industry, thereby eliminating more barriers to cooperation in the semiconductor space.

In the same month, South Korea appointed semiconductor expert Lee Eun-ho to be its envoy to Taiwan. Lee, the former president of the Korean Security Agency of Trade and Industry, a government institution that helps South Korean corporations comply with export controls, has already spoken favorably about Chip4.

His appointment is a strong signal that the ROK is increasingly seriabout heightening cooperation with Taiwan in the semiconductor space.

While participation by Tokyo and Taipei is more or less assured, doubts remain regarding Seoul's commitment to a potential Chip4 alliance – given that
60%
of its semiconductor exports go to China.

Given
past
economic coercion by the PRC, Seoul is inevitably concerned that any decision to join Chip4 would be met by economic retaliation against its semiconductor industry.

Seoul, however, should keep two things in mind. First, trends suggest that South Korean semiconductor exports to China will decrease precipitously going forward regardless of Seoul's decision-making.

Beijing has, after all, set a target self-sufficiency rate in semiconductors of 70% by 2025 and launched aggressive state
subsidy
programs to realize this goal.

South Korean companies must be reminded that market opportunity in China will fall as Beijing pursues such autarky, even if it falls
short
of meeting its targets. Semiconductor
exports
from the ROK to China have already fallen 13.4% year-on-year. Second, Beijing has exhibited significant reluctance to sanction TSMC despite heightening cross-strait tensions.

Moreover,export controls, endorsed by the Netherlands and Japan, have made Chinese firms more dependent on South Korean companies such as SK Hynix and Samsung for critical semiconductor materials. Concern about potential counter-sanctions, therefore, should be minimal.

The aforementioned steps listed in this article provide three, realistic avenues through which the United States, ROK, and Japan can cooperate in a trilateral manner over Taiwan while also bolstering bilateral ties.

Any or all of these steps will remind Beijing that military action against Taiwan is strongly opposed by other East Asian security actors. As Beijing continues its campaign of military and economic coercion against Taipei and consolidates increasingly formidable military capabilities with an eye on Taiwan, such deterrence-building efforts are sorely needed.

Daniel Fu
( ) is a research associate at Harvard Business School.

This article was first published by Pacific Forum . Asia Times is republishing it with permission. This Pawas developed as a part of the United States-Japan-Republic of Korea Trilateral Next-Generation Leaders Dialogue to encourage creative thinking about how this vital partnership can be fostered. For the previentries please click
here ,
here ,
here ,
here , and
here .