The Internet Has A Strait Of Hormuz Problem

(MENAFN- Asia Times) The next attack on the global economy may not arrive with a missile strike or a cyberattack on a server farm. It may arrive as silence - the sudden, eerie quiet of severed fiber-optic cables resting on the floor of the Persian Gulf, cut by a vessel whose crew will claim it was an accident.

Recent developments in the Middle East should alarm policymakers far beyond the region. Iran has already mined the Strait of Hormuz, constricting the flow of oil and gas through one of the world's most critical energy passages.

But a quieter and potentially more consequential campaign is now underway. State-linked Iranian media outlets began circulating detailed maps of undersea cable routes, landing stations and regional data hubs across the Persian Gulf on April 22, 2026. Analysts at The Jerusalem Post have concluded that these disclosures appear to be target preparation.

To understand why this matters, consider a fact that surprises most people: nearly all global internet traffic - more than 97% - moves not through satellites but through fiber-optic cables resting on the ocean floor.

These strands, thinner than a garden hose, carry an estimated US$10 trillion in daily financial transactions. They underpin bank transfers, stock markets, cloud computing and the artificial intelligence systems now increasingly woven into the fabric of the global economy. Satellites, despite their reputation as a technological fallback, cannot come close to absorbing the load if major cables fail.

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Geography concentrates the risk. At least 17 cable systems run through the Red Sea, and several more cross the Persian Gulf. These are not redundancies; they are primary arteries. Both regions are now disrupted by conflict. And both are narrow chokepoints where a single, well-placed break can reverberate across continents.

There is precedent for this kind of attack and a chilling pattern that preceded it. On February 7, 2024, the BBC reported that Yemen's Houthi movement had shared a plan on the Telegram app outlining its intent to target undersea cables linking Europe and Asia through the Red Sea.

That same day, Foreign Policy magazine observed that even if the Houthis lacked the technical capability to execute such an attack on their own, Iran could readily supply the necessary assets. The warning was explicit, and the threat was credible, but the world largely moved on.

Less than three weeks later, the warnings materialized. On February 26, 2024, four undersea cables connecting Saudi Arabia and Djibouti were severed. The Houthis had telegraphed their intentions, and the cables were sabotaged. The pattern was unmistakable: public signaling, followed by action.

Now that pattern is repeating itself - this time potentially targeting infrastructure that connects not just a region, but the entire digital world. Iranian state-linked outlets are circulating maps of cable infrastructure with the same clinical detail the Houthis used before the 2024 attack.

The Middle East, once primarily an energy hub, has become a digital one as well - hosting more than 300 data centers across 18 countries, with Amazon, Microsoft and Google investing billions in Gulf-based cloud facilities.

Severing the cables feeding these hubs would not simply disrupt email. It would strand hundreds of billions of dollars in digital infrastructure overnight and potentially shut down the world economy, as so much of the world relies on the Internet for banking, investing and commerce every day.

What makes this threat so difficult to deter is precisely what makes it so appealing to Iran: plausible deniability. A missile strike is unmistakable aggression, triggering immediate political and military consequences.

But a vessel dragging an anchor across a cable near the Strait of Hormuz is something murkier. Was it an accident? A fishing boat that strayed off course? A proxy operating at arm's length from Tehran?

By the time those questions are answered - and cable repair ships cannot safely enter an active conflict zone - the damage is already done, and entire regions can remain offline for weeks or months.

The legal framework designed to deter such attacks is astonishingly weak. Under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), when a cable is damaged in international waters, jurisdiction to prosecute the attacker falls to that attacker's own country, not the cable owner's.

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The result is predictable: no nation has ever been prosecuted. No cable cut has ever gone to court. When states operate through proxies, as Iran routinely does, attribution becomes even harder to establish, and the threshold for retaliation is never clearly met.

The US and more than two dozen allies signed the 2024 New York Joint Statement on undersea cable security, acknowledging the vulnerability. But acknowledgment, obviously, is not deterrence.

What is needed now is a legal framework with teeth - one that empowers cable-owning states to pursue action directly against perpetrators regardless of nationality, and that holds state sponsors accountable for attacks carried out through proxies.

Since the US is already in the region, one action it can take immediately is to guard the undersea cables to minimize the potential of a cut. The Houthis warned, and the cables were subsequently cut.

Iran is now signaling a similar but potentially more devastating cable cut. The only question is whether Washington and its partners will act before the silence comes.

Amy Paik is an adjunct professor at Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) and a part-time lecturer at Northeastern University. She is a recipient of the 2024–2025 Wilson International Competition Fellowship and holds a doctorate in international affairs from Johns Hopkins SAIS.

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