Unfinished Business Left Over From Afghanistan Exit

The proposed legislation has since been inserted into multiple spending bills, including , most recently, the National Security Supplemental in February 2024. But the measure failed to advance due to Republican opposition to the overall bill, which amounted to a US$95 billion foreign aid package to assist Ukraine, Israel and Taiwan.

Partly this is the general rule in American politics: The vast majority of bills fail to become law, and the current Congress has a historically low passing rate.

Yet the act's failure comes despite bipartisan and wide-ranging popular support to assist Afghans – including among members of the military, veterans, religious groups and refugee advocates. Shortly after the fall of Kabul, the majority of Americans polled favored taking in Afghans who passed security checks. Even two years later, 80% of Americans thought the U S should help Afghans who assisted American forces in Afghanistan to resettle in the United States.

There is also strong precedent for providing expedited pathways to permanent residency. The US has previously passed adjustment acts for Cubans, Cambodians, Vietnamese and Iraqis, among others, allowing them to adjust their status from temporary to permanent residents.

Republican legislators opposing Klobuchar's bill cited concerns that vetting procedures were not stringent enough, implying that some Afghans could have links to terrorist groups. Advocates for the Afghan evacuees counter that the bill has failed to pass simply because there is not a sufficently high-powered lobbying effort behind it.

And while allowing Afghans to legally come to the US or obtain long-term residency has bipartisan support, the issue has played into partisan politics concerning executive authority over immigration, with Republican detractors broadly objecting to President Joe Biden's use of humanitarian parole.

In July 2023, Senator Tom Cotton, a Republican, introduced a competing bill, the Ensuring American Security and Protecting Afghan Allies Act . Rather than granting Afghans a direct pathway to permanent residency after further screening, this would require evacuees to meet the stringent standards for obtaining refugee status. And this could be difficult for many of the Afghan evacuees: Applicants would have to demonstrate individual fear of persecution from the Taliban – a high bar for those who have now been outside of Afghanistan for three years.

Even with its more narrow requirements, Cotton's bill failed to pass.

As a temporary fix, in May 2022 the Department of Homeland Security announced that Afghans without permanent legal status in the United States could apply for temporary protected status , allowing those with expired or about-to-expire permits to remain in the country for a further 18 months.

In September 2023, temporary protected status was extended for another 18 months, protecting Afghans from deportation but still failing to provide a long-term solution.

Instead, most Afghans have turned to an overburdened asylum system, with a backlog of 2.6 million asylum applications as of mid-2024. Rather than refugees who are resettled to the US from abroad, individuals have to be in the US already to apply for asylum.

In an attempt to speed up the asylum process, US officials exempted Afghans from filing fees in August 2021 and implemented a streamlined application process.

Yet even when Congress directed US Citizenship and Immigration Services to issue a final asylum decision on Afghan cases within 150 days , only 136 and 191 Afghans were granted asylum in fiscal years 2023 and 2024, respectively – out of tens of thousands of pending applications.

Afghans present in the U.S. under humanitarian parole can still apply for a Special Immigrant Visa, but without an extension this pathway is only available to those who worked for the US government for at least one year.

The process was revised in July 2022 by combining two steps into a single one, but it remains arduous for Afghan applicants. Long processing times and uncertainty about their future in the US have created structural barriers and psychological fears for Afghans attempting to rebuild their lives. These difficulties are compounded by trauma from years of conflict in Afghanistan and a rapid departure from the country – with many forced to leave numerous family members behind.

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How the election may affect the act

As the third anniversary of the fall of Kabul is marked, what happens next to Afghans still in limbo in the US? The chances of the Afghan Adjustment Act passing under the next administration are uncertain.

Advisors to Vice President Kamala Harris have said the Democratic candidate for the White House is“committed to Afghan relocation efforts and looking for new ways to assist.” As such, a Harris administration could be expected to presure Congress further to pass the act, emphasizing its moral and strategic importance.

Donald Trump, who slowed down the entry of Afghan allies by adding even more security checks to the Special Immigrant Visa process in 2017, has signaled that, if elected, his administration would prioritize stricter immigration policies. This could reduce the likelihood of the Afghan Adjustment Act being a legislative priority, despite some Republican support.

Just as crucial will be the composition of Congress. If Democrats retain the Senate or gain control of both the House and Senate, the act will have a higher chance.

Either way, we argue that the Afghan Adjustment Act should not be seen as simply an immigration bill. Regardless of which administration is elected in November, we believe failing to support wartime allies and ensure Afghans' safety sends a damaging message to future partners. Without such assurances, the willingness of individuals and groups to aid the US abroad could diminish, potentially leaving American forces without critical support in future operations.

Kelsey Norman is a fellow for the Middle East in the Baker Institute for Public Policy, Rice University , and Ana Martín Gil is research manager at the Edward P. Djerejian Center for the Middle East, Baker Institute, Rice University .

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article .

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