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China's industrial policies created domestic overcapacity in key industries such as electric vehicles and carbon-free energy, while European investors found it increasingly difficult to operate in China.

Overcapacity combined with China's export-led model of growth led to prices so low that in many sectors European products could not compete in China, in their own countries, or in third-country markets.

Security concerns

Changes in the EU's economic relations with China over the past 50 years moved within the context of broader geopolitical changes.

With the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, most of Europe felt there was no longer any external threat to Europe's peace and prosperity.

China's leaders, on the other hand, feared that a fate like the Soviet Union's could befall China and began massively increasing military spending.

As China became a wealthier and more militarily powerful country, tensions with the EU periodically flared over human rights or specific Chinese actions. Increasing Chinese aggressiveness against Taiwan, in the South China Sea and elsewhere led to fears that China was beginning to represent a threat to global peace and stability.

By 2019, the EU was describing China as a“cooperation partner, economic competitor and systemic rival.”

Russia's Ukraine invasion

Then, in 2023, Russia invaded Ukraine. For the first time in over a generation, Europe faced a clear and present security threat. Subsequently, the 2024 U.S. election led some to doubt the new US administration's commitment to the defense of Europe.

Meanwhile, while China professed neutrality in the Ukraine conflict, it had become the chief enabler of the Russian war machine.

By 2025, China was purchasing nearly half of Russia's crude oil exports. In addition to providing the funding Moscow needed to continue the war, China was also providing four-fifths of the“critical electronics” used in Russian drones, according to Ukrainian intelligence.

In a meeting with the EU's chief foreign affairs official in July 2025, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi stripped away any doubts about China's position on the war when he said that Beijing“could not accept Russia losing its war against Ukraine as this could allow the United States to turn its full attention to China.”

The summit: A dialogue of the deaf

Against this backdrop, no one expected much from the July 25 summit meant to mark the 50^th anniversary of EU-PRC relations. And nothing is what the summit delivered.

The summit had originally been scheduled to take place in Brussels, but China insisted it be held in Beijing. China also cut the originally scheduled two days of meetings to one day.

During the summit, the EU president stressed that the EU relationship with China was“at an inflection point”: There needed to be progress on European concerns over China flooding European markets with the fruits of subsidized overcapacity as well as a decrease in Chinese support for Russia's war in Ukraine.

Xi Jinping responded,“The current challenges facing Europe do not come from China.”

The only concrete outcome of the summit was a commitment by both parties to continue cooperation on climate change.

Future prospects for EU-China relations

Relations between the EU and China are clearly trending downward. The EU believes Russian aggression represents an existential threat to its member countries, while China appears determined to feed the Russian war machine.

Several factors could, however, push against that downward drift.

EU member countries benefitting the most from trade with or investment from China – for example, Hungary and Slovakia – will push against damaging EU ties with Beijing. (Slovakia was the only EU member to attend China's massive celebration of the defeat of Japan in World War 2.)

Another factor: China has previously cut off exports to Europe of rare earths or other items critical to supply chains. Broad or sustained action of that sort could cripple much of Europe's industrial production. Threats of such action could soften support within the EU for tougher policies toward China.

Ultimately, so long as the Russian war against Ukraine continues and so long as China remains determined to export its overcapacity in manufactured goods, it is hard to see how the EU's relations with China will move in a more positive direction.