The Strategic Parallels Between Gaza's Hamas And Pakistan's Lashkar-E-Taiba

In discussions of state-linked militancy, two prominent examples frequently cited for their complex operations and evolving tactics are Hamas in Gaza and Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) in Pakistan. Both organizations have adopted a comparable approach: securing territorial control, pursuing political roles, and simultaneously maintaining militant operations. This strategic duality-combining political legitimacy with continued use of armed capabilities-reflects a growing challenge in addressing modern extremism.

Both Hamas and LeT initially focused on consolidating influence within specific regions. Hamas assumed control of Gaza in 2007 following its conflict with the Palestinian Authority, transforming the territory into its operational base. LeT, meanwhile, has developed a strong presence in Pakistan's Punjab province, establishing networks of religious schools, welfare organizations, and recruitment hubs. These efforts have often operated with limited interference, and in some cases, alleged state tolerance or support.

Territorial presence offers significant strategic advantages. It enables these groups to carry out training, recruitment, and logistical planning while also presenting themselves as community service providers. In this model, militant organizations build grassroots support while maintaining their operational capabilities. Hamas is widely regarded as benefiting from Iranian backing, while analysts frequently cite Pakistan's complex relationship with LeT as a factor in its continued presence.

Both organizations have also launched political wings. LeT established the Milli Muslim League (MML), with leaders such as Saifullah Kasturi and Haji Abdul Rauf. Critics argue this was an effort to gain political legitimacy without disbanding militant operations. Similarly, Hamas has presented political figures such as Khalid Mashaal and Ismail Haniyeh to engage in governance and diplomacy. The United States designated the MML as a terrorist entity in 2018, citing continued ties to LeT's leadership. Hamas remains designated in full as a terrorist organization by several countries, reflecting skepticism over distinctions between its political and military wings.

This dual structure-political engagement alongside armed operations-can create ambiguity in international responses. Participation in elections or running civil institutions lends an appearance of legitimacy, complicating efforts to counter or sanction these groups. Nonetheless, both Hamas and LeT continue to maintain armed capabilities. Hamas's attack on Israel on October 7 revealed the scale of its arsenal, including rockets and drones, much of it reportedly sourced from Iran. LeT, on the other hand, is believed to run camps in Pakistan-administered Kashmir and maintain active militant cadres.

Observers argue that this hybrid model allows groups to shift tactics depending on strategic needs-moving between political activity and armed operations. Reports suggest that LeT has received support in the form of training, logistics, and diplomatic cover from elements within Pakistan's security establishment. Similar allegations are made regarding Iran's role in providing arms and technical support to Hamas.

Recent military trends also reflect tactical borrowing. Pakistan's reported use of over 500 drones in May 2025 against Indian positions has drawn comparisons to Hamas's use of low-cost rocket salvos intended to overwhelm defensive systems. These asymmetrical tactics aim to impose higher economic and operational costs on adversaries, a strategy that has gained prominence in conflicts worldwide, including the ongoing war in Ukraine.

Of particular concern to security analysts are indications of increased cooperation or communication between militant groups across regions. Intelligence reports cited by some sources suggest that representatives of Hamas may have attended a LeT meeting in Rawalakot earlier this year, signaling a potential exchange of tactics and operational knowledge.

One recent attack in Pahalgam, a tourist area in Indian-administered Kashmir, has drawn comparisons to previous incidents attributed to Hamas, particularly in terms of targeting public and civilian spaces. Such incidents raise fears about the spread of urban-targeted tactics intended to maximize psychological and political impact.

The public visibility of individuals like LeT founder Hafiz Saeed-who is under U.S. sanctions-raises ongoing questions about the effectiveness of counterterrorism measures when such figures can reportedly engage in political activities within Pakistan. For critics, this undermines international efforts to isolate armed groups and prevent their normalization.

The model used by groups such as Hamas and LeT reflects an evolution in the strategies of non-state actors: building dual-function entities that blend militant operations with political narratives. For policymakers, the core challenge remains in distinguishing legitimate political engagement from cover for armed operations. Analysts argue that where such distinctions are not clearly enforced, the risk grows of more groups adopting similar frameworks.

The experiences of Gaza and parts of Pakistan point to broader concerns in international security: that militant-political hybridization may become a preferred template for extremist movements. Preventing this trend will likely require sustained international cooperation and a focus on addressing both the political and operational dimensions of such organizations, along with the role of state support in enabling them.

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