Is N Korea Cranking Out Tanks To Help Russia In Ukraine?

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If so, this would extend its assistance beyond munitions, ballistic missiles and troop deployments to include tanks, reinforcing its quid pro quo arrangement in return for cash, technology transfers and political backing.

Newsweek reported in April 2025 that North Korea has earned an estimated US$20 billion from its involvement in the Ukraine war, mostly from munitions sales with a smaller amount for providing troops and technical personnel. Additionally, Asia Times has noted that Russian support may have significantly advanced North Korea's nuclear ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) and intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) programs.

Beyond transactional motives, North Korea's support for Russia may also reflect its strategic interest in diversifying partnerships and reducing reliance on China.

Choong-Koo Lee writes in a February 2025 War on the Rocks article that China's renewed dialogue with South Korea and Japan, coordination on sanctions on North Korea's nuclear program and resumption of military talks with the US could have dismayed the Kim regime, nudging it closer to Russia.

North Korea's tank production capacity could prove valuable to Russia, whose armored forces have been heavily depleted by over three years of high-intensity combat in Ukraine.

In a June 2023 article for the Polish Institute of International Affairs (PISM), Marcin Piotrowski notes North Korea has copied and modified Soviet-era T-62 tanks and maintains active production lines with at least 2,000 units.

Piotrowski emphasizes that although Russia no longer produces the T-62, it continues to draw on this model from Soviet-era reserves, making North Korea a valuable supplier of spare parts and compatible shells for 115mm and 125mm guns.

While obsolete by modern standards, these tanks use ammunition and parts compatible with Russian stockpiles. Russia's staggering tank losses and strained production capacity further raise the value of such assistance.

According to open-source intelligence (OSINT) group Oryx, Russia lost 3,960 tanks between February 2022 and May 2025 . Veaceslav Epureanu, writing for Insider in February 2025, states that by December 2024, Russia had depleted half of its estimated 7,342 Soviet-era tanks in open storage before the war.

Epureanu also noted that Russia had 1,897 T-62s in storage in 2022, which had declined to 1,082 by 2024, with only half deemed in good or satisfactory condition. His data shows that the T-62 remains Russia's most numerous tank in open storage despite its age.

In a July 2024 Forbes article , David Axe points out that T-62s are relatively abundant and easier to restore than more modern types such as the T-72, T-80, and T-90.

He argues that even though Russia's factories can produce only 500-600 new tanks annually-a rate too low to compensate for attrition-relying on T-62s may be Russia's only viable short-term solution to sustain its armored strength.

However, this strategy has its limits. Pavel Luzin writes in a January 2025 article for the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA) that 2025 may be the final year Russia can depend on Soviet-era reserves.

He cites equipment degradation, reliance on foreign components, shortages of skilled workers, inflation and a weak ruble as key constraints forcing Russia to shift toward newly manufactured equipment.