Abandoning AUKUS: A Better Way To Defend Australia

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In short, if war eventuates, Australia's only goal is to prevent a change to the status quo. In this way, strategic defensive would suit very well as the intellectual foundation of Australia's security policy.

Strong reasons for a strategic defensive approach

There are also sound military and technological reasons why Australia should frame its security around the strategic defensive.

First, defense is the naturally stronger position in war , compared to attack.

It is harder to capture ground (including sea and airspace) than it is to hold it. All aggressors must attack into the unknown, bringing their support with them. Defenders, by contrast, can fall back onto a known space and the provisions it can supply.

The AUKUS agreement has locked Australia into dependency on the United States for decades to come. Photo: AAP Image via The Conversation / Richard Wainwright

Military thinkers generally agree that to succeed in war, an attacker needs a three-to-one strength advantage over the defender.

And the wide water moat surrounding the Australian continent greatly complicates and increases the cost of any aggressor's effort to harm us.

Australia could also use weapons now available to enhance the inherent power of being the defending side. Its task needs only to be making any attack prohibitively expensive, in terms of equipment and human life.

Long-range strike missiles and drones, combined with sensors, provide the defending nation with the opportunity to create a lethal killing zone around it. This is what China has done in the East and South China Seas.

Australia can do the same by integrating missiles, drones and uncrewed maritime vessels with a sensor network linked to a command-control-targeting system.

Missiles and drones are a better buy when compared to the nuclear-powered submarines Australia hopes to acquire from the United States, as well as the warships – including more submarines – the government plans to build in the Osborn and Henderson shipyards.

And most importantly, they are available now.

A smarter strategy

A defensive network also makes strategic sense for Australia, unlike the planned AUKUS nuclear-powered submarines. Australia has no need to operate in distant waters, such as those off the coast of China.

In addition, Australia can afford so few vessels that their deterrence effect is not credible. Missiles and drones are vastly cheaper, meaning Australia can buy them in the thousands.

Australia is making the mistake of focusing on the platform – expensive ships and planes – rather than the effect needed: the destruction of a potential enemy with swarms of weapons.

In fact, the age of large crewed warships, both on and below the sea, is coming to an end. Long-range strike technology means the sea can now be controlled from the land. Rapidly improving sensors make it impossible for attackers to hide on, below or above the surface of the ocean.