Sunday 27 April 2025 01:29 GMT

US Navy's Latest Frigate Drifting Into Familiar Troubled Waters


(MENAFN- Asia Times) The US Navy's newest frigate program is sailing straight into the same storm that sank its last two major shipbuilding efforts: rising costs, design chaos and shrinking credibility.

Last month, the US Government Accountability Office (GAO) reported that despite repeated assurances of lessons learned from the troubled Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) and Zumwalt-class (DDG 1000) destroyer programs, the US Navy's Constellation-class frigate (FFG 62) is repeating the same acquisition missteps.

In all three cases, the US Navy committed to ship construction before achieving stable designs, resulting in cascading delays, soaring costs and diminished capabilities, according to the GAO's latest findings.

Like the LCS, the Constellation-class frigate began construction with an overstated design completion date, later revealed to be only 70%, not 88%. This led to a three-year delay for the lead ship and a US$3.4 billion commitment to incomplete designs.

Like DDG 1000, where immature technologies and unstable requirements inflated unit costs sevenfold, the frigate now faces technical risks from unproven propulsion and machinery control systems.

Further, the frigate's modifications have eroded its advertised commonality with the Italian parent design, undermining the program's original risk-reduction rationale and prompting it to sacrifice speed in compensation for weight growth - a trend that parallels the LCS and Zumwalt's ultimate delivery of less than promised.

The GAO stresses that history will continue to repeat itself until the US Navy abandons its flawed acquisition playbook and adopts leading commercial ship design practices, such as completing functional designs before construction, which jeopardizes the fleet's readiness and credibility.

The Constellation class was envisioned as a general-purpose naval combatant, akin to the 1970s Oliver Hazard Perry-class frigates. A December 2024 US Congressional Research Service (CRS) report notes that the class intentionally avoids introducing new, unproven technologies and relies instead on systems already deployed across the US Navy to reduce costs.

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