China Is Struggling To Control Its Provinces As They Expand Distant-Water Fishing

(MENAFN- The Conversation) Since the late 2010s, China has shown increasing sensitivity to the environmental and socio-economic impacts of its distant-water fishing (DWF) growth, as well as the reputational harm partly inflicted by international environmental advocacy .

DWF describes countries that fish outside their own territories and extend their range of activity to the other countries' economic exclusive zones or the high seas.

Was China's exponential DWF growth necessarily a direct result of Beijing's grand strategy to develop what's known as a“blue economy” and become a maritime power ? And what are the main challenges China faces if it's going to rein in this growth?

In an article published in Marine Policy , I seek to shift the state-centric perspective on the rapid development of China's DWF and explore the crucial role of Chinese provinces in driving this growth.

Not all of China's coastal provinces are equally interested in expanding their DWF industry. Between 2010 and 2020, Liaoning, Shandong, Zhejiang, Fujian and the China National Agricultural Development Group Co. Ltd. played a disproportionate role in boosting China's DWF activities, as measured by the number of vessels, horsepower and fish catch.

As of 2020, these provinces collectively owned 84 per cent of China's DWF vessels, and their combined horsepower accounted for 86.6 per cent of the total horsepower across all Chinese DWF vessels. Their catch also constituted 87 per cent of the total weight and 86.8 per cent of the total value of China's DWF catch.

Fujian excelled as the province where fleet capacity growth yielded the highest returns in capture fisheries. It didn't have the largest DWF fleet (Zhejiang did) or the most powerful (Shandong did). But it led in both total DWF catch volume and average catch per vessel, and was second only to Shandong in catch value per vessel.

Although Fujian was not initially chosen as a pilot province for marine economy development in 2010, it soon formed what's known as a leading small group, headed by the provincial governor, to reapply .

This effort succeeded in 2011, granting Fujian additional administrative and budgetary powers to develop its marine economy. Sub-provincial leading small groups were also created to enhance co-ordination and compliance across bureaucratic levels.

Once Fujian's marine economy development gained national importance, it quickly expanded its DWF industry. In 2013, the provincial government urged efforts to forge a new era for its DWF vessels to“sail to the Western Ocean for the second time”. Local businesses seized this opportunity to seek support and gain a competitive edge over their peers from other provinces.

Starting in 2014 , the provincial government promoted targeted policy incentives across the industry's value chain: vessel renovation, access to fishing grounds, business operations and human resources. The launching of the Maritime Silk Road in 2015 with Fujian as a key participant further enabled its DWF expansion.

These measures led to a production-focused, extraction-driven DWF growth in Fujian. From 2012 to 2015, the number of Fujian's DWF vessels and catch rose by 78 per cent and 50 per cent, significantly exceeding national targets of 15.5 per cent and 18 per cent .

Since 2016, amid heightened international scrutiny, Beijing started to recentralize and tighten control over China's DWF fleet. But this effort took time to trickle down to the provincial level. The Fujian incentive measures remained in place and were implemented until 2018 to facilitate the province's DWF growth.

Towards the end of the 2010s, Beijing started implementing concrete centralized policies to rein in DWF growth. These included a blacklist for vessels and captains involved in illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing, a compliance ranking for DWF companies and revisions to China's DWF regulations.

While Fujian appeared to adhere to Beijing's policy to limit fleet growth, it shifted efforts to secure the establishment of a national DWF base on its coast . This form of terraqueous infrastructure seeks to reorganize spaces where land and sea meet. The goal is to reduce the turnover time of DWF catch as commodities, and to maximize its commercial value.

Read more: Maritime power shapes the world order -- and is undergoing a sea change

Beijing's delegation of certain administrative and fiscal power to local governments is crucial to enhancing economic performance in China's provinces. But economic interests can motivate local governments to pursue policies that result in excessive growth and can lead to unintended foreign policy consequences for China.

Fujian's incentive policies suggest a firm commitment to a DWF growth model focused on enhancing capacities, maximizing outputs and boosting production. These policies pay inadequate consideration to potential environmental impacts beyond its border.

A performance evaluation report on Fujian's special subsidy fund for marine economic development praises the shift of Fujianese fishers from offshore fishing near its coast to distant-water fishing.

It says there are“social” and“environmental” benefits that include supplying more DWF professionals and easing offshore over-fishing. The report makes no reference to potential concerns over overcapacity or the ensuing environmental and foreign policy impacts.

Measures introduced by Beijing during the 13th Five-Year planning period in 2017 marked a first step towards recentralizing control and oversight over such provincial activism. But monitoring DWF poses a daunting challenge for Beijing, as its environmental footprints occur outside China and are not borne directly by Chinese citizens.

China's 2023 White Paper on DWF reaffirms efforts to improve information-gathering and monitoring on DWF fleet capacities and operations. These include establishing an inclusive DWF data collection framework and expanding the national fisheries observer program.

Although Beijing views the West as“strongly suppressing and restricting” China's DWF , the white paper endorses dialogue with international non-governmental organizations on sustainable fisheries management and actions against IUU fishing. In other words, it acknowledges the role of international bottom-up monitoring in addressing the pervasive problem Beijing faces in gathering information on DWF.

Read more: We've measured the cost of unsustainable industrial fishing on coastal communities – and it's vast

Strengthening information-gathering and verification regarding any violations by Chinese DWF vessels of both domestic and international regulations has become critical since China replaced the DWF fuel subsidy with the international compliance capacity enhancement subsidy in 2021.

This new subsidy is partly tied to compliance scores of DWF enterprise. The Chinese Ministry of Agriculture publishes these scores annually. Any of the 14 DWF-regulated violations leads to lower scores , which in turn reduces the subsidy amount for offending enterprises.

Prompt and reliable data on IUU breaches is therefore essential to achieve the intended deterrent effect. A meaningful degree of monitoring and transparency efforts by fisheries NGOs, alongside with continued collaboration with international and regional fisheries organizations, should be encouraged and maintained by Beijing.

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