Make No Mistake, Israel And Iran Are Already At War

The Israeli military then launched what the country's leaders describe as a“limited [ground] operation” into southern Lebanon to remove Hezbollah positions along the northern border.

Tehran's October 1 attack in response against Israel was, according to many Middle East experts and indeed Iranian military leaders , primarily a retaliation for the two high-profile assassinations against Hamas and Hezbollah leaders.

These were certainly key factors. But as an expert on Iran's defense strategy , I argue that Iran's leaders also felt compelled to attack Israel for three equally, if not more important, reasons: to slow Israel's advance in Lebanon, to save face, and to restore deterrence.

Iran hopes to slow and potentially reverse Israel's successes against Hezbollah, especially as Israel embarks on ground operations into southern Lebanon. Of course, Israeli ground troops must now deal with what is perhaps the world's most capable guerrilla fighting force – one that performed quite successfully during the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah war.

Nevertheless, Israel's ability to achieve a tactical surprise and eliminate Hezbollah's top leaders – even in the midst of an ongoing localized war, and even after Israel's leaders announced their intention to engage Hezbollah – reveals a far superior Israeli strategy and operational planning and execution capability than that of Hezbollah.

And that presents a huge blow to what is seen in Iran as the Islamic Republic's crown jewel within its“Axis of Resistance.”

In this respect, the Oct. 1 retaliatory strike by Iran can be seen as an attempt to afford Hezbollah time to appoint replacement leadership , regroup and organize against Israel's ground invasion.

It also serves to help Iran save face, especially in how it's seen by other parts of its external proxy network.

Orchestrated by the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps, or IRGC – Tehran's primary arm for coordinating external operations – Iranian money, training, guidance and ideological support enabled and encouraged the October 7, 2023, Hamas attack against Israel – even, as it has claimed, Iran had no prior warning of the assault.

Since then, Hamas fighters have received almost no real-time support from Tehran. This lack of support has no doubt contributed to Hamas being successfully degraded as a threat by Israel, with many of its members either dead or in hiding and unable to mount a coherent offensive campaign, leading Israel's military leaders to claim the group has been effectively defeated .

Unsurprisingly, Iran is glad to enable Palestinians to fight Tehran's enemies and absorb the human costs of war, because this arrangement primarily benefits the Islamic Republic.

Once the fighting in Gaza started, the IRGC was nowhere to be found.

Now that Israel has shifted its attention to Lebanon and scored several initial tactical successes against Hezbollah, Iran cannot afford to stand back and watch for two main reasons. First, a year of fighting in Gaza has demonstrated that Israel is willing to do whatever it takes to eliminate threats along its borders – including a willingness to withstand international political pressure or operate within Iran's borders.

And second, Iran's proxy groups elsewhere are watching to see if Tehran will continue supporting them – or will abandon them, as it seemingly has done with Hamas.

Perhaps above all, in Tehran's calculus over how to respond is Iran's need to restore a deterrence.

The two defining features of Iran's interrelated external, or“forward defense ,” and deterrence strategies is its regional network of militant proxies and its long-range weapons arsenal , which includes a large number of advanced ballistic missiles, cruise missiles and attack-capable drones.

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These Iranian defense strategies seek to dissuade enemies from attacking Iran proper in two ways: first, by threatening Israel and other regional US allies with punishment via proxy militia or long-range weapon attacks; and second, by offering scapegoat targets against which Iran's enemies can express their rage. In effect, Iran's proxy forces act as proxy targets that pay the costs for Iran's hostile policies.

Israel's degradation of Hamas and ongoing operations against Hezbollah threaten to undermine Iran's ability to deter attacks against the homeland. For the Islamic Republic's leaders, this is an unacceptable risk.

Who plays the next move?

These interweaving imperatives likely prompted Iran's leaders to launch a second massive, direct missile attack on October 1 against Israel. How effective the strike will be in achieving any of Tehran's aims is unknown.

The Islamic Republic claimed that as many as 90% of the ballistic missiles reached their intended targets , while Israel and the United States characterize the attack as having been“defeated and ineffective ,” despite unverified cellphone videos showing several ballistic missiles detonating after reaching land in Israel.

What is almost certain, however, is that this will not be the last move in the conflict. Israel is unlikely to halt its Lebanon operation until it achieves its border security objectives. And Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has vowed retaliation against Iran for its latest retaliatory attack.

IRGC leaders met this warning with a counter threat of their ow that if Israel responds to the October 1 attack militarily, Iran will again respond with unspecified“crushing and destructive attacks.”

Rhetorically, neither side is backing down; militarily this may be true, too. The nature and scope of Israel's next move will dictate how the war with Iran develops – but make no mistake, it is a war.

Aaron Pilkington is Fellow at the Center for Middle East Studies, University of Denver

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article .

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