(MENAFN- AzerNews)
By Huseyn Sultanli
This month's European Parliamentary elections shaped a new
period of intense debate on the current state of European
integration. Among several key issues, few are considered as
important among European policy makers as the question of European
Union (EU) enlargement. Amidst rising global instability,
characterized by the increasing willingness of states to resort to
the use of force, discussions on European security are likely to
overshadow most other policy areas. Although this issue has not
generated unanimity, the majority of EU officials argue in support
of enlargement and view as essential the further diffusion of a
European project that has become increasingly vulnerable to
far-right nationalism domestically and the threat of military
aggression externally. The first factor is reinforced by the
results of these elections. Even though the 'centre' appears to
have held ground, the ability of far-right parties to maintain and
even, in some cases, strengthen their presence remains undeniable.
President Macron's abrupt decision to call a snap election
highlights that European leaders are aware of this, with some, like
the French leader, willing to take the challenge to the polls
almost immediately.
However, the process of enlargement, on a technical level, is
continuing to experience various obstacles which, depending on the
country in question, manifest themselves in different ways. One
would assume that given its status as the largest free trading bloc
in the world and a successful model of regional cooperation,
'candidate' states and their governments would do their utmost to
secure membership and deepen engagement. However, in an era of
international affairs where actions are taken predominantly on the
basis of geopolitical calculations and the fight for regional
influence, there are significantly more factors at play than just
'collective will'. It is therefore essential to carry out an
analysis on the state of the EU's enlargement ambition, focusing on
this occasion on Georgia's candidacy and what it might reveal for
the broader enlargement dynamic. Crucially, is the rather 'static'
nature of this process an indication that, due to the superiority
of geopolitical processes at play, further EU enlargement remains
distant from reality?
Enlargement: The Georgian case
The EU currently has ongoing accession procedures with nine
states, each considered to be at different stages of the
integration process. This includes Georgia, currently experiencing
an intense domestic dispute on the nature of the country's foreign
policy trajectory. The Georgian case is unique in that the vast
majority of the country's population, both in a widespread and
consistent manner, has indicated that it views its future as part
of the European project. Taking into consideration its immediate
neighbours, Azerbaijan and Armenia, this is certainly a more
categorical position that pushes for the country to side with a
major 'power' or alliance, in this case the EU. As argued by
regional experts, Azerbaijan, for example, is guided by a balanced
foreign policy approach that is best characterized by its
chairmanship of the Non-Aligned Movement. The country has firmly
positioned itself at the heart of international cooperation and is
displaying an increasingly multi-faceted foreign policy, with
balanced integration as a way of taking advantage of its unique
strategic position. Armenian internal dynamics, on the other hand,
are not as clear cut as in Georgia. Despite heavily relying on
Russia since its independence following the collapse of the Soviet
Union, Armenian leadership appears to have shifted away from
cooperation within Russian-centred institutions such as the CSTO,
which it considers to have failed in protecting its interests.
Nevertheless, attitudes in favour of integration with the West are
not currently at the levels witnessed in Georgian society. More
than 80% of the Georgian population is said to be 'pro-European',
preferring a future that is shaped by profound integration into a
European framework. This, to a certain extent, differentiates
Georgia from other accession candidates, with the younger
population as the most passionate advocates of EU membership.
However, recent actions of the Georgian government (composed
predominantly of the Georgian Dream), do not indicate a
pro-European preference for the future. As mentioned, the highly
complex nature of accession requires a comprehensive compliance
with EU norms at all levels of society. In the case of the ruling
Georgian Dream party, however, critics point specifically to a
degree of reconciliation with Russia on a governmental level. Even
though the countries continue to have no official diplomatic
relations, given the situation in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, minor
steps such as the resumption of flights and other diplomatic
gestures have been taken, indicating a reluctance on the Georgian
side to further deepen an already severe fracture.
Recent events and their impact on the EU-Georgia
relationship
The recently introduced 'foreign agents bill' by the government
demonstrates that Georgia's path to a European future will involve
serious complications. The bill has been categorized as being
'Russian in style' and a clear message that the government is not
willing to prioritise or facilitate an accession process that had
been making considerable progress. The bill (now law) requires
civil society groups based in the country to register themselves as
'foreign agents' should more than 20% of their funding be received
from abroad. This extends to private individuals, with law recently
modified to include requirements for individuals to comply with
government authorities upon the request of information on the
source of funding. Logically, this bill has been severely
criticised by European policymakers, who have labelled its
potential ratification by the Georgian parliament as a fatal step
for the country's prospects of EU membership. On May 28th, the
Parliament's decision to overrule the veto of the Georgian
President became official. This was met with fierce criticism,
labelling the development as being highly incompatible with core
'EU values and principles' any candidate state should aspire to
achieve. Moreover, for the first time during this crisis, the EU
publicly stated that it is open to undertaking some form of action
against the government for introducing the bill. A European
Commission press release suggests that as part of a broader
institutional response, member states are actively considering all
options. This is a clear and significant indication by Brussels
that domestic laws considered to be non-aligning with European
expectations will not be ignored and are likely to significantly
complicate the integration process.
The EU has, in fact, invested considerable time and effort into
institutionalizing Georgia's potential 'accession' to the Union.
The country first applied for EU membership in March 2022 and was
granted candidate status in December 2023. At the core of this
rapidly evolving process was a list of twelves priorities that,
according to the European Council, Georgia needed to prioritise if
it was to reach the status of a 'candidate' that is fully aligned
and compliant with key European values. This includes Priority 10,
which calls for a civil society that is free to influence
'decision-making' at all levels. The European Commission's '2023
Georgia Report' is clear in its rejection of any type of direct
influence on civil society. This had been in response to the
Georgian Parliament adopting a similar 'draft law' on civil society
restrictions, eventually overturned by protests. This explains why
the EU's response to the bill's recent re-introduction was carried
out in equally unreserved fashion. Essentially, the prospect of
further integration has been hanging in the balance for some time
now. Ever since the government's refusal to publicly condemn
Russia's invasion of Ukraine began, policymakers in Brussels have
expressed the awkwardness of working together with a government
that is unwilling to support a potentially pivotal effort by the EU
to uphold Ukrainian sovereignty. There is, however, an inherent
contradiction here given the EU's own struggles to reach a
consensus on supporting Ukraine, with member states like Hungary
actively refusing to contribute with military assistance. This is a
factor that will be considered further below.
Supporters of the law among the country's leadership argue that
the bill would help protect the nation's sovereignty by minimising
external interference via its civil society. There is a concern
that appetite for European integration amongst the Georgian
population might be used by Brussels and other Western governments
for political purposes, seeking to accelerate the Union's expansion
into regions that are not traditionally considered to be under its
immediate sphere of influence. This would be a continuation of what
is believed to be a policy of 'double standards', attempting to
enforce a certain mode of conduct on candidate states without first
enforcing the same level of expectation on states that are already
members. Hence, the 'Georgian Dream' argues that similarly
'controversial' measures are adopted by European countries, with
there being an evident lack of consensus on several social issues
among the member states themselves. According to this line of
thinking, it is unfair to single out Georgia for an approach that
is already existent within the Union itself. Essentially, as long
the inability of Brussels to effectively mediate between the
increasingly conflicting positions of its member states continues,
the EU is not in a position to 'interfere' and impose expectations
on the domestic affairs of its membership candidates. Crucially,
the government views that by pursuing its own independent approach
to its domestic affairs, without relying on pre-defined external
models, it secures a degree of political independence for the
country in what is an increasingly unstable international and
crucially for Georgia, regional environment. This would grant
Georgia significant room for manoeuvre, allowing it to shape its
own future according to geopolitical realities in its own region
and without external influence. One could argue, by relying on
international relations theory, that this is a more 'realist'
approach in that Georgia prioritises its immediate security by
maintaining some sort of balance in its relationship with Russia.
There exists a feeling that a path of full-scale European
integration would not serve as a guarantee for the country's
security. Moreover, there appears to be a consensus that the
further rupturing of relations with Russia by supporting Ukraine
and joining a key Western institution would compromise its
immediate security. This is reinforced by the view that the major
effort of both the EU and US in supporting Ukraine and the
potential toll of this support on their respective domestic
economic performance could limit the protection provided to Georgia
in case of further Russian military aggression. In Russia, Georgia
has and is surrounded by a powerful neighbour that has made its
intention to revert to the use of military force clear. Following
the annexation of Crimea in 2014, Russia resumed its operation with
a full-scale war in February 2022. With Georgian territory already
under Russian occupation, a radical and 'officialised'
approximation with the EU risks further compromising the country's
security and therefore, the survival of its ruling elite.
Broader implications for the South Caucasus
This particular case is likely to continue developing, with the
EU seemingly determined to influence the overruling of the law in
one way or another. However, this is a highly useful example for
assessing current dynamics in the South Caucasus and the
geopolitical tug of war that has recently characterized the
approach of 'great powers' to the region. Russia's invasion of
Ukraine and the subsequent sanctions programme that followed
isolated, or at least attempted to isolate, the country from the
Western world. Apart from inflicting damage on the Kremlin's war
effort, this approach also sought to finalize the 'recapturing' of
what is considered as Russia's traditional sphere of influence by
the West. Following Azerbaijan's restoration of its territorial
integrity and Armenia's apparent decisiveness to move away from the
Russian domain, Georgia's immediate future, however, remained an
'unresolved' matter due to the uncomfortable dichotomy of a largely
pro-European population and a government that resists the urge to
side with Europe and prefers to maintain some degree of diplomatic
contact with Russia. Therefore, in Brussels, there is a shared
assumption that with initiatives such as the foreign agents bill,
the Georgian government is deliberately positioning itself closer
to the Kremlin. Crucially, given upcoming Georgian parliamentary
elections, the bill would facilitate the party's re-election and
prevent pro-European parties from gaining a real foothold in the
domestic political process. It is evident that a Georgian Dream
victory would reinforce Russia's position as it would further
reduce the momentum of EU enlargement and would allow Russia to
maintain some degree of authority over a region that is has
gradually lost a grip of. With an Azerbaijan that is rapidly
broadening its foreign policy portfolio and an Armenia that seems
determined to become more 'Western', Russia sees a clear
opportunity in Georgia that would allow it to maintain some degree
of influence in the South Caucasus.
For the EU, this case serves as an opportunity to reassess the
extent to which its 'normative power' remains a powerful foreign
policy tool in its neighbouring regions. Even though the majority
of Georgians appear determined to fight for a European future, the
country's accession is complicated by a government that is not
willing to proceed with full-scale integration at the cost of
further upsetting Russia and potentially jeopardizing its national
security. Given that the underlying objective of EU enlargement
into the South Caucasus was to 'push back' Russian influence and
export EU values, this example should act as a reminder that
Russian influence in the region remains a factor to be considered.
Moreover, in addition to candidate states meeting conditions
outlined by the EU, there are significant geopolitical factors at
play that governments of the countries in the region now appear to
prioritise. The fact that Georgia was granted official candidate
status was a consequence of it cooperating with the EU on various
areas of reform, culminating with the European Commission's
approval of progress made on the '12 priorities'. Nevertheless, it
is unclear the extent to which the momentum that was initially
created for the securement of candidate status will be carried on
to achieving full accession. Even though the government does not
publicly express a preference for either path, it is clear that the
level of cooperation required by EU officials will not be
encountered in Georgia as long as the current government remains in
place. This should force EU leaders to assess the extent to which
their current rhetoric on EU enlargement, which is one of fierce
optimism, remains appropriate, especially given the evident
challenges the process is likely to continue experiencing down the
line.
Elsewhere in the region, Azerbaijan, fresh from finalizing the
restoration of its territorial integrity following the withdrawal
of the final Russian peacekeepers from Karabakh, has reinforced its
position as an independent state that is powerful enough to
determine its own foreign policy direction. Even though Azerbaijan
and the EU are engaged in mutually beneficial cooperation in the
oil and gas industries, the country has not shied away from
expressing its discontent with Europe's approach to its internal
issues and particularly the attitude of the EU's foreign policy
chiefs. The country, for several decades, felt that it was
abandoned in the fight against illegal occupation. This feeling
guided the shaping of its renewed foreign policy strategy, focusing
on strengthening relationships with its traditional allies, like
Turkey, whilst pursuing an independent strategy of comprehensive
economic and military development. Azerbaijan has made it clear
that future membership of international institutions like the EU or
NATO is not on its radar, underlining the preference to build up
the country's capability as an independent actor that is in a
position to choose its own future. Even though the Georgian Dream
has never publicly said it is against EU membership, its actions
suggest it is preparing Georgia for a future that is outside the
European Union and one that is marked by both regional and external
geopolitical challenges the country must be adequately prepared
for.
Georgia's complex domestic political situation further
exacerbates the situation. In fact, the Georgian President vetoed
the passage of the foreign agents bill and has been consistent in
condemning the law by making pledges to European authorities. The
Georgian Parliament, primarily because of the ruling party's
dominant position, managed to overrule the vote and the bill can
now be categorized as official law. However, the President is
showing no signs of slowing down her efforts at re-establishing
momentum for European integration. Recently, President Salome
Zurabishvili, during a speech at Independence Day, called for
political parties to sign the“Georgian Charter”. The document
essentially outlines a path for the country to return to
integration with Europe, calling for the removal of any legal or
judicial obstacles to this process. Crucially, the Charter seeks to
restore compliance with the '9 factors' outlined by the European
Commission which would eventually allow Georgia to accede to the
EU. The President introduced the Charter to the European
Commission, with her pledge being met by local opposition parties
that joined forces and signed the document.
For this reason, the October elections in Georgia are likely to
serve as a crucial turning point. The current government shows no
sign of stepping away from its revised foreign policy approach,
maintaining a balance between cooperating with the EU and
protecting itself from the threats that come with pursuing an
openly anti-Russian policy. It would be logical to closely observe
whether the EU decides to push for a further deepening of
institutional ties with Armenia whilst its struggles to push
forward its Georgian agenda. The Armenian government has repeatedly
expressed its discontent with the CSTO, an alliance it considers as
one that failed in meeting its underlying obligations of preserving
collective security. It is no coincidence that European countries
like France are stepping up their support to Armenia, especially
through the provision of a military alliance. Moreover, a European
Union Border Mission (EUMA) was deployed in Armenia in February
2023. Although such efforts are de-stabilizing and could
potentially be detrimental to peace in the region, it confirms the
EU's desire to persist with its aim of being an influential actor
in the South Caucasus. The principal state through which this
objective is implemented, however, could soon change.
Conclusion: Is Georgia's membership candidacy still a
potent one?
In short, EU enlargement remains a highly debated and popular
topic in Europe. EU enthusiasts are adamant that it is via
enlargement that European security can be maximized, and prosperity
can be brought to neighbouring regions. However, this appetite for
European integration, despite enjoying from different levels of
public support in different countries, is likely to prove
insufficient for any serious materialization. Russia's war in
Ukraine initially seemed to weaken the country's influence in the
region, with many analysts predicting a complete collapse of its
presence and authority in the region. Nevertheless, as Ukraine
struggles to contain recent Russian offensives and the 'West'
continues its indecisiveness on the extent of its support to the
Ukrainian armed forces, other actors in the region appear to have
entered a period of profound reflection. Paradoxically, with a
powerful neighbour on their borders and also an increasingly
assertive China on the horizon, it will be 'leading applicants'
like Georgia that will likely end up freezing what seemed an
inevitable diffusion of the European project.
Huseyn Sultanli
Analyst - Geopolitical Risk, European Cooperation,
Azerbaijani foreign policy
MSc International Relations, LSE
London, United Kingdom
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