US Mulls Nuke Cruise Missiles On Subs To Deter China

The exclusive emphasis on strategic-level deterrence may have created a deterrence disparity between the US and its close rivals, as the SLCM-N offers a tactical nuclear strike capability to counterbalance China and Russia's tactical nuclear weapons.

The effort to bring back the SLCM-N might also suggest broader deficiencies in US conventional deterrence, with low-yield nuclear weapons compensating for gaps in conventional capability.

Amid increasing tensions, the US may consider shifting its naval strategy to include the deployment of low-yield nuclear weapons at sea as a deterrent to China's expanding military capabilities.

In a May 2024 Real Clear Defense article , Joe Varner argues that the US should deploy low-yield nuclear weapons at sea to deter China and other potential aggressors. Varner contends that the US must adopt a warfighting doctrine with forward-deployed tactical nuclear weapons on warships.

He notes that shift is imperative given China's increasing territorial claims and military threats toward its neighbors, including US allies like South Korea, Japan, Taiwan and the Philippines. He also points out China's significant military advancements, such as expanding its nuclear warheads, missiles, navy and air force.

Varner says the US faces a dilemma whether to fortify its forward-deployed forces against Chinese missile attacks or retreat to less vulnerable positions, potentially exposing its Asian allies. He criticizes the post-Cold War decision to withdraw theater-level nuclear weapons from US warships and advocates for their redeployment to enhance deterrence.

He claims that China's“no first use” nuclear policy is unreliable and that forward-deploying nuclear weapons at sea would provide the US with options to control escalation and deter aggression without resorting to strategic nuclear forces. He adds that the US must push back with its allies and consider tactical nuclear weapons as a component of their warfighting strategy.

The potentially pivotal role of the SLCM-N in strengthening US nuclear deterrence would represent a significant shift in nuclear strategy since the Cold War.

In an April 2024 Atlantic Council article , Robert Soofer emphasizes the importance of the SLCM-N in maintaining a credible nuclear deterrent. Soofer says the SLCM-N would be the first new US nuclear weapon since the Cold War, signaling a strong message of deterrence and reassurance to allies.

Soofer outlines critical considerations for Congress to ensure the program's success, such as examining existing missiles for adaptation, avoiding overly stringent military requirements and providing effective submarine deployment. He also highlights the need for focused leadership and management to prevent disruption to other nuclear modernization programs.

Critics argue that the US's proposed deployment of SLCM-N could be more harmful than beneficial and suggest focusing on diplomatic engagement and strategic stability instead.

The Washington Post, in an August 2023 article , argues that placing SLCM-Ns aboard US submarines would complicate the submarines' primary mission of enemy vessel detection and consume valuable space needed for anti-submarine warfare. It also says that the presence of nuclear cruise missiles would restrict naval exercises with allies and port calls to nations averse to nuclear platforms.

The Washington Post also highlights the SLCM-N's financial implications, saying that maintaining the missile and its warheads would cost US$10 billion over a decade. The report says the US already has three tactical nuclear delivery systems: the B61 gravity bomb, the W80-equipped air-launched cruise missile (ALCM) and the Trident W76-2 SLBM, thereby making the SLCM-N redundant.

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Moreover, the Washington Post report points out readiness issues in the US submarine fleet, saying that 40% of US fast-attack submarines are currently waiting for maintenance. It argues against the revival of the SLCM-N and instead advocates for modernizing the US nuclear triad while addressing the US Navy's maintenance issues.

In an October 2023 article for the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists , Andrew Facini argues that the US fixation on hardware and military capability to counter China's growing nuclear arsenal could lead to instability and potential nuclear war due to the stability-instability paradox. Facini says the US should instead build mutual understanding and risk reduction measures with China to avoid escalation.

He criticizes the promotion of the SLCM-N and other tactical nuclear weapons, which he argues complicate conflict outcomes and increase the risk of rapid nuclear counter-attacks. He also points out the dangers of escalation dominance efforts, which adversaries like China could perceive as triggers for quick responses.

Facini advocates for a strategy that accepts potential vulnerabilities at certain levels to prevent worse conflicts and emphasizes the importance of arms control and communication for strategic stability. He says that the US should engage with China to reduce tensions and avoid nuclear war, highlighting the need for sustained investment in civil society and government processes to maintain deterrence.