(MENAFN- AzerNews) By Orkhan Amashov
In a vain bid to bolster its weakening sway over the
Azerbaijani-Armenian peace process, Russian President Vladimir
Putin hosted another of those trilateral meetings on 31 October and
achieved practically nothing, other than a written confirmation
that Baku and Yerevan are“appreciative” of the Russian
peacekeepers temporarily stationed in Karabakh.
Relevance test
If Putin's genuine intention was to mediate some
Russian-controlled mini-breakthrough, then his travails were of no
avail. If he wanted to give a mere simulacrum of progress via his
good offices, then he appeared to be too enfeebled to be the source
of authority, particularly when he concluded that the meeting was
“useful”, his verdict falling short of resounding self-praise. He
admitted that the main points included within the provisional text
of the declaration were omitted from the final document.
However, to suggest that the trilateral Sochi summit was a
complete non-event would not be right either, as the final document
should not be solely viewed in terms of what was included therein,
but also in the context of what the parties were striving to
incorporate and how it panned out.
As was initially apparent during the 28 October session of the
Kremlin-led Collective Security Organisation Treaty (CSTO)
preceding the trilateral meeting and, later, in Sochi on 31
October, the firm intention of Yerevan was to garner some
sympathetic recognition on several counts.
Firstly, Pashinyan wanted the recent 12–14 September escalation
to be blamed on Azerbaijan, resulting in the installation of
security mechanisms on the border for delimitation. Secondly, he
also proposed a return to the positions held before May 2021.
Thirdly, he wanted the declaration to reflect the Armenian view
that Azerbaijani control over the Farrukh height is encroaching on
the temporary zone under the responsibility of the Russian
contingent in Karabakh.
Fourthly, it was Yerevan's design to include a clause on the
repatriation of all Armenian detainees currently in Azerbaijan.
Fifthly, Pashinyan was willing to achieve a compromise on the
prolongation of the term of the Russian peacekeepers for 10–20
years, after which a sense of permanency would pervade.
Sixthly, and most importantly, during the trilateral meeting,
the Armenian Prime Minister proposed“the Russian project on the
Basic Principles”, focusing on the bilateral interstate relations
between the parties, to be referenced in the final document.
None of these made it to the 31 October declaration which, apart
from the questionably positive assessment of the Russian
peacekeeping mission, entails points on the“non-use of force” and
“the mutual recognition of sovereignty, territorial integrity and
inviolability of borders in accordance with the UN Charter and the
Alma-Ata Declaration of 1991”.
These clauses are not light years away from what was enshrined
in the 6 October Prague declaration and cannot be seen as remotely
new. These declarative clauses all require tight definitions so as
to assume a definable meaning and Russia, whose mediatory role is
understandably hinging on maintaining 'constructive ambiguity',
could not be expected to be the initiator of 'dangerously specific'
constructs.
President Aliyev, on the other hand, was operating under no
delusions of achieving a sweeping breakthrough, and contented
himself with foiling Armenian attempts, reiterating the essentials
of Baku's negotiating position and declaring, with a sense of
self-consequence, the most critical of the myriad points made
throughout the whole meeting: 'The Karabakh conflict is history; it
was resolved two years ago. Therefore, there is practically nothing
to discuss in this context, and achievement of the normalisation of
Azerbaijani-Armenian relations requires very serious steps'. Given
Putin's earlier statements alluding to the judiciousness of
deciding on Karabakh's fate at a later stage, this was also a
riposte to the Russian President.
Russia's game
Moscow must feel that it is owed something by both Armenia and
Azerbaijan. The 10 November 2020 declaration that ended the Second
Karabakh War was devastating for Yerevan. But it could have been
far worse, had the Kremlin not brokered a deal ending the
hostilities. Russia might also think that, by brokering this
self-same deal, it“allowed” Baku to get what it wanted, without
frustrating its own strategic objectives. It may very well be
possible that this mindset is still central to Vladimir Putin's
sense of primacy and his erstwhile attempts to ensure Russian
centrality in the post-2020 negotiations.
Since the Kremlin is adamant about its desire to pull the
strings, it understands it cannot please both sides, and needs to
be“beastly” and“benevolent” towards both parties in a measured
way, so as to fix the necessary balance. The CSTO has repeatedly
snubbed Yerevan's pleas to interfere after the recent border
escalation, with Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko's swift
reprimand of Prime Minister Pashinyan in the latest session being
most noteworthy.
Simultaneously, Putin reminded Armenia in his Valdai speech
that, unlike the so-called Washington document envisaging the
recognition of Azerbaijani sovereignty over Karabakh, within the
negotiations mediated under the aegis of Moscow, there is some
vague possibility that“certain characteristics of the region” will
be taken into account.
The benevolence towards Baku could be said to have manifested
itself as a virtual absence of Russian on-ground military backing
for Armenia and not completely superficial siding with Azerbaijan
over the Zangazur Corridor project. Nevertheless, Moscow does not
share Baku's view that the Karabakh problem is resigned to the
past, speaking of it in the present sense with irregular
frequency.
It is within Russia's interests to keep both sides in a state in
which they risk committing an unpardonable act of ingratitude
towards the Kremlin and obviate such an eventuality on the pain of
unfavourable repercussions. The Kremlin's design favours an
environment in which Baku and Yerevan face an uphill battle with a
prospect of falling further down preying more heavily on their
minds than the criticality of moving upwards. Like a complex game
of snakes and ladders, ascent is naturally accompanied by the risk
of falling into the abyss.
It could be assumed that Moscow is not just disinterested in a
peace treaty without its active involvement, but does not favour
any comprehensive deal anytime soon. Russia's way of looking at the
negotiations appears to be that long, arduous discussions on the
delimitation and demarcation (DD) of the state border and the
reopening of communications should be pursued under its aegis, with
a final treaty left for an unspecified future date.
This also complements the view that the Russian peacekeeping
contingent is necessary and should remain in place until the sides
agree on the DD subject and sign a peace treaty. In other words, by
suggesting that a comprehensive deal should not be viewed as an
immediate objective to be reached as quickly as possible, the
Kremlin is seeking to prolong the duration of its peacekeeping
mission in Karabakh.
All in all, the Sochi convocation revealed Russia's longstanding
stubborn urge to maintain its perceived mediatory primacy, despite
its increasingly weakened hold over the state of affairs in the
wake of the Ukrainian situation. Since the onset of the crisis, the
Moscow format of post-conflict normalisation has been gradually
evolving into a slow, arduous, substance-free and deeply
formalistic platform that is drifting into irrelevance..
Pashinyan's calculations seem to rely on pressing an improbable
geopolitical reset button, rendering a quasi-miraculous escape from
'doom'. His distinctly presentist temperament is one of the main
weaknesses shrouding his horizons. In fact, Pashinyan was
reasonably brave to propound certain proposals, the realisation of
which is impossible, due to his lacking both the art of persuasion
and sufficient political weight.
Nevertheless, he perhaps should be commended for proposing a
question to Putin which was asked through a cumulative force of
ungratified requests: 'What are you ready to give Armenia that the
West is unwilling to provide?'. The answer can only be hypothetical
and be regarded as one akin to 'as the lesser of the evils, Moscow
could still furnish the best possible deal for Armenia'.
Neil Watson, British Journalist, commented: 'As far as
Azerbaijan and Western public opinion is concerned, Russia's role
as a negotiator has been sacrificed, due to its Ukrainian
incursion. However, Armenia is like a drowning man grasping for a
straw. A beweakened Russia is like a large leaking raft. It will
stay afloat for a long time – just – but eventually will slowly
sink. Pinning its hopes on Russia is now Armenia's only hope to
delay accepting the inevitable.'
The situation is different with the Azerbaijani leader, of
course. President Aliyev is not just envisaging the future, but
effectively instigating a vision, in which there is no place for
dithering and teetering. In Sochi, he was crystal-clear again. No
misbegotten proposal that views Karabakh's future in uncertain
terms or as a matter for future deliberations will be touched with
a barge pole. Russia has displayed 'self-serving' open-mindedness
regarding all sorts of eventualities. But, when the final curtain
is about to fall, the Kremlin, too, will face its onerous duty to
bow out, recede into ignominy and lick its wounds like an
embattled, elderly lion.
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