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Hanwha's US solar subsidiary, Qcells, was once a poster child for Biden's clean energy agenda. It built factories in Georgia, hired local workers and qualified for generous Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) tax credits. For a time, it represented the ideal foreign investor: helping localize production while strengthening US supply-chain resilience.
But when Chinese firms began exporting low-cost panels through Malaysia, Vietnam, Thailand and Cambodia -countries Washington itself relies on to diversify away from China-Hanwha didn't respond with innovation or efficiency gains. Instead, it turned to politics, demanding new tariffs under the guise of fighting“circumvention.”
This was not a defense of American jobs-it was rent-seeking wrapped in patriotism. Worse, it ignored a simple truth: Southeast Asia isn't a loophole; it's a lifeline. The US depends on these hubs to maintain distance from China without triggering full decoupling. Punishing them risks fracturing the very network that enables diversification-and keeps ASEAN aligned with the West.
The backlash was swift. US solar developers warned of project cancellations and rising costs. Utilities balked. Even within Washington, Hanwha's gambit raised eyebrows: was Seoul now siding with protectionism over partnership?

Misreading the game

Hanwha's misstep reflects a wider pattern among middle powers: mistaking US rhetoric for operational reality.
Washington isn't pursuing full decoupling-it is engineering managed interdependence. It wants to secure choke points in semiconductors, AI and defense while retaining flexibility in lower-stakes sectors. When allies push for maximalist anti-China measures in industries like solar, they cross an invisible line-from useful partner to political irritant.
For South Korea, the stakes are particularly high. Its economy thrives on dual access: US technology and Chinese markets. Over-identifying with one side invites retaliation from the other. When corporate giants like Hanwha treat US politics as a bidding arena rather than a strategic alliance, they erode Korea's most valuable asset: trust.

The middle-power trap

Hanwha's overreach is not unique. Across the world, middle powers are walking the same tightrope.
– Turkey flirts with Russian arms deals while pledging loyalty to NATO-earning suspicion from both sides.
– Saudi Arabia plays Beijing and Washington off each other, leveraging oil and investment diplomacy to extract concessions.
– India walks the line most adroitly-joining the Quad while deepening trade with China and Russia.
Success in this game depends on restraint. Middle powers gain influence not by defying gravity, but by moving with it. Overreach begins when ambition outpaces awareness of scale.
Hanwha saw an opportunity in US–China friction but misunderstood the architecture of American strategy. It mistook access for influence-and influence for control.