Neither At War Nor At Peace In Singapore

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New areas of collaboration, including digital economy and green development, are also taking shape. Notably, SAF-PLA engagements have quietly expanded in recent years, adding nuance to the familiar framing that security ties are limited while economic ties flourish.

Yet, Singapore's troops continue to train in Taiwan under Project Starlight – an arrangement maintained for over 40 years, as former Deputy Prime Minister and Senior Minister S. Jayakumar reflected in his book“Diplomacy: A Singapore Experience.” This has been a point of tension with China, despite Singapore's unequivocal“one-China policy.”

Singapore remains the only Southeast Asian nation to acquire the American F-35 Joint Strike Fighter – unlike US treaty allies Thailand and the Philippines, which have opted to hedge with Sweden's Gripens and South Korea's FA-50s.

Coincidentally, the UK has also announced an expansion of its F-35 fleet. Unlike Britain's F-35s, which support its NATO nuclear deterrent posture, Singapore's fleet has no such role yet it underscores deep interoperability with US platform architecture.

Additionally, the SAF maintains rotational access agreements for US forces under the 1990 Memorandum of Understanding Regarding United States Use of Facilities in Singapore, the 2005 Strategic Framework Agreement and the 2015 Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement.

While access is also extended to international navies, the scale and frequency of US deployments – especially during heightened South China Sea and Taiwan Strait tensions – raises the perception that Singapore is de facto aligned with the US, even when it is not. This perception risk is not trivial.

The precedent of Qatar is instructive. In June, Iran launched at least 14 ballistic missiles at the Al-Udeid air base, a US facility in Qatar, in retaliation for US strikes on Iran's Fordow nuclear facility.

The Qatari Prime Minister later said it“scarred” the relationship. Qatar was targeted not for what it did, but for what it hosted. In a future US-China conflict, could the distinction between hosting and aligning of military assets and facilities similarly blur in the eyes of great-power rivals?

3. Diffusion as deterrence

As part of its 5G SAF evolution, Singapore's investments in AI-enabled platforms and unmanned systems go beyond addressing manpower constraints. They are designed to enhance the SAF's ability to project presence, monitor contested environments and sustain operations without unnecessarily placing personnel at risk.

Take, for example, the SAF's use of digital twins – computer-generated simulation environments that replicate high-threat theatres and allow units to rehearse complex operations virtually.

These simulations extend operational readiness across scenarios that may be too politically sensitive or physically hazardous to stage in real life. Paired with autonomous maritime patrols and remote sensing platforms, such tools are increasingly vital to maintaining forward situational awareness while minimizing exposure on the ground.

Geographic diffusion is another critical dimension. While longstanding overseas training partnerships remain foundational, new options merit exploration.

For instance, could Timor-Leste , soon to join ASEAN and cooperate with both Singapore and China under the Third Country Training Program, serve as neutral terrain for future SAF training, given its strategic proximity to Singapore and relatively low geopolitical baggage?

Similarly, could Oman's Port Salalah , situated near key chokepoints in the Indian Ocean, offer a viable platform for naval exercises or maritime logistics access beyond the operational reach of the First and Second Island Chains?

Deterrence through cohesion

Concentration of force has long been a cornerstone of military doctrine, famously championed by Carl von Clausewitz as the path to achieving a decisive advantage.

But in today's Indo-Pacific, where threats are more asymmetric, intentions more easily misread and escalation more automated than ever, the logic of strategic diffusion is gaining ground. For a point target like Singapore, diffusion buys time, creates space and preserves freedom of maneuver.

Yet diffusion does not replace concentration; it relies on it. The ability to disperse assets and operate with agility across domains only works when anchored by cohesion.