Can Prabowo Coherently Govern Indonesia?

Jokowi's programs have largely emphasized economic development, especially infrastructure, such as the construction of a new capital city , Nusantara, on Borneo.

Prabowo has also been a vocal advocate for the economic nationalist policies embraced by Jokowi. These include restrictions on the import of rice and other agricultural commodities to support local production and restrictions on the export of minerals to encourage domestic downstream processing.

Also in Prabowo's favor: the composition of the new parliament is remarkably similar to the one elected in 2019.

Former President Megawati Sukarnoputri's party, the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (or PDI-P), will be the largest in the parliament to be inaugurated in October, with 110 seats. Next is the Golkar Party with 102 seats and then Prabowo's Gerindra with 86.

None of the parties are opposed to the economic nationalist consensus that has long dominated Indonesian policy, including under Jokowi.

The only issues that generate real policy debate among the parties relate to sensitive questions over the state's involvement in religious affairs, especially regarding the status of women in public and private life.

Given these factors, is Prabowo's lack of a parliamentary majority really a problem?

It can be. If Prabowo and his ministries do not manage their relationships with lawmakers the right way, it can be a source of irritation and even obstruction.

Party loyalties can be tenuous and legislators are notorious for being mostly concerned with pork-barrelling and patronage in their own constituencies. They often use their seats to advance their own personal business interests.

For example, Prabowo could encounter problems in one of the few areas where his administration may try to make a mark: defense policy and procurement. As a former military officer and defense minister, he appears committed to building up Indonesia's military capability and asserting a leading role in regional security and the ASEAN bloc.

But when it comes to major defense budget allocations, his administration will need to satisfy powerful lawmakers who are linked to domestic contractors and others who benefit from military spending.

His controversial decision as defense minister to purchase outdated fighter jets from Qatar in 2023 was shelved after being criticized in parliament. His apparently off-the-cuff proposal for a Russia-Ukraine peace plan at a conference in June 2023 was criticized, as well.

So, how will Prabowo manage the problem of the parliament?

He will almost certainly follow the same approach of his predecessors – tempt as many parties as possible into his tent by giving out attractive ministerial positions.

This is where the politicking for parliamentary positions and jockeying for cabinet posts are directly related. A party's numbers in the parliament are its main bargaining chip for a place in cabinet. And the gifting of a ministerial post is the key to the president gaining support from rivals.

If experience is any guide, most parties will join his alliance if a ministry is on offer. The majority of parties did this under Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono's administration from 2004–14, as well as during Jokowi's time in office. Prabowo benefited himself when Jokowi gave him the defense portfolio in 2019.

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So far, no parties have come forward to publicly lobby for a post in Prabowo's government, but this is undoubtedly part of the game of playing hard-to-get.

It is possible that Megawati's party, PDI-P, may stay out of the cabinet and attempt to lead a parliamentary opposition. She likely still feels jilted by Jokowi, a former member of PDI-P , after he decided to support Prabowo instead of his own party's presidential candidate during the campaign.

But other parties are likely to be receptive to cabinet posts. While it is true that a healthy legislature requires a healthy opposition, most Indonesian parties are more attracted by a share of the spoils of government than they are by the notion of keeping government accountable in opposition.

So, from now until the October inauguration, we will see a flurry of backroom meetings, flirtations and negotiations between Prabowo and the leaders of the parties to patch together a cabinet.

Then, for Prabowo, comes the even harder task of trying to govern with such an unwieldy coalition, while maintaining some semblance of policy coherence and coordination.

Stephen Sherlock is Visiting Fellow, Department of Political and Social Change, Coral Bell School of Asia Pacific Affairs, Australian National University

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article .