(MENAFN- Asia Times) When Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi undertook a three-day state visit to Beijing last week, most headlines focused on prospects for reviving the iran nuclear deal – known officially as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) – or how much oil China might buy from the Islamic Republic.
But a careful review of what transpired reveals a more sobering, and narrower, picture of China-Iran relations.
In 2021, China agreed to invest US$400 billion over 25 years to support iran's development . The agreement was reportedly“activated” last year during a visit to China by Iranian Foreign Minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian, leading many to assume Raisi's visit would yield specifics on implementation.
However, they were disappointed. While there was a long list of matters agreed to – such as on sovereignty, governance, the JCPOA, and regional affairs – economic agreements were virtually non-existent. There wasn't even reference to the energy sector or on increasing Chinese imports of Iranian oil and gas – the impetus for China's $400 billion pledge. About the only substantial announcement was related to cooperation on agricultural technologies .
Since Raisi became president in August 2021, Iran has attracted $5.95 billion in direct foreign investment, and nearly half of that has come from Russia, at $2.7 billion. China's presence is limited to small- and medium-sized projects worth just $185 million . The rosy picture China painted for Iran in 2021 has yet to materialize. What's China waiting for?
For starters, China has been under tremendous international pressure over its economic ties to Russia since the beginning of the war in Ukraine. Investing heavily in Iran now would only invite further scrutiny and leave it open to a new round of sanctions from Washington. China has made a similar calculation by not investing heavily in Afghanistan.
Second, Chinese observers who are critical of Iran's revolutionary past and expansionist foreign policy believe that by withholding investment, China is looking to restore balance in the Middle East. This line of thinking suggests that Beijing, opposed to Iran's support of regional militant groups, wants to punish Tehran for destabilizing the neighborhood.
Third, the JCPOA is a double-edged sword for China. Without the resumption of the nuclear deal, China's economic engagement with Iran faces the threat of financial penalties. But if the JCPOA is indeed revived, Iran could prioritize more“friendly” investors from Europe, bypassing China altogether.
While Beijing has publicly called for the resumption of the deal, the shadow of uncertainty it casts on China's economic engagement cannot be overlooked.
Clearly, China will not abandon Iran, just as it hasn't abandoned Russia. As long as the countries share an agenda – to counter and undermine American dominance – Beijing will see Tehran as a useful partner in a critical region, and a source of potential for future collaboration. Raisi's visit is reflective of this political conviction, as is Chinese President Xi Jinping's promise to repay the favor .
Links to Arab regimes a priority
Yet rather than double down on Iran, China is looking to improve ties with the united states . In the Middle East, developing closer relations with states in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) also seems to sit atop Beijing's list of priorities.
For pragmatic and economic reasons, China needs to maintain its relationships with the GCC and with Iran. This is why Xi's 2016 visit to the region included stops in both Saudi Arabia and Iran, and why then-foreign minister Wang Yi's 2021 visit had stops in Saudi Arabia, Iran, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain and Oman.
And, given that Xi was in saudi arabia in december , it stands to reason that Beijing wanted to balance that trip with an invitation to Raisi.
But symbolism doesn't pay the bills. Based on Chinese investment in the region, it's clear that Beijing isn't favoring Iran over the GCC.
In 2021, China's total trade with Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Oman and Iraq amounted to $230 billion , and trade with Saudi Arabia alone was $82.4 billion . By comparison, China's trade with Iran in 2021 was $14.7 billion , which increased to $15.8 billion in 2022. Iran isn't even among china's top 10 crude-oil suppliers .
The deals China has signed with GCC states are comprehensive, covering a range of industries from green energy, digital technologies, transportation and infrastructure. They also have implementation schedules, which is fundamentally different from China's 25-year agreement with Iran, a pledge that looks great on paper but has little to back it up.
While that doesn't mean China will never act, it does mean that its lack of action now is not helping Iran during its most difficult days.
On the second day of his trip to China, Raisi visited the elite Peking University, where he was awarded an “honorary professor” title . The ceremony was formal and conveyed plenty of warm feelings, but did nothing to advance Raisi's objective – to secure investments that might help restore confidence in Iran's flagging economy.
Just like the rest of his trip, it was all style, no substance.
This article was provided by syndication bureau , which holds copyright.
Yun Sun is director of the China program and co-director of the East Asia program at the Stimson Center in Washington, DC.