China's Missile Reach Forces Japan Back To Iwo Jima

In this context, Japan's plans to expand its military presence on the island may be linked to providing redundancy and defense-in-depth in case bases such as Okinawa were taken out by Chinese strikes during a US-China conflict over Taiwan.

The US Department of Defense's (DoD) China Military Power Report 2025 states that China's expanding arsenal of long-range precision strike weapons gives the People's Liberation Army (PLA) the ability to threaten US forces far into the Western Pacific, with kinetic strikes potentially reaching 2,800–3,700 kilometers from mainland China, placing many US bases in the region, such as Okinawa and Guam, within range.

Pointing out Okinawa's vulnerability to such an attack, Kelly Grieco and other writers mention in a December 2024 Stimson Center article that China's growing arsenal of ballistic and cruise missiles could crater runways and taxiways at Japanese and US forward bases in Okinawa, such as Naha Air Base, Kadena Air Base and US Marine Corps Air Station Futenma, preventing aircraft from taking off or landing.

Grieco and others say that such an attack could close US bases in Japan to fighter operations for roughly 280 hours (about 11–12 days) and to tanker operations for around 800 hours (over 33 days), severely degrading US airpower early in a conflict.

The lack of airfield fortification also compounds the problem. Thomas Shugart III and Timothy Walton mention in a January 2025 Hudson Institute report that US bases in Japan, including those in Okinawa, are highly vulnerable to Chinese missile attack because they lack sufficient fortification and hardened infrastructure.

Shugart and Walton point out that many US aircraft operate in the open on ramps with limited protection, meaning precision ballistic or cruise missile strikes could destroy aircraft, fuel systems, and support infrastructure on the ground.

Situating Iwo Jima within a larger network of US and Japan Pacific island bases, solidifying Japan's military presence on the island could boost the deterrent value of the US-Japan alliance, since every structure Japan builds there might also serve US forces.

Such ties in with the US Agile Combat Employment (ACE) concept, which disperses aircraft and support forces across numerous austere or temporary bases, enabling rapid movement and flexible operations to complicate enemy targeting and maintain combat effectiveness under attack.

Against this backdrop, Japan could be elevating Iwo Jima's role as an air operations hub in the Second Island Chain, which spans the Bonin Islands, the Volcano Islands, the Marianas, and Western New Guinea.

However, within the Second Island Chain, Guam may be facing similar vulnerabilities to those of Okinawa. A US Government Accountability Office (GAO) report from May 2025 mentions that Guam remains vulnerable despite US missile defenses because its current defensive architecture is limited and still under development.

The report notes that the strategic island is presently protected mainly by a single Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) battery consisting of six missile launchers and one radar, with additional protection occasionally provided by US Navy ships.

While the report says the US DoD plans to build a more robust integrated system-the Guam Defense System-to counter threats such as advanced ballistic, cruise, and hypersonic missiles, this capability will not be fully deployed until the late 2020s or early 2030s.

Furthermore, Lyle Goldstein argues in an October 2025 Defense Priorities article that while the US is building additional bases at Tinian and Palau as backups should Guam be taken out of action, these facilities are likely too few and too distant to make a major difference.