Japan Searching For A Quiet Place In Trumpworld

Ishiba knows he cannot reproduce the close relationship that former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe had with Trump. The American leader refers to the late Abe routinely when Japan comes up, but he will quickly find the new Japanese leader is not a mere extension of Abe.

“Ishiba's style goes counter to that of Abe – he is not a flatterer,” says Richard Dyck, Tokyo-based director of Japan Industrial Partners, who has been part of a study group attended regularly by Ishiba.

Asked to describe the greatest impact of a Trump presidency on Japan, a former senior Japanese foreign ministry official who was deeply engaged in negotiations with the first Trump administration replied with just one word:“tariffs.”

Japan, so far, has not been on Trump's tariff list. Next in line is the European Union, and the tariffs on Mexico and Canada are only paused for a month. The 10% tariff imposed on China may also lead to some kind of negotiation. But if those pauses prove to be temporary, Japan will be a de facto victim as well of the widening economic war that Trump has unleashed.

The cross-border tariffs would effectively dismantle the US-Mexico-Canada trade pact that was negotiated during Trump's first term. In that framework, Japanese firms have set up hundreds of factories in both Mexico and Canada to create an integrated North American supply chain. Some 1,300 Japanese companies operate in Mexico alone.

The auto industry would be the first to feel the impact of these tariffs, not only Japanese firms but also US and Korean ones, all of which operate plants in both Canada and Mexico not only to assemble vehicles for export to the US market but also to supply the vital car parts that go to plants inside the US. Nissan alone exported 326,000 vehicles to the US from Mexico.

The tariffs against China, on top of tariffs already imposed, will also impact Japanese firms that use China as a manufacturing base for exports. A growing trade war with China would, of course, have broader consequences for Chinese growth and hit Japanese firms that produce for the Chinese market.

In some circles in Tokyo, there is a hope, echoed by American policymakers, that Japan's role as an anchor in an anti-China confrontation will ensure that it remains off the Trump list of bad actors.

Traditional conservatives who have a hawkish view of China hold some key positions in the Trump administration, notably Secretary of State Marco Rubio and National Security Advisor Michael Waltz.

In that framework of confrontation, the US may look to strengthen security ties with Japan and other partners in the region, Randall Schriver, a former defense official in the first Trump administration, predicted while speaking to the JIIA gathering last week.

Others are concerned that Trump may opt instead for some“grand bargain” with Chinese leader Xi Jinping, a new version of a“G2” with China that effectively excludes Japan.

However, most experts dismiss that worry.“The danger of that is pretty low,” according to Thomas Fingar, a Stanford China scholar and former senior US intelligence official. If Trump wants to go to China to see Xi, the Chinese“will be delighted to have him there.” As for Trump, he“will go because it will be a great personal triumph.”

But the key issues on the table are difficult economic ones – technology competition and market access. The tech billionaires want access to China that is not easy for the Chinese to give, Fingar tells Toyo Keizai.

“Even if Trump and Xi meet, it is not the start of G2,” agrees Tokyo University expert Sahashi.“Military-strategic competition will continue.”

Prime Minister Ishiba is already headed in a very different direction: a concerted effort to improve relations with China and with the rest of Asia – particularly South Korea and key countries in Southeast Asia – to lessen the harsh impact of the return of Trump and the drift into global economic warfare.

Ishiba's view of defense policy is focused less on the needs of the alliance with the US than on the importance of strengthening Japan's ability to defend itself. His advocacy of an Asian NATO has been widely misunderstood as a further subordination to American strategic goals. Rather, as Foreign Minister Takeshi Iwaya explains in a recent issue of the monthly Bungei Shunju , the aim is to create a“multi-layered security system for Asia.”

In unscripted remarks to the Global Dialogue, Ishiba spoke passionately about how the country needed to mark the eightieth anniversary of the end of World War II by engaging in a serious examination of the decision to go to war and Japan's defeat.

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“It is time for us to revisit and review the war experience,” he said. He called for Japan to understand“how to position itself in the world to create a world with more peace.'

There is a comparable interest in China, observes Stanford scholar Fingar, the former US deputy director of national intelligence. China has been reaching out to Japan, particularly, and to Europe and others, seeking to repair the damage done by its alliance with Russia and Vladimir Putin.

“The Chinese smile diplomacy is partly due to fear of being isolated,” Fingar told Toyo Keizai.“They have buyers' remorse because of lining up with Moscow,” with growing criticism within China that it has not been a good deal. But China is also motivated by its own interests.

“The Chinese want to bolster relations because it is useful for a domestic audience. Japan is in that category – if you can divide it from the Americans, it can fuel doubts about the reliability of the Americans. But the big motivation is China's economy. They don't need to have friendly relations with Japan for strategic reasons, but they need Japan to continue to play in the Chinese economy.”

The next months will be a test of how far China is ready to go to really improve ties with Japan.“We need some commitment from their side,” says Sahashi, including clear steps to shelve economic coercion, protect Japanese citizens and investors and ease their military pressure on the Senkaku islands and the East China Sea.

The summit in Washington this week, and the trade war that has been launched, will likely encourage both Tokyo and Beijing to go down this road. But in order not to openly challenge the monster, it will be done quietly.

Daniel Sneider is lecturer in international policy at Stanford University and a former Christian Science Monitor foreign correspondent. This article was originally published by Toyo Keizai and is republished with permission.

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