India Aims New Crystal Maze Missile At Pakistan's Nukes

Before launch, the pilot allocates a mission to the missile and loads data such as target type, coordinates, impact angle, azimuth, topographic image data and fuse delays.

ROCKS uses INS/GPS guidance for midcourse navigation trajectory, with its terminal phase using terrain matching or anti-radiation technology that locks onto target radar signals to overcome GPS jamming scenarios and minimize target location errors, with a circular error probable (CEP) of just 3 meters.

India's choice of Israel as a supplier of a strategic weapon such as an ALBM reflects its drive to wean itself off its dependency on Russian weapons , whose effectiveness has been put into question by the Ukraine war.

This month, Politico reported that India's arms purchases from Russia have been declining, with the Ukraine war being a significant factor in the decrease. Politico notes that while Russian weapons made up 76% of India's arms purchases from 2009 to 2013, that has now dropped to 36% in the last five years.

The source notes that while India will continue to buy spare parts from Russia for in-service Russian equipment, it no longer considers Russia a source of big-ticket items.

It mentions the poor performance of Russian weapons in the Ukraine war, such as its widely-touted Kinzhal hypersonic weapon, which has been intercepted by Patriot missiles in the conflict.

The report also notes its Black Sea Fleet warships have been sunk by drones and cruise missiles while top-of-the-line aircraft such as Sukhoi fighters have been shot down quickly.

The provision of substandard MiG-29K fighters to India and unfulfilled defense contracts have also acted as significant disincentives for India to continue to rely on Russia as its primary arms supplier, the report said.

Politico notes that while India cannot wean itself off Russian weapons overnight, it is diversifying its defense partners, engaging countries such as the US, France, Germany, South Korea and Israel, while recalibrating its relations with Russia to avoid Western secondary sanctions.

In discussing the role of ALBMs in India's military doctrine, Rohit Kaura notes in a December 2018 article for the Center for Air Power Studies that evolving air defenses have rendered traditional strategic bombers obsolete, necessitating ALBMs to allow bombers to stay away from the range of surface-to-air missiles (SAM) and interceptor aircraft.

Kaura notes that ALBMs allow bombers to remain a credible second-strike option, as ALBMs are very hard to intercept after launch, ensuring counterstrike capabilities.

He also notes that ALBMs deprive adversaries of lower-altitude boost-phase intercept opportunities, with the ability to launch ALBMs from bombers from multiple locations, leaving terminal-phase interception the only realistic defense.

Kaura notes that in times of high alert, the Indian Air Force (IAF) could send its strike aircraft to holding positions far from the range of enemy air defenses, thus not needing to enter enemy airspace to be effective.

He notes that once ALBM-armed aircraft are airborne, the national leadership can be assured of retaliation capabilities, with aerial refueling enabling them to be airborne for a day.

Kaura mentions that ALBMs offer a way to increase the survivability of land-based nuclear forces until India can develop reliable submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM) and nuclear ballistic missile submarines (SSBN) as the ultimate in nuclear deterrence.

He notes that ALBMs can be retargeted before launch, which is a capability deficient in ground-based systems. In addition, he says that ALBM-armed aircraft can be used as a second-strike weapon to attack targets missed in a first strike or attack countervalue or counterforce targets.

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Countervalue targeting refers to using nuclear weapons to target an enemy's cities or economic infrastructure. Coupled with the concept of mutually assured destruction (MAD), this is thought to reduce significantly the possibility of a first strike.

In contrast, counterforce targeting aims to eliminate an adversary's military infrastructure in a limited nuclear war. However, counterforce targeting is associated with first-strike capabilities, bringing the possibility of nuclear escalation.

In a 2018 article in the peer-reviewed International Security Journal , Christopher Clary and Vipin Narang note that Pakistan's introduction of tactical nuclear weapons may have put India in strategic paralysis, with India caught between its“no first use” nuclear doctrine and the possibility of Pakistan using tactical nuclear weapons against India's conventional forces.

Hence, Clary and Narang note that some Indian policymakers are drawn to developing counterforce capabilities to eliminate Pakistan's nuclear capability to attack strategic targets in India.

While they note that a counterforce strategy is in line with India's massive retaliation doctrine, it incentivizes Pakistan to unleash its nuclear arsenal before losing it.

Moreover, they point out the questionable odds of a successful Indian counterforce strike on Pakistan's nuclear arsenal, mentioning challenges in identifying and intercepting Pakistan's nuclear arsenal.

They also say that India's adoption of even a limited counterforce nuclear strategy could fuel an arms race, as Pakistan would most likely react to India's acquisition of counterforce capabilities.