China Ramps Up Missile Buildup For A Taiwan War

That growth is backed by a substantial increase in production and storage facilities, with CNN reporting in November 2025 that China expanded 60% of 136 missile-related facilities between 2020 and 2025, adding over 21 million square feet of floor space, identifying 99 missile manufacturing sites, of which 65 have expanded.

On missile deployment, The New York Times reported in September 2025 that China is expanding and dispersing missile deployments along its eastern coast facing Taiwan. It reported that missile brigades have built larger new bases and added launch pads and facilities for mobile launchers.

The report says Chinese forces practice launching missiles from farm fields, valleys, expressways and coastal outcrops near Taiwan. It notes that during wartime, commanders would deploy mobile missile units to caves and protected sites, then move them after firing to avoid detection.

In the event of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan, Lyle Goldstein, in an October 2025 Defense Priorities report, says China would use ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, rocket artillery, drones and airpower to suppress Taiwan's air defenses and strike radars, command-and-control nodes, airbases, naval facilities and logistics infrastructure.

Goldstein says Chinese strike missions could number in the thousands per day initially, while China's industrial capacity would allow it to replenish missile stocks during a prolonged conflict and sustain repeated strikes on Taiwanese airfields.

Looking into the effect of Chinese missile strikes on Taiwanese airfields, Kelly Grieco and Hunter Slingbaum argue in a March 2026 Stimson report that Chinese missile and artillery strikes could crater Taiwan's runways and taxiways, grounding Taiwanese fighters for days or weeks, and potentially for months if China employed more advanced missile systems or aerial bombardment.

Using modeling based on DF-11 and DF-15 missile attacks, they say China could keep Taiwan's fighter bases closed for over two weeks, and nearly a month if long-range artillery were added.

They also note that five successful strikes could disable all operational surfaces at Ching Chuan Kang Air Base, leaving surviving aircraft unable to take off or land, while repeated Chinese follow-up strikes could keep airfields unusable during the conflict's opening phase.

Comparing China's missile production capacity to that of the US, a January 2026 Heritage Foundation report states that Chinese state-owned defense enterprises are reportedly producing munitions, high-end weapons systems, and other equipment at rates approximately five to six times faster than their US counterparts.

The report further assesses that the People's Liberation Army (PLA) could plausibly surge output of selected munition types by roughly 150–250% within six to eight months of national mobilization.

It attributes this potential to military-civil fusion policies, automated“smart factory” production lines, the rapid conversion of dual-use civilian industry, and China's access to critical inputs such as rare-earth elements and energetic materials.

In comparison, Seth Jones argues in a May 2026 Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) report that the US military lacks sufficient munitions and industrial readiness for a prolonged war with China, particularly in long-range strike and air defense systems.