Indonesia Blindly Drifting Into A US Vs China Storm

Economically, the relationship is deep and growing. China is Indonesia's largest trading partner and is deeply integrated into Indonesia's minerals, manufacturing and infrastructure sectors. Indonesia officially joined BRICS + in January 2025, a bloc in which China is the primary force building systems and channels outside US-led institutions.

Yet these engagements do not resolve Beijing's core concern: the prospect that Indonesian airspace and maritime routes could be used by US forces in a kinetic conflict. This concern has crystallized around recent reports of a US request for broad military overflight access.

Indonesia's own Foreign Ministry has cautioned that such access could enable US surveillance, create the perception of an alliance and possibly make Indonesia a target in a regional conflict pitting the US against China.

Beijing's diplomatic response, delivered through its Foreign Ministry, was characteristically measured but pointed, saying defense cooperation should not“target any third party” or harm regional stability. The“third party” did not need to be named.

Herein lies the crux of the matter. In contemporary conflict, overflight rights, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) integration and shared logistical corridors shape military outcomes more than formal treaties or partnerships.

Indonesia may not choose geopolitical sides - but its airspace could be used by the US before it does. That is the threshold Beijing's statement suggests it is wary of Indonesia's crossing.

China's reaction to the Indonesia-Japan agreement was likewise telling. When Tokyo's leadership signaled that a Taiwan contingency could constitute a direct security threat to Japan, Beijing responded sharply, warning of consequences while saying a red line had been crossed.

Tokyo's announcement marked a decisive shift from strategic ambiguity to an explicit commitment to contingency planning. Once a state is seen as part of a Taiwan scenario, it is no longer neutral – it is pre-positioned in China's strategic calculus.

Indonesia has made no such declaration on Taiwan. But its deepening defense engagement with Japan creates what analysts call a second-order alignment risk. Beijing's concern is not what Jakarta says; it is with whom Indonesia is becoming functionally aligned.

The events of February deepened this perception. Indonesia's participation in a US-led“peace” initiative framed around Palestine was quickly overtaken by the subsequent US–Israel strikes on Iran, leading to the disruption in Hormuz, a surge in energy prices and an overt US shift from diplomacy to coercion.

A diplomatic initiative turned, without warning, into an instrument of force, leaving Indonesia exposed – appearing to have taken sides in the process.

Individually, none of Indonesia's recent moves – defense cooperation with the US, Australia and Japan, a trade agreement including critical minerals cooperation with Washington and industrial discussions with Europe – amounts to overt alignment. But collectively, they form a clear pattern.

This is not policy incoherence. It is a strategy of drift through steady accumulation. Each step is defensible, but together they reduce ambiguity and create a directional signal.

At the same time, geopolitical competition is intensifying with European sanctions regimes expanding to include third-country nodes, turning energy and other transactions into geopolitical positioning.