The incremental steps-high-level official visits, arms sales packages, training programs, and increasingly explicit security guarantees-have created what scholars call an“escalation trap.”

Each step makes it harder for Washington to back down without losing credibility, while simultaneously making it harder for Beijing to ignore what it views as American provocations.

This dynamic should sound familiar to students of international relations. It's precisely how great powers stumble into catastrophic wars they never intended to fight-through a series of seemingly reasonable commitments that cumulatively create impossible situations.

The question American policymakers should ask themselves is whether they're prepared for their daughters and sons to die in the Taiwan Strait, because that's where this trajectory leads.

The economic dimension adds another layer of complexity that ideological hawks prefer to ignore. China is America's largest trading partner, and despite all the talk of“decoupling,” the two economies remain deeply interconnected.

A war over Taiwan would destroy this relationship overnight, triggering a global economic crisis that would make the 2008 financial meltdown look manageable by comparison.

Meanwhile, Taiwan's famous semiconductor industry-often cited as justification for American involvement-represents both an asset and a vulnerability. Yes, Taiwan produces many of the world's most advanced chips.

But those facilities would likely be destroyed in any military conflict, making them useless to whoever“wins.” The rational response to semiconductor dependence is to diversify production, not to threaten war with a nuclear power.

Proponents of a more confrontational approach toward China frequently invoke America's regional allies as force multipliers in any Taiwan scenario.

This reflects another dangerous delusion. Japan and South Korea have their own complex relationships with Beijing and their own domestic political constraints.

Australia is even more economically dependent on China than the United States is. None of these countries has shown enthusiasm for actual military confrontation with China over Taiwan-and why should they?

European allies are even less likely to support American military action in the Taiwan Strait. They view the Asia-Pacific as outside their sphere of vital interests and are already dealing with the costs of the Ukraine conflict.

Expecting them to sacrifice their economic relationships with China for what they see as an American obsession is unrealistic.

None of this means abandoning Taiwan to its fate or appeasing Chinese aggression. But it does mean adopting a more realistic approach that acknowledges both American limitations and Chinese motivations.

First, Washington should return to genuine strategic ambiguity. This means stopping the incremental steps toward explicit security guarantees while maintaining enough uncertainty to deter Chinese adventurism.

Strategic ambiguity worked for 40 years because it gave all parties flexibility to avoid the worst-case scenarios.

Second, American policy should focus on making any Chinese military action as costly as possible through defensive arms sales and asymmetric warfare capabilities, while avoiding provocative offensive weapons that Beijing views as preparation for Taiwanese independence.

Third, the United States should explore diplomatic solutions that acknowledge Chinese concerns about sovereignty while preserving Taiwan's democratic autonomy.

This might involve reviving proposals for confederation or other creative arrangements that satisfy Beijing's need for symbolic unity while maintaining Taiwan's practical independence.

Sign up for one of our free newsletters

• The Daily Report Start your day right with Asia Times' top stories
• AT Weekly Report A weekly roundup of Asia Times' most-read stories

Power limits

Ultimately, the Taiwan question illustrates a broader challenge facing American foreign policy: learning to operate in a multipolar world where the United States cannot simply impose its preferred outcomes through military superiority or economic leverage.

China's rise represents a fundamental shift in the global balance of power, and no amount of military posturing or alliance-building will restore the brief unipolar moment that followed the Soviet collapse.

The tragedy of American foreign policy since 9/11 has been the repeated failure to recognize these limits, leading to costly interventions in Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya and elsewhere that achieved little beyond demonstrating American vulnerabilities.

Taiwan could represent the ultimate expression of this strategic overreach-a conflict that America cannot win at an acceptable cost, fought over interests that are peripheral to genuine American security.

The choice facing Washington is stark: adapt American strategy to the realities of Chinese power and geographical proximity, or risk a catastrophic war that could destroy the global economy and potentially escalate to nuclear exchange.

For those who claim to put America first, that should be an easy choice to make.

Leon Hadar is a senior fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute and contributing editor at The American Conservative. He is the author of“Quagmire: America in the Middle East” and“Sandstorm: Policy Failure in the Middle East.”

Sign up here to comment on Asia Times stories Or Sign in to an existing accoun

Thank you for registering!

An account was already registered with this email. Please check your inbox for an authentication link.

• Click to share on X (Opens in new window) X
• Click to share on LinkedIn (Opens in new window) LinkedIn
• Click to share on Facebook (Opens in new window) Facebook
• Click to share on WhatsApp (Opens in new window) WhatsApp
• Click to share on Reddit (Opens in new window) Reddit
• Click to email a link to a friend (Opens in new window) Email
• Click to print (Opens in new window) Print