Pakistan's Fatah-3 May Open Gulf Door To Chinese Missiles

Missile Threat says the HD-1 emphasizes affordability, lighter weight and fuel efficiency through its solid-fuel ramjet. In contrast, BrahMos emphasizes kinetic strike power, multi-platform deployment, stealth features, advanced INS/GPS and active/passive radar guidance, heavier payload options and longer ranges of 300–500 kilometers depending on variant.

At the operational level, the Fatah-3 could give Pakistan a similar conventional precision-strike capability targeting India's strategic infrastructure, while staying below the nuclear threshold.

In the May 2025 skirmishes over Kashmir, India notably deployed the BrahMos missile to target Pakistan's Nur Khan Airbase, located roughly 1.6 kilometers from the Pakistan Strategic Plans Division (SPD) headquarters, the unit overseeing the country's nuclear arsenal.

The BrahMos strike on Nur Khan may have demonstrated a potential Indian conventional counterforce capability against Pakistan's nuclear command-and-control infrastructure, while exposing that as a capability gap for Pakistan.

As such, the Fatah-3 could provide Pakistan with further flexibility in its asymmetric response against India. As noted by Mandip Singh in a January 2026 report for the Center for Land Warfare Studies (CLAWS), Pakistan's Full Spectrum Deterrence (FSD) doctrine envisions the use of tactical nuclear weapons to skip the conventional stage of conflict, which is between the sub-conventional phase and nuclear war.

But Singh points out that Pakistan's ARFC adds another step between sub-conventional conflict and conventional conflict –“pre-conventional conflict” – which involves non-contact, deep, and calibrated missile, rocket, and drone attacks to offset India's conventional superiority while staying below the threshold of nuclear war.

In view of that, Pakistan's ARFC, armed with the Fatah-3, could now have a viable conventional counterforce asset against India's nuclear arsenal, enabling Pakistan to threaten India's strategic deterrent short of using tactical nuclear weapons for counterforce strikes.

Aside from giving Pakistan a potential conventional counterforce asset against India's nuclear arsenal, the Fatah-3 could enable China to indirectly increase its footprint in the Middle East through arms sales.

A South China Morning Post (SCMP) article this month argues that Pakistan's deployment of fighter aircraft to Saudi Arabia under the Strategic Mutual Defense Agreement (SMDA), signed in September 2025, could give Chinese-origin systems operational exposure under real crisis conditions without direct Chinese involvement.

SCMP notes that reports indicated one deployed aircraft may have been a JF-17 Block III, co-produced by Pakistan and China, while analysts said Pakistani operation of Chinese-linked systems could help rebut Gulf concerns that such platforms are“unproven,” potentially making Saudi Arabia more receptive to Chinese-equipped aircraft.

It also cites a Reuters report stating that Pakistan and Saudi Arabia were discussing converting roughly US$2 billion in Saudi Arabian loans into JF-17 acquisitions, a move that could directly benefit Chinese defense exporters.

Beyond possible JF-17 acquisitions from Pakistan, Saudi Arabia could consider the Fatah-3 missile for its missile buildup. Fabian Hinz, in a February 2025 article for the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), notes that Saudi Arabia has quietly expanded or modernized its ballistic missile force by constructing a suspected new underground missile base, adding tunnels and upgrading Royal Saudi Strategic Missile Force (RSSMF) infrastructure since the late 2010s.

Hinz points out that Saudi Arabia first acquired Chinese DF-3 intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) in 1988 and later reportedly sought more accurate solid-fuel Chinese systems, with later reporting claiming Saudi Arabia purchased the DF-21 medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) in 2007.