Taiwan Spending And Betting Big On Home-Built Submarines

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They mention that submarines' ability to operate in this environment makes them a critical asymmetric tool in Taiwan's defense strategy, enabling them to inflict significant damage on the invading fleet.

However, Cancian and others point out that while submarines alone would not be sufficient to repel a full-scale invasion, they would play a crucial role in delaying and complicating the PLA's efforts.

That, in turn, would give Taiwan and its allies, including the US, more time to respond and potentially prevent Chinese forces from establishing a sustainable beachhead.

In line with Cancian and others' assessment, David Axe says in a September 2023 Forbes article that the Hai Kun and its seven sister submarines, alongside bombers, are vital to repelling an invasion and would have the potential to sink numerous Chinese vessels.

In addition to providing tactical and operational options for Taiwan, Collin Koh, in a February 2024 Newsweek article , points out the psychological and political value of Taiwan's submarines.

Koh says Hai Kun's public unveiling aimed to assure the Taiwanese public of accountability and that the project is progressing as planned. He adds that the unveiling projects deterrence, leaving China guessing about the submarine's capabilities.

Although Taiwan's audacious submarine program is a critical asymmetric defense undertaking, its construction, personnel training and strategic integration challenges have underscored the complexity of transforming this vision into reality.

In a June 2023 article for the Global Taiwan Institute (GTI), John Dotson points out that constructing eight submarines is a daunting task. Dotson says it is uncertain how long it will take for Taiwan's current naval shipbuilding facilities to build all the vessels, especially considering the competition for production capacity and budget constraints for building surface ships locally.

He also mentions uncertainties concerning the training and certification of crews for a significantly larger Taiwanese submarine fleet and the establishment of protocols to manage overlapping patrol areas with allied and regional nations during peacetime and wartime.

Dotson notes that Taiwan's biggest submarine operational challenge is integrating these assets into its overall defense strategy.

He says that Taiwan could consider operational models such as Nazi Germany's“wolfpacks,” the US Navy's controversial 1980s“Maritime Strategy,” and a passive submarine“fleet in being” to complicate PLA planners' blockade or invasion plans.

Balancing the construction of submarines with a diversified naval force, Taiwan faces the dual challenge of integrating asymmetric strategies while countering China's conventional and unconventional military tactics.

In January 2024, Asia Times mentioned that Taiwan's simultaneous naval construction projects may indicate a challenge in designing its naval force.

This challenge arises from balancing building an asymmetric force to counter China's unconventional tactics in disputed areas and establishing a conventional force to defend against a possible invasion.

Taiwan emphasizes developing a highly visible conventional naval force to counter China's gray zone tactics. However, this approach does not effectively address China's significant military advantage.

Taiwan's strategy of diversifying its force design and procurement to handle conventional and asymmetric warfare may leave it vulnerable.