The Quad's New Agenda: Ports, Cables And Minerals

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Ports, logistics hubs, telecommunications systems and undersea cables are no longer viewed simply as commercial assets. They are assessed on resilience, access and economic security.

China's growing economic footprint has accelerated this shift. Beijing is the largest trading partner for most economies in East and Southeast Asia. China has financed or constructed infrastructure projects across Asia, Africa, the Middle East and the Pacific through the Belt and Road Initiative.

Chinese firms have also developed commercial interests in ports, logistics facilities and telecommunications networks across several strategically important maritime regions.

For countries such as Australia, Japan and India, the concern is less the ownership of any individual project than the cumulative effect of expanding Chinese influence across the infrastructure and connectivity networks that underpin regional economies.

The Pacific Islands have become increasingly important within this context. For much of the post-Cold War period, the islands occupied a relatively marginal place in Indo-Pacific strategic thinking.

That assumption no longer holds. Chinese diplomatic engagement and infrastructure investment have expanded across Kiribati, the Solomon Islands, Papua New Guinea, Vanuatu and elsewhere.

The 2022 security agreement between China and the Solomon Islands reinforced concerns across the Indo-Pacific that economic engagement could gradually facilitate broader strategic access.

Geography explains much of the region's importance. Although Pacific Island states possess relatively small populations, they collectively control vast Exclusive Economic Zones spanning millions of square kilometers of ocean.

These maritime spaces sit astride routes linking Asia, Oceania and the Americas and increasingly form part of the wider communications a nd logistics architecture of the Indo-Pacific.

The Pacific is vital to global digital connectivity. More than 95% of international data traffic travels through submarine cables. Several major cable systems linking North America, Asia and Oceania pass through or near Pacific Island territories.

As economic activity becomes increasingly dependent on digital infrastructure, concerns about connectivity and infrastructure security now extend well beyond ports and shipping routes.

This explains the significance of the Quad's decision to support infrastructure development in Fiji. The initiative is significant for what it suggests about evolving strategic priorities across the Indo-Pacific.

By combining infrastructure support with maritime surveillance and maritime domain awareness programs, the Quad is seeking to strengthen connectivity and improve visibility across a region that is of importance to trade, communications and strategic access.

Similar considerations are increasingly shaping strategic thinking elsewhere in the Indo-Pacific. As attention shifts towards the security of critical maritime routes and the infrastructure that supports them, the importance of key chokepoints linking the Indian and Pacific Oceans has become more apparent.

This is reflected in India's Great Nicobar project. Located near the western approaches to the Malacca Strait and adjacent to the Six Degree Channel, Great Nicobar occupies a position close to one of the world's most important maritime corridors.

About 75% to 80% of China's oil imports transit the Strait of Malacca, while the wider maritime system connecting the Indian Ocean, the South China Sea and the Pacific is central to the trade and energy security of major Asian economies, including China, Japan, South Korea and India.