US Navy's Audacious Drone Swarm Bet Against China

Furthermore, Rudraksh Pathak notes in a March 2026 article for the Center for International Maritime Security (CIMSEC) that autonomous systems achieve effectiveness by exploiting cost asymmetry and defensive saturation, creating an“interceptor trap” in which defenders are forced to expend scarce, high-value missiles against low-cost targets, eventually depleting their magazines and compelling withdrawal.

He adds that such systems do not need to penetrate defenses perfectly; they only need to force defenders to use their most capable weapons against low-value targets, degrading operational tempo and endurance over time.

Together, these dynamics suggest that USV swarms are less about decisive strikes than cumulative degradation of defenses.

Drawing on tactical lessons from the Iran war, Kateryna Bondar notes in a March 2026 article for the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) that drone campaigns are effective because they generate sustained pressure at relatively low cost, allowing actors to impose economic, psychological, and operational strain while preserving higher-end missile assets.

She highlights that Iran's campaign followed a two-phase pattern-an initial large-scale saturation wave followed by a steadier, sustained tempo of strikes over several days-demonstrating how drones function as a persistent campaign tool rather than a one-off strike asset.

In a Taiwan Strait scenario, USV swarms could challenge the People's Liberation Army Navy's (PLAN) defenses and drain their operational endurance with costly attacks. Their success hinges on resilient targeting and communication but may be limited by range and layered Chinese defenses.

Yet tactical disruption alone does not guarantee operational success, as battlefield effects must be translated into coordinated force employment. At the operational level, USV swarms hinge on integration into existing naval formations and broader joint and allied frameworks.

George Galdorisi, in a February 2026 CIMSEC article, describes incorporating USVs into a hybrid fleet through man–machine teaming, where uncrewed and crewed platforms operate as a coordinated, synergistic force.

He highlights the use of large USVs as“trucks” to transport and deploy smaller USVs, unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs), and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) into contested areas.

He adds that this approach enables distributed operations while allowing crewed ships to remain out of range of adversary anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) systems, provided they are supported by robust command-and-control.

Furthermore, Thomas Clare notes in a November 2025 Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA) report that USVs have proven effective at enabling sea denial and extending operational reach, but their employment is constrained by factors such as range, control links, and the need for supporting infrastructure.

He suggests that USVs are best used as part of a broader attrition-and-distributed-operations campaign rather than as standalone solutions, highlighting both their potential and their limitations.

Considering Taiwan Strait operations, USVs would serve as forward-deployed, networked extensions of manned forces, supporting distributed, multi-domain operations from standoff ranges. Their effectiveness depends on resilient command links, ISR integration, and access to forward-positioned systems. Even so, effective employment at scale depends on more than force structure.

Beyond operational integration, their broader value lies in shaping strategic deterrence by influencing how adversaries assess risk and assess their own success.

Xidi Chen and Lun Li note in a February 2026 Frontiers in Political Science article that unmanned maritime vehicles offer advantages such as low cost, potential for mass deployment, long endurance, and the avoidance of personnel casualties, enabling states to enhance maritime situational awareness and reshape patterns of maritime competition.