'Operation Hidden Hand': Iran-Russia Military Axis Comes Into View

This growing military integration extends beyond weapons transfers. It is reinforced by Russia's space-based ISR capabilities, which-while limited-remain among the most capable available to Iran.

Michael Connell and other writers mention in a November 2023 Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) report that as of May 2022, Russia had 172 satellites in orbit, including 73 military satellites; among those military systems were 20 earth-observation satellites: 3 electro-optical, 10 signals/electronic intelligence (SIGINT/ELINT), 2 synthetic aperture radar (SAR), and 5 early-warning satellites.

Connell and others note that Russia's optical reconnaissance is particularly thin: just 2 Persona satellites and 1 EMKA satellite. According to them, Persona can image a 1,300-kilometer swath at roughly 0.5-0.3 meter resolution, while EMKA offers about 0.9 meter resolution; three EMKAs were launched, but only one remained functional.

They add that Russia also relied on low-resolution civilian Resurs and Kanopus satellites, whose revisit rates ranged from three to 15 days.

John Sheldon, in a December 2024 report for the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), says Iran uses dual-use satellite systems to strengthen military ISR, and that Russia signed space-cooperation agreements with Iran, built and launched a high-resolution Earth-observation satellite, Khayyam, for Iran, and that several others are in development.

In addition to Khayyam, Sheldon states that Iran launched its Pars-1 electro-optical Earth observation satellite from Russia's Vostochny Cosmodrome in February 2024. Notably, the co-production of Iran's Shahed-139 drones, Russia's use of Fath-360 SRBMs and space cooperation integrate the two states' military systems, potentially enabling ISR sharing.

At the operational level, these analyses support the idea that Russia-Iran ISR cooperation is real and meaningful, but specific operational claims are hard to verify. But given those limitations, Russia's ISR assistance to Iran may not be sufficient to enable the latter to hit moving targets such as aircraft carriers in real time, but could be enough to enable strikes on large, static targets such as bases and airfields, such as Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean.

Iran's attempted strike against the US Naval Support Facility Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean may offer a partial indication of how improved ISR could support Iranian strikes.

The Wall Street Journal (WSJ) reported that Iran used two intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) to attack the facility, which is situated 4,000 kilometers away from Iran. The WSJ reports that one missile failed in flight and the other was intercepted by an SM-3 missile fired from a US warship, but it is unclear whether the interception was successful.

More significant than the strike's outcome was its range, demonstrating Iran's ability to reach targets far beyond its immediate region.

Diego Garcia is a critical US military operations hub in the Indian Ocean and the Middle East, with runways capable of supporting strategic bombers and strategic airlifters and a deepwater port that can support large warships such as aircraft carriers and destroyers. Notably, the island base was used as a staging point for US air operations in the 1991 Gulf War and 2003 Invasion of Iraq.