Latest stories

China's $3 trillion stock rally is outrunning its economy

Steely brinksmanship: China's iron ore power play jolts Australia

From pariah to partner: Trump's puzzling Pakistan pivot

US officials cite NATO's 5% of GDP benchmark for defense spending as precedent. Yet this comparison ignores the vastly different geopolitical and economic realities South Korea faces. For Washington, the imperative is to cut costs and extract more from allies; for Seoul, it is a question of economic sustainability.

Another contentious issue is Washington's push for“strategic flexibility” – the right to redeploy US forces stationed in Korea to other theaters, such as Taiwan or the South China Sea. For South Koreans, this raises profound sovereignty concerns and risks entangling the nation in conflicts unrelated to its core security interests.

The possibility of being drawn into a Taiwan crisis is particularly alarming, given that China is one of South Korea's largest trading partners and holds direct leverage over North Korea. If South Korea were dragged into a military confrontation with Beijing, the peninsula could once again become the frontline of a much larger regional conflict.

The 2015 bilateral nuclear energy agreement, which bars Seoul from enriching uranium or reprocessing spent fuel, has also become a point of contention. South Korea has quietly pushed greater autonomy over its nuclear energy program, citing concerns over energy security and the pursuit of technological advancement.

Yet US resistance remains firm, even as North Korea has become a fully fledged nuclear power. Washington's unwillingness to accommodate Seoul's legitimate energy needs is perceived by many Koreans as hypocritical and patronizing – unbecoming of an equal partnership.

Trade relations between the two allies remain fraught. Washington continues to press Seoul for trade concessions, demanding greater Korean investments in the United States, expanded market access for American firms, tighter intellectual property protections and limits on South Korea's industrial subsidies.

If fully met, including a Trump demand for $350 billion worth of Korean investments in the US, could weaken Seoul's competitiveness amid structural stagnation, widening inequality and demographic decline. For many in Seoul, this pattern reinforces the perception that the alliance has become a vehicle for advancing Washington's agenda at Korea's expense.

Taken together, these pressures illustrate the narrowing policy space available to Seoul under the current alliance framework.

Turn toward autonomy

President Lee's call for greater self-reliance is significant. His announcement of an 8.2% increase in defense spending, raising the budget to 66.3 trillion won ($47.1 billion) and prioritizing AI-driven combat systems, autonomous drones and precision-guided missiles, conveys not just ambition but strategic necessity.

Lee's declaration that South Korea must“not depend on anyone else but strengthen our own power” is a clear articulation of strategic autonomy – a goal long pursued by Korean leaders but consistently constrained by reliance on American protection. By emphasizing indigenous capabilities, Seoul is positioning itself for a future in which external guarantees may no longer be dependable.

Equally consequential is Lee's push to complete the long-discussed transfer of wartime operational control (OPCON) from the US commander to a Korean-led joint command. While often portrayed in Washington as a technical matter, for South Koreans it is a profound question of sovereignty.

The symbolism of reclaiming wartime command authority – after decades of foreign control – cannot be overstated. For critics, OPCON transfer risks undermining deterrence. For supporters, it represents the maturation of the Korean state into a fully sovereign power.

The contradiction at the heart of the alliance is now starkly apparent. Both Trump and Lee speak of maintaining a“solid” alliance, yet their actions chart divergent trajectories.

Trump seeks to reduce US entanglements and shift burdens onto allies, while Lee seeks to reclaim sovereignty and avoid overdependence. Ironically, though driven by different motivations, their policies converge in practice: a gradual loosening of the alliance masked by the rhetoric of solidarity.

This dynamic raises profound questions about the future: Will the alliance evolve into a looser partnership focused on coordination rather than command?

Will South Korea's pursuit of self-reliance clash irreparably with US efforts to integrate Korean forces into its Indo-Pacific strategy against China? Or will the two nations reconcile sovereignty with solidarity, redefining the alliance for a new era?

A more unsettling possibility is that mounting stress within the alliance could eventually push South Korea to consider the unthinkable – distancing itself from Washington and, under certain conditions, moving closer to Beijing's strategic orbit.

The long goodbye?

It would be premature to declare the US–Korea alliance dead. The two nations still share vital interests, from deterring North Korea to maintaining stability in East Asia.