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The Q2/2025 report provides a stark example. While it records a post-tax profit of 2.265 trillion dong ($85.5 million), this positive figure is entirely manufactured by a single line item: an“other income” entry of 18.516 trillion dong, which Vingroup vaguely attributes to“sponsorship funds.” Without this unexplained infusion, the conglomerate's core business operations would have posted a massive loss of more than 13.9 trillion dong.

This reliance on non-business cash is a recurring theme. The only clarified major inflow came from chairman Vuong himself, who injected 23 trillion dong in the past quarter, just three months after a similar 5 trillion dong transfer. Likewise, in 2024, a personal cash injection of around 10 trillion dong from Vuong was what allowed Vingroup to report a profit.

This pattern of financial irregularities is not confined to the company's domestic operations. In July 2024, its subsidiary VinFast was rebuked by the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) for inflating revenues in a filing.

The SEC rejected the report, forcing VinFast to admit that“accounting errors” had caused it to overstate sales by $33.9 million. (See Vingroup's cash flow statement in Q2 of 2025 here .)

Foreign red flags

The red flags surrounding Vingroup's financial health are not a recent development. The warnings began as early as 2019, when the credit agency Fitch Ratings downgraded the conglomerate's outlook from“Stable” to“Negative,” citing the“cash-burning” investments in its subsidiary VinFast.

Instead of adjusting its strategy, chairman Vuong withdrew Vingroup from Fitch's rating program, effectively removing a key mechanism for monitoring its soaring debt.

As the conglomerate's debt continued to climb, the warnings have grown louder. Financial platforms like Alpha Spread now classify Vingroup as a high-risk company, while the German assessment firm Simply Wall estimates its business profits can cover only 40% of its interest expenses. Consequently, major foreign investors have begun to flee, dumping their Vingroup shares.

Recent filings with the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) reveal the severity of the current situation. Vingroup is acting as a guarantor for VinFast's $2.54 billion debt and is obligated to settle over $1.6 billion of that amount in 2025.

This debt is made even more precarious by a significant currency mismatch: 41% of the interest on Vingroup's total debt is in US dollars, while 92% of VinFast's revenue comes from the domestic market, where the Vietnamese dong continues to depreciate.

To secure these massive loans, Vuong has pledged a vast portfolio of assets, including production lines in Haiphong, the VinES battery factory in Ha Tinh, and even the under-construction EV plant in North Carolina in the United States.

VinFast debt spiral

Since its founding in 2017, VinFast has never made a profit, acting instead as a massive financial drain on its parent company. This cash burn is the primary driver of Vingroup's deteriorating financial health , which began in 2021 when the conglomerate posted its first major loss, after many years of steady profitability.

In the first half of 2025 alone, VinFast's automotive business lost over 37 trillion dong-a deficit that Vingroup's core real estate profits failed to cover. This situation is the direct result of Vuong's ambition to expand electric vehicle sales into the US and European markets.

“We regard the US as the key market, a test to measure effectiveness. [...] If we succeed in America, conquering other markets will be much easier,” Vuong stated in a May 2020 shareholders meeting.