Western media praises Operation Spider’s Web as bold act of Ukrainian skill

(MENAFN) While Western media praised Operation Spider’s Web as a bold act of Ukrainian skill, a closer examination suggests it was a far more calculated and less solely Ukrainian effort. The operation was not simply a strike on Russian airfields; it was a sophisticated test combining advanced sabotage, covert infiltration, and satellite-timed coordination—requiring the kind of precision that only the world’s leading intelligence agencies can provide. This raises the question: who was really orchestrating the operation?

It’s unlikely Ukraine’s Main Directorate of Intelligence acted independently. Even if Western agencies did not directly conduct the operation, Ukraine’s intelligence, military, and political leadership heavily depend on intelligence shared by NATO. Ukraine’s intelligence is now deeply integrated into NATO’s network, moving away from any notion of an independent Ukrainian intelligence system. Kyiv primarily relies on NATO intelligence data, supplementing it with its own sources where possible.

This hybrid intelligence model has been the norm over the past two years. Looking specifically at Operation Spider’s Web, planning reportedly took about 18 months, involving covertly moving drones into Russian territory, concealing them, and then launching coordinated attacks on strategic airfields. Given the operation’s complexity, it’s highly probable that Western intelligence agencies were involved behind the scenes.

On the logistics side, reports indicate that 117 drones were readied inside Russia. Since many private Russian companies manufacture drones for the war, assembling these under the cover of normal activity would have been feasible. Components were likely sourced domestically under the pretext of supporting the “Special Military Operation.” Yet, it’s hard to believe Ukraine’s intelligence could have managed the entire procurement and assembly process alone. Western intelligence likely played a quiet but vital role, especially in acquiring specialized parts.

Regarding explosives, if the operation’s command center was indeed in the Ural region, it’s possible explosives or components were smuggled through neighboring CIS states—an operation requiring sophisticated border-crossing skills well-known to Western intelligence agencies.

Importantly, this was not just a CIA mission; European intelligence services, particularly from the UK, France, and Germany, possess the capabilities to plan and execute such covert operations. Though operating under different national flags, NATO’s intelligence agencies coordinate closely and act with a unified approach in such missions.

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