UK's Strategic Defense Posture Still Includes East Of Suez Roles

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The rise of China in this region, and the shift of political, military, and economic weight from Europe to Asia has cemented this shift. Colby's ratification as undersecretary of defense for policy has also added an explicit message to the Europeans: The dribbling of small amounts of assets to the Indo-Pacific is unnecessary; the United States would infinitely prefer that European powers – France, Germany and the UK – focus on the Euro-Atlantic and deal with Russia.

The SDR wisely accommodates this resource imperative, while still providing a place for UK interests and support to the US and its allies in the region. If one looks at the number of times“Indo-Pacific” is mentioned in the document (17), it is notable that this is down from a high of 32 mentions in the 2021 Integrated Review.

Still, it is still better than the Strategic Defence Review of 1998 or the 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review , documents which mentioned“Asia” five times and two times respectively. The 2025 SDR states that NATO-first does not mean NATO-only, putting the list of priorities as Euro-Atlantic, Middle East, and Indo-Pacific in that order.

It states that“the Indo-Pacific is strategically important to the UK as a global economic and political powerhouse and arena of increasing geopolitical tension.” It notes the strong partnerships the UK has in the region – ASEAN, Australia, Brunei, Japan, India, Indonesia, Nepal, New Zealand and Pakistan come in for special mention – and, of course, China.

The SDR's position on China is probably closest to that of the UK Ministry of Defence and –sadly – does not reflect broader opinion across government in Whitehall. China is a“sophisticated and persistent threat,” which behaves aggressively in the South China Sea and has escalated tensions in the Taiwan Strait.

It notes the fact that China has supported Russia in its invasion of Ukraine and that the US-China relationship will be a“key factor” in global security. It also notes the threats provided by Beijing's military build-up, nuclear modernization and technological and cyber capabilities and recommends the maintenance of UK-China military-to-military communications.

Given that US-China mil-to-mil relations are extremely limited now and constantly under pressure from China over US arms sales to Taiwan, this might prove a helpful channel in time. Notably, it recognizes that most of the UK's adversaries will likely field Chinese technology – an important observation in its own right.

The SDR's integrated approach toward the Indo-Pacific region is consistent with the US Indo-Pacific Strategy, and consistent with the overall security interests of its closest partners, Japan and Australia, which are rapidly becoming the more important partners of choice across a number of different metrics.

First, both are key partners in intelligence-sharing, both work closely with the United States to demonstrate deterrent capability in military exercises in the region and both are defense industrial partners of choice.

With Japan, the UK is developing the Meteor, a joint new air-to-air missile (JNAAM) and the Global Combat Air Programme (with Italy), though this latter effort is under pressure.

With Australia, there is even more by way of“production deterrence” in the form of the AUKUS submarine and technology programs. The rotation of UK Astute-class submarines to HMAS Stiling, in Australia, planned as early as 2027 will be an immense boon to deterrence and warfighting capability.