(MENAFN- AzerNews)
Akbar Novruz
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The geopolitical chessboard of the South Caucasus is being
reshaped as Armenia boldly shifts its orientation toward the West.
January has witnessed a flurry of strategic moves: Yerevan approved
a bill initiating its bid to join the European Union and inked a
Charter of Strategic Partnership with the United States in
Washington. While these developments signal Armenia's deepening
ties with Western powers, they have not gone unnoticed in Moscow.
The Kremlin has issued stark warnings about the regional
consequences of Armenia's aspirations, questioning whether
Yerevan's balancing act between Russia and the West can endure.
Moscow has been quick to remind Armenia of the precariousness of
its choices. Officials have cautioned Yerevan about the potential
incompatibility of EU membership with its commitments to the
Russia-led Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU). Furthermore, Moscow's
rhetoric suggests a looming threat of destabilization in the region
if Armenia proceeds with its Western pivot. By signaling that
Armenia's coveted“Western security umbrella” might not offer the
protection Yerevan envisions, Russia is clearly staking its claim
in the unfolding geopolitical tug-of-war.
Despite expressing discontent, Moscow has refrained from
unleashing heavy-handed tactics against Armenia. Russia's approach
appears calculated, leveraging Armenia's economic dependency rather
than resorting to overt coercion. The benefits of EAEU membership,
including access to the Russian market and the inflow of
remittances from Russian-based Armenian workers (amounting to 5% of
Armenia's GDP), remain key levers for Moscow.
But in reality how much does this economic
dependency shine in numbers?
From 2021 to 2023, Armenia's trade turnover with Russia surged
2.6 times, reaching $7.4 billion. Imports from Russia doubled
during this period, while exports quadrupled. This sharp rise is
unprecedented in the region and reflects Armenia's growing economic
dependency on Russia. In fact, by 2023, 5% of Armenia's GDP was
derived from remittances from Russia. The upward trajectory
continued into 2024. During this period, imports from Russia
doubled, while exports to Russia quadrupled. This growth trend
continued into 2024, where, in the first five months, Armenia's
trade turnover with Russia was $190 million higher than the total
for 2023. In just the first five months of the year, Armenia's
trade turnover with Russia surpassed the total trade for 2023.
Unlike previous years, where export growth dominated, import growth
played a key role in the 2024 increase. This suggests a deeper
economic entanglement with Russia, despite Western narratives
portraying Armenia as distancing itself from Moscow.
Notably, the sharp increase in the volume of imports played a
crucial role in this growth in 2024. Specifically, imports soared
by five times compared to the same period in the previous year,
while exports saw a decline of 20.5%. This is a stark contrast to
the previous years, where rapid growth in export volumes to Russia
was the norm.[FOR STATS ]. Changes in trade dynamics have also impacted Russia's
share in Armenia's foreign trade . Russia's share of Armenian
exports climbed from 28% to 45% in 2022, then fell to 40% in 2023
and 17% in the first five months of 2024. Meanwhile, Russia's share
of Armenian imports decreased from 37.3% to 32.5% over the
2021-2023 period, but saw a dramatic rise to 69% in early 2024.
However, a notable shift occurred in 2024. While Armenia's
exports to Russia began to decline, imports saw a significant
increase. This shift might suggest a reduced role in re-exporting,
but this interpretation oversimplifies Armenia's ongoing engagement
in trade. In fact, Armenia has resumed participation in exporting
products from Russia to third countries, particularly evident in
the diamond trade. In 2023, Armenia imported approximately 3.5
million carats of diamonds, 48% of which originated from Russia. A
staggering 96.2% of the diamonds exported by Armenia were
re-exported, predominantly to the UAE and Russia.
Russian officials had also once sharpened their criticism of
Armenia's strategic partnership with the U.S. Viktor Sobolev, a
member of Russia's State Duma Defense Committee, has openly
speculated about the risk of NATO bases being stationed in Armenia.
“Undoubtedly, this threatens Russia's interests,” he remarked,
adding that such developments would force Moscow to bolster its
defenses in the South Caucasus.
Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov echoed these concerns,
warning that deeper U.S.-Armenian ties might compel Yerevan to
adopt Western-imposed sanctions against Russia. Lavrov drew
parallels to U.S. pressures on Serbia, suggesting that Armenia
could face similar ultimatums in its bid to align with the
West.
Lessons from Georgia and the Ukrainian
precedent
History offers Armenia sobering lessons about the challenges of
navigating alliances with the West. Georgia's experience with the
U.S.-Georgia Strategic Partnership Agreement of 2009 highlights the
risks of relying on Western commitments. The agreement once touted
as a cornerstone of Georgia's EU aspirations, saw its
implementation falter in 2024 when Georgia froze its EU accession
process. Similarly, Ukraine's 2021 strategic pact with the U.S.
failed to deter Russian aggression, underscoring the limits of
Western support in high-stakes conflicts.
Armenia must tread carefully. While Yerevan's pivot to the West
aligns with its current leadership's goals, it risks alienating
longstanding partners. For all its rhetoric about moving away from
Russian influence, Armenia remains deeply intertwined with Moscow
economically. Trade between Armenia and Russia has surged
dramatically in recent years, with Armenian exports to Russia
quadrupling between 2021 and 2023.
The West faces a dilemma in its approach to Armenia. While
supporting Yerevan's aspirations may seem strategically
advantageous, overplaying its hand could exacerbate regional
tensions and deepen Armenia's isolation. Armenia's growing reliance
on Russia-despite its Western pivot-raises questions about the
sincerity of its intentions.
The case of Georgia looms large. Should the West pressure
Georgia too heavily, it may drive Tbilisi closer to Moscow, leaving
Armenia more isolated than ever. Additionally, Donald Trump's
administration, known for its pragmatic approach to foreign policy,
may deprioritize Armenia altogether. The absence of an invitation
for Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan to Trump's recent inauguration
is a subtle yet telling indicator of Armenia's limited strategic
value in Washington's eyes.
Armenia's balancing act is nearing its breaking point. By
pursuing closer ties with the West while benefiting economically
from Russia, Yerevan risks alienating both sides. While the U.S.
and EU may offer political and financial incentives, these come
with strings attached, including potential sanctions on Russia-an
unpalatable prospect for many in Armenia's leadership.
Simultaneously, Russia's tolerance for Armenia's dual alignment
may be wearing thin. The Kremlin has refrained from escalating
tensions, but its warnings grow louder with each Western overture
from Yerevan. Should Armenia's pivot to the West continue, Moscow
may feel compelled to act, potentially reshaping the fragile
stability of the South Caucasus.
Will Armenia succeed in its ambitious Western pivot, or will the
weight of its economic and geopolitical ties to Russia prove too
great?
Most likely, Pashinyan's multi-vector policy between the West
and Russia indicates that he is more hopeful about the outcome of
Russia's war against Ukraine and Europe. It is likely that whether
Russia will finally raise the white flag will reveal its intention
to become a complete vassal of the West. But still, cautious,
Pashinyan is in no hurry to burn bridges with Russia just yet.
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