What France Loses By Closing Its Military Bases In Africa

(MENAFN- The Conversation) Senegalese president Bassirou Diomaye Faye announced on 31 December 2024 that all foreign military bases in his country would close by 2025. On the same day, the Ivorian president said France would hand over control of the Abidjan military base to his country's army.

These announcements followed the planned withdrawal of French forces from Chad , Burkina Faso , Mali and Niger . Researcher Thierry Vircoulon discusses the potential implications of these decisions for France.

France's military presence in French-speaking Africa has evolved in strategic importance over the past 65 years. Over time, the significance of this presence has diminished. By the end of the 20th century, some French military bases had been closed and the number of pre-positioned troops had reduced from 20,000 in 1970 to 6,000 in 2022 .

Military bases have been a strategic asset for France, initially securing newly independent and fragile regimes in the aftermath of independence. They also played a key role in conducting external operations . These bases served as logistical hubs that enabled French military interventions and the evacuation of French nationals during crises.

For instance, Operation Sagittarius , which evacuated European nationals from Sudan at the start of the war in April 2023, relied on the resources of the French base in Djibouti.

Without these logistical points, projecting military strength becomes much more challenging and, in some cases, impossible. The closure of these military bases implies the end of major French military interventions, such as Operation Licorne (2002-2015) or Barkhane (2014-2022).

In recent years, the cost-benefit analysis of these bases has been questioned in Paris. They have become a political and strategic issue. On one hand, these bases symbolise the old post-independence security pact between Paris and the leaders of some countries, making them appear as a legacy of neocolonialism.

On the other hand, from a strategic point of view, having a pre-positioned military presence in Africa serves little purpose when the main threats to France come from elsewhere (for instance, eastern Europe and the Middle East). As a result, the strategic value of France's military bases in Africa has diminished in recent years.

The closure of the bases would signal the end of France's capacity to intervene – whether justified or not – in certain conflicts across Africa.

This would weaken its influence in the region, particularly as conflicts intensify across the continent, with more and more African countries seeking security providers . Addressing, stabilising or resolving these conflicts requires a combination of diplomacy and military intervention.

It's important to distinguish between countries that have chosen to sever military cooperation agreements with Paris (such as Chad and Senegal) and those that have simply closed military bases but maintained the military cooperation (like Ivory Coast).

The announcement of base closures by African leaders, rather than by Paris, symbolises a rejection of French policy. This marks a significant loss of influence for France in the countries involved.

As part of the informal division of security responsibilities among western nations, France has long been considered the“gendarme of Africa”.

Between 1964 and 2014, France conducted no fewer than 52 military operations across the continent. At the start of the 21st century, it played the role of lead nation in European military interventions in Africa. Other western powers recognised France's expertise in managing African crises. In most cases, they either supported or simply followed its policies.

This was reflected in France's diplomatic responsibilities within the European Union and at the United Nations. French diplomacy is well represented in the Africa division of the European External Action Service . The French delegation is tasked with drafting UN security council resolutions on Africa. The peacekeeping department at the UN is led by a French diplomat.

The end of France's military interventionism will have diplomatic repercussions beyond Africa. They are already being felt in Brussels, Washington and New York.

In Niger, the United States did not follow France's hard line stance after the coup that ousted President Mohamed Bazoum in 2023. Instead it attempted to engage with the junta. This effort ultimately failed.

In Chad, while Paris was complacent towards the dynastic succession from Idriss Déby to his son, Berlin took a critical stance. This led to a diplomatic crisis and the expulsion of ambassadors from Chad and Germany in 2023. In Italy, prime minister Giorgia Meloni publicly criticised French policy in Africa, causing tensions between Paris and Rome.

In 2023, Africa accounted for only 1.9% of France's foreign trade , 15% of its supply of strategic minerals, and 11.6% of its oil and gas supply.

France's top two trading partners in sub-Saharan Africa are Nigeria and South Africa – former British colonies which have never hosted a French military base.

Since the beginning of the century, relations between France and African countries have been marked by a clear separation between economic and military interests. France not only has diminishing economic interests in Africa, but these are concentrated in countries that do not host French military bases.

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